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Abstract
This Article intervenes in the self-execution debate by revisiting the early American understandings of treaty implementation in the decades before Foster. I first assess the significant materials from the founding era, some of which have never before been discussed in this context. I also
critique the interpretations of other commentators who have been too quick to find support for a
broad notion of self-execution in the historical materials. Although I conclude the founding generation generally assumed treaties would be law without congressional intervention, I emphasize that
the ordinary story of consensus on these issues is inaccurate. Second, I analyze post-ratification
controversies over these issues. The period between ratification and Foster saw sharp dispute about
the scope of the treaty power and Supremacy Clause, particularly on issues the framers and ratifiers
left unresolved. Contemporary accounts often ignore or minimize the importance of this period,
which is unfortunate, because it complicates the history of treaty implementation in important
ways. Third, this Article recovers an important aspect of the debate that contemporary scholars
downplay: the role of Congress. Congress–and not the framers, ratifiers, or Supreme Court–most
fully considered the problems of treaty implementation in this period.

CONGRESS, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES
John T. Parry*
I. INTRODUCTION
The President has power to make treaties with the advice
and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.' Once made, the
Supremacy Clause declares treaties "the supreme law of the
land." 2 One might therefore assume treaties have the same status in the U.S. legal system as federal statutes; once adopted,
they operate as law for all relevant purposes. One scholar has
even argued that "it is difficult to imagine that something shall
be supreme federal 'law of the land' but not operate directly as
'law' except by believing in one of the most transparent of judi3
cial delusions."
But the treaty power and Supremacy Clause are deceptively
clear. The Constitution also vests Congress with the power to
legislate in specific areas, such as the authority "to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises," and "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations."4 Congress's Article I powers risk colliding
with the Article II powers of the President and Senate. What
happens when a treaty purports to control a matter within the
legislative jurisdiction of Congress? What if the treaty conflicts
with an existing statute, or if a subsequent statute conflicts with
an existing treaty?
In 1829, the Supreme Court gave a partial answer to these
questions when it announced in Foster v. Neilson that treaties fall
into two categories for judicial purposes:
* Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I am grateful for the comments,
thoughts, and assistance of Curtis Bradley, Jacob Katz Cogan, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher,
Calvin Johnson, Martin Lederman, Jules Lobel, Pauline Maier, Michael Ramsey, Andrew Shankman, David Sloss, and Seth Barrett Tillman, as well as participants in the
2008 International Law in Domestic Courts Workshop at Temple Law School. Lynn
Williams at Lewis & Clark's Boley Law Library provided invaluable assistance with hardto-find materials.
2.
1. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl.
2. Id., art. VI, cl. 2.

3.
2003).
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4. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
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Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It
is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.5

This doctrinal statement means some treaty provisions go
into effect as judicially enforceable law without implementing
legislation, while other provisions require legislation. Further,
some treaties may not be law for judicial purposes, but they may
grant power directly to the executive branch without legislative
intervention. That is to say, all treaties may be the supreme law
of the land for the purpose of creating international legal obligations, but the precise domestic legal effect and status of their
provisions-including their impact on existing law-is anything
but uniform.6

In recent years, scholars have clashed over the best interpretation of Foster, including whether there should be a presumption for or against treaties having the status of judicially enforceable law-that is, as being self-executing.7 Although the weight
5. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
6. For general discussions, see Paul B. Stephan, III, Open Doors, 13 LEwis & CLARK
L. REv. 11 (2009); Carlos Manuel Vzquez, The FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
7. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: HistoricalScholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999);
Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1479 (2006); Caleb
Nelson, The Treaty Powerand Self-Execution: A Comment on Professor Woolhandler's Article, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 801 (2002); PAUST, supra note 3; David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties:
Exposing a ConstitutionalFallacy, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1 (2002); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082 (1992) [hereinafter Vzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies]; Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Laughingat Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties]; Carlos
Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and theJudicialEnforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REv. 599 (2008) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the
Land]; Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public Law Litigation Model, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 757 (2002); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-SelfExecution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter
Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution];John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and StructuralDefense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking]. A related debate concerns the interaction of
the treaty power and federalism. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and Ameri-
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of scholarly assertion tends toward a presumption of self-execution as a matter of historical accuracy and normative desirability,
the Supreme Court rejected this view last Term in Medellin v.
Texas8 and came very close to establishing a presumption against
self-execution. 9 The Court declared a treaty is "of course, 'primarily a compact between independent nations"' and "ordinarily 'depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.' ,10
"Only '[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, [will]
they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment."' 11 The
text of the treaty is crucial. Courts must ask "whether a treaty's
terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it
and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic
effect."' 2 In short, for the Medellin Court, treaties are a matter of
international politics. Sometimes they also have a status similar
to legislation, but only if the language of the treaty supports such
an interpretation."
This Article intervenes in the self-execution debate by revisiting the early American understandings of treaty implementation in the decades before Foster. I first assess the significant
materials from the founding era, some of which have never
before been discussed in this context. I also critique the interpretations of other commentators who have been too quick to
find support for a broad notion of self-execution in the historical
materials. Although I conclude the founding generation generally assumed treaties would be law without congressional intervention, I emphasize that the ordinary story of consensus on
can Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the
Nation: The HistoricalFoundationsof the Nationalist Conceptionof the Treaty Power, 98 MICH.
L. REv. 1075 (2000).
8. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
9. Id. at 1357.
10. Id. (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
11. Id. (quoting Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
12. Id. at 1366.
13. The Court also said in a footnote that even when a treaty is self-executing, "the
background presumption is that '[i] nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private
cause of action in domestic courts.'" Id. at 1357 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1986)). For some of
the implications of this statement, see John T. Parry, A Primer on Treaties and § 1983 after
Medellin v. Texas, 13 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 35 (2009).
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these issues is inaccurate. On the issue of treaties and federalism, there was general agreement that the Supremacy Clause
made treaties directly enforceable notwithstanding state law, including in judicial proceedings. The same was not true for separation of powers issues, however. The debates and discussions
reveal not only a lack of consensus but also considerable confusion about how the treaty power, legislative powers, and
14
Supremacy Clause would interact under the new Constitution.
Second, I analyze post-ratification controversies over these
issues. The period between ratification and Foster saw sharp dispute about the scope of the treaty power and Supremacy Clause,
particularly on issues the framers and ratifiers left unresolved.
Contemporary accounts often ignore or minimize the importance of this period, which is unfortunate, because it complicates
the history of treaty implementation in important ways. 5 Conflicts arose about neutrality, the extent of congressional discretion over appropriating funds to carry the Jay Treaty into effect,
the extradition ofJonathan Robbins by the President and judiciary pursuant to the same treaty but without legislation, and the
implementation of the 1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain. These controversies spurred arguments about nearly all aspects of treaty implementation at the federal level-not simply
the issue ofjudicial enforcement. Indeed, to the extent the term
"self-execution" has any relevance to these debates, it is less
about judicial enforcement and more about the ability of treaties, first, to displace legislative power by creating legal rules or
overriding existing federal statutes and, second, to grant power
directly to the President.
Third, this Article recovers an important aspect of the debate that contemporary scholars downplay: the role of Congress.
Congress-and not the framers, ratifiers, or Supreme Courtmost fully considered the problems of treaty implementation in
14. Cf Jack N. Rakove, Solving a ConstitutionalPuzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a
Case Study, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. (N.S.) 233, 236 (1984) ("[I]n 1787 .. .the conduct of
foreign relations was regarded as a problem more of federalism than of the separation

of powers.").
15. For a counter-example, see, e.g., David Sloss, JudicialForeignPolicy: Lessons from
the 1790s, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 2009). Other articles consider post-ratification events but do not focus on self-execution. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 7; Golove,
supra note 7; Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties
and FederalStatutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005);Jules Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower:
Conflicts between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071 (1985).
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this period. Extensive debates helped establish boundaries, crystallize issues, and clear the ground for the Court's subsequent
decision in Fosterand its adoption of the last-in-time rule for conflicts between treaties and federal statutes. 16 Congress, in other
words, played an important part in resolving ambiguity and developing17 constitutional doctrine-a role that went beyond "dialogue."'

This expanded historical focus assists the unresolved debate
over the law of treaty implementation. Originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation have gained ground in recent years,
but most scholars of constitutional law do not think the founding era provides the sole touchstone for constitutional meaning.' 8 Particularly for separation of powers doctrine, post-ratification historical practice is important.' 9 Moreover, the ambiguities of founding era history in this area mean that original
understandings provide little traction for resolving many issues;
other historical sources necessarily gain in stature.20
Taken as a whole the historical materials tell a story of doctrinal development in response to changing circumstances and
intense debate. Even for those who would look only to history,
however, these materials mandate few solutions to issues of
16. For articles that recognize the historical link between self-execution and the
last-in-time rule, see Ku, supra note 15, at 334-35; Lobel, supra note 15, at 1098 n.138;
see generally Kesavan, supra note 7.
17. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and

FederalJurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1990). To the extent treaties intersect with the
scope of federal court jurisdiction-as with the Robbins extradition-my reference to
theories of dialogue is more than suggestive.
18. For an overview of interpretive methods, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189

(1987). For the resurgence of originalism in various hues, see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1120244. For exploration of the intersections between originalism and
the law of foreign affairs, see, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalismfor Foreign Affairs?, 53
ST. Louis U. LJ. (forthcoming 2009).

19. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
20. -Thus, I strongly disagree with claims that post-ratification history is less important in this area. See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1593; Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution,

supra note 7, at 2074. Whether the goal is to understand how the Foster doctrine and
last-in-time rule developed, or merely to support a theory about the "best" rule of constitutional law, the later history is critical. Cf Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality
Controversy, in PRESIDEN-rIAL POWER STORIEs 21, 22 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis
A. Bradley eds., 2009) ("History, especially an early constitutional struggle, may cast
light on possible 'original' understandings of the Constitution..
").
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treaty implementation. Instead, they create a framework of ideas
and arguments within which the discussion of these issues takes
place. Thus, I depart from nearly every other commentator and
insist that the result of historical inquiry in this context is less a
conclusion for or against a presumption and more a conversation about constitutional law and politics.
Nor is there any reason to believe the conversation is over.
Attention to history reveals the persistence of certain ideas and
possible answers, suggests the dismissal of others, and indicates
areas in which new ideas or understandings might find room to
grow. This perspective also provides a way of understanding Medellin as simply the latest doctrinal contribution to an argument
that is necessarily ongoing and unresolved. In the Conclusion, I
suggest the implications of this approach for assessing contemporary treaty implementation doctrines in general, and Medellin
in particular.
II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
This Part provides a critical account of the framing and ratification debate over the implementation of treaties. In brief,
Federalists initially assumed that treaties automatically would operate as ordinary law under the new Constitution. This understanding was vague, however, at the separation of powers level
because it derived from the federalism problem of treaty enforcement under the Articles of Confederation. 21 Further, many
Antifederalists objected to the treaty power and the apparent status of treaties under the Supremacy Clause.22 In response, many
Federalists softened their position. The founding commitment
to what we now call self-execution thus was not as solid as many
commentators have suggested, and it had separation of powers
weaknesses.2 3 Practice and experience would be necessary to
gain a more durable interpretation of the new Constitution.

21. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2128; Kesavan, supra note 7 at 1542-48; Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2041-43, 2045, 2048-49.
22. See Kesavan, supra note 7 at 1542-48; see generally Flaherty, supra note 7.
23. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2123-28; Kesavan, supra note 7 at 1542-48; Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2041-43, 2045, 2048-49.
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A. The Relevance of British Thought and Practice
John Yoo begins his historical argument against self-execution with an account of British thought and practice .2 4 He highlights the concerns of seventeenth and eighteenth century British writers-such as Locke and members of the country opposition to the Walpole government-about concentrations of
executive power and resulting corruption, as well as the dangers
created by standing armies. 25 Few doubt these writers heavily influenced the revolutionary generation. 26 Moreover, Yoo is correct that the writers of the country opposition focused heavily on
the dangers to individual liberty created by the corruption that
they associated with strong executive power.2 7
The harder questions are how much the country influence
continued in the United States through the framing and ratification of the Constitution and, more precisely, whether these ideas
had much impact on the treaty power. Martin Flaherty argues
these concerns applied against the monarchy and did not easily
translate into the context of democratic government and debates about the power of a democratically accountable president.28 His claim about the difficulties of translation is sound,
but other writers have shown that the ideas and rhetoric of the
country opposition helped shape American politics into the
1790s. 29 Traces of this rhetoric also resonated through the ratification debates and the fight over the Jay Treaty and extended
24. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7.
25. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 1990-94.
26. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22-54 (1992); PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION 27-48 (1972);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 14-17
(1969); see also JoYcE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 140-87 (1992) (articulating theory of revolutionary ideas that makes more room
for economic and social context and thought); Rakove, supra note 14, at 267 (cautioning against reliance on "the venerable authority of Locke, Montesquieu, Blackstone, or
other writers" to determine what early Americans thought, especially on separation of

powers).
27. See BAILYN, supra note 26, at 46-51; MAIER, supra note 26, at 42-45; WOOD, supra
note 26, at 18-36.
28. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2105-08; Cf WOOD,supra note 26, at 561-64 (some
Federalists denied any continuity between British and American constitutionalism).
29. See BAILYN, supra note 26, at 323; SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 79 (1999); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 18-25 (1993).
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through the debate over the 1815 commercial treaty.3 °
With respect to British practice, Carlos Vdzquez and Yoo,
and to some extent Vasan Kesavan, argue that by the revolutionary era, Parliamentary action was necessary for a treaty to go into
effect in Great Britain, although they draw different conclusions
3
about what that means for the constitutional rule in the U.S. 1
Flaherty, by contrast, argues a presumption existed for self-execution, although he admits British practice was evolving towards
non-self-execution. 32 Flaherty and Yoo agree that Parliament
had substantial impact on the implementation of treaties because of its appropriations power, that Parliament was sometimes consulted about treaties, and that the framers and ratifiers
knew about this practice. 3
Ultimately, as Vdzquez notes, if the goal of this debate is to
determine the original meaning or understanding of the treaty
and Supremacy Clauses, then actual British practice is less important than what participants in U.S. constitutional debates believed it to be.3 4 But British practice did not provide a clear
baseline against which to measure the changes wrought by the
Constitution. The available materials make clear that participants in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution were
uncertain about British practice, even as they continued to refer
to it-sometimes as a model, sometimes as a caution-during
the founding period and, later, in Congress. 5

30. See Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 7, at 614-18 (discussing the

relevance of British thought and practice to the Supremacy Clause).
31. See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1516-29; Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra

note 7, at 1997-2004; Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 7, at 614-18; Vtzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 7, at 2158 & n.14.

32. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2109-12 & n.81.
33. See id. at 2110; Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2003-04.
34. See Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 7, at 618; Vizquez, Laughing

at Treaties, supra note 7, at 2158 n.14; cf Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611
(1990) (plurality opinion) (suggesting original understanding of legal rule is more important for determining its consistency with 14th Amendment due process than actual
content of the rule).
35. Vdzquez explains how an understanding that treaties were not self-executing in
Britain need not support a similar presumption for the United States: for some Federalists, one goal of the Supremacy Clause may have been to adopt a new rule. In light of
the fact that many participants expressed no opinion on the issue, his assertion that the
majority understood British practice to require parliamentary approval is less convincing. See Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies, supra note 7, at 1110-14.
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B. Revolution and Confederation
Noting that revolutionary thought focused on establishing
democratic self-rule, which meant governments should be structured to give primacy to the legislature, Yoo asserts that a presumption of treaty self-execution is inconsistent with these
ideas.3 6 As Flaherty observes, however, the grievances that
fanned revolution did not involve treaties or foreign affairs; revolutionary concerns about self-rule were directed more often at
the tyranny of Parliament over colonists and their legislatures.3 7
Yoo's effort to derive a rule about self-executing treaties
from concerns about self-rule thus outreaches the scope of its
premise. Still, his assertion deserves more attention than it receives from Flaherty."8 Under the Articles of Confederation,
Congress had the "sole and exclusive right and power" of enter36. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2005-09.
37. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2115-16.
38. Flaherty focuses on Yoo's description of the Articles of Confederation Congress as an executive entity in order to counter Yoo's theory about when modern notions of separation of powers developed. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2013; see al/sJACK
N.

RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE

383-87, 394 (1979) (arguing separation of powers ideas remained fluid and rudimentary into 1787, especially at national level); WooD, supra note
26, at 449, 549 (arguing separation of powers became important only after 1776). Yoo
suggests separation of powers theories flourished earlier, see Yoo, Treaties and Public
Lawmaking, supra note 7, at 2231, but his sources are consistent with the claim that
separation of powers thinking broadened and deepened under the Articles of Confederation. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLCONTINENTAL CONGRESS

OGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY

ERA 264-73 (Rita

Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 2001) (tracing changes in separation of powers thinking culminating with Madison); MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY
109-30 (1997) (providing general endorsement of Wood's views but suggesting early
separation of powers thinking also included significant constraints on legislatures); FORREST McDONALD,

Novus ORDO

SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTI-

80-87, 160 (1985) (suggesting early state constitutions recognized separation of
powers but still gave bulk of power to legislatures). Importantly, Adams and Kruman
focus on the thinking of those who adopted state constitutions, not the practices of
state legislatures that often undermined constitutional ideals. See, e.g., MARC W.
KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY 36 (1997) (making this distinction and admitting legislatures sometimes violated state constitutions). Moreover, the brief attention paid by Adams and Kruman to the role of the judiciary and the near total absence
TUTION

ofjudicial review in their discussions, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:

REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE

264-69 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 2001) (discussing
judiciary and noting general absence of judicial review); MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY 122-23 (1997) (mentioning efforts to make judiciary more independent). These sources implicitly undermine Yoo's claim that separation of powers
thinking was fully developed in the revolutionary period. For further analysis, see also
REVOLUTIONARY ERA
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ing into treaties (with the consent of nine states) .3 At the same
time, Congress lacked any power not "expressly delegated" and
was barred from using commercial treaties to restrain "the legislative power of the respective states" over imposts, duties, or
prohibitions on imports and exports.4" Subject to this limitation, Congress arguably possessed the power to use treaties to
restrict or override state legislative power on other issues.4 1 For
example, Charles Thomson, the Secretary of Congress, declared
the states were bound by treaties, had no right to interfere with
them, and were required to remove all obstacles to their enforcement.12 George Mason expressed similar views in a letter to Patrick Henry.4 3
Text notwithstanding, Congress could not compel the states
to implement treaties and could not implement them itself, in
part because it depended on the states for revenue.4 4 Indeed,
Thomson's and Mason's assertions came in the face of state legislation that hindered the efforts of British creditors to vindicate
their rights under the Treaty of Paris.4 5 A "Grand Committee" of
Congress proposed several amendments to the Articles in August
1786, including the creation of "a federal Judicial Court," the
jurisdiction of which would include appeals from state courts "in
all Causes wherein questions Shall arise on the meaning and
construction of Treaties entered into by the United States with
any foreign power, or on the Law of Nations." 46 Congress never
debated these amendments, in part because of the controversy
over the proposed treaty with Spain, which would have limited
John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, IndependentJudges, DependentJudiciary: InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 967 n.27 (2002).
39. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX.
40. See id. arts. II, IX.
41. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 32-34
(2d ed. 1916) (making this argument); RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 343-45, 384-85 (noting
the argument and related claims).
42. See id. at 344.
43. Id.
44. See CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 34; RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORCING OF THE
UNION, 1781-1789, at 364 n.5 (1987); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1996).
45. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Br., art. IV, 8 Stat. 80, 82.
For the problems with treaty enforcement and related issues under the Articles, see
RAKOvE, supra note 44, at 27; Golove, supra note 7, at 1104-32.
46. Amendments to the Articles of Confederation Proposed by a Grand Committee of Congress (Aug. 7, 1786), reprinted in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 163, 167 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
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access to the Mississippi River.4 7
John Jay, who as Secretary for Foreign Affairs endured British complaints about state noncompliance and the outrage of
Southerners over his negotiations with Spain, reported to Congress in October 1786 on his view of the appropriate status of
treaties under the Articles. "When therefore a treaty is made,
ratified and published by Congress," he insisted, "it immediately
becomes binding on the whole nation, and super-added to the
laws of the land, without the intervention, consent or fiat of State
legislatures." 48

As had the Grand Committee, Jay sought to

transform contentious political debates about treaties into judicial issues. Doubts over the meaning of a treaty, he wrote, "like
all doubts respecting the meaning of a law, are in the first instance mere judicial questions; and are to be heard and decided
in the Courts ofJustice having cognizance of the causes in which
they arise"-a view seconded by Alexander Hamilton.4 9 Jay also
pressed Congress to assert its rights by resolving that, "on being
constitutionally made, ratified and published, [treaties] become,
in virtue of the confederation, part of the laws of the land, and
are not only independent of the will and power of [state] legislatures, but also binding and obligatory on them."5 °
Two months before the Constitutional Convention ("Constitutional Convention" or "Convention"), Congress unanimously
adopted Jay's resolutions and declared treaties "the law of the
land" and "binding and obligatory" on state legislatures-although it followed that declaration with a recommendation that

47. See id. at 164. For the importance of this controversy, see LANCE BANNING, THE
SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY 66-71 (1995); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties'End: The Past, Present,
and Future of InternationalLawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE LJ. 1236, 1281-86
(2008); Rakove, supra note 14, at 272-75.
48. See generally Report ofJohn Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Congress (Oct.
13, 1786), reprinted in 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 781, 798 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1934) [hereinafter Report of John Jay].
49. Id. at 798-99. Alexander Hamilton attempted in Rutgers v. Waddington to establish that treaties trump conflicting state laws, but the court decided the case on a narrower ground. Even so, the New York assembly censured the court, and Mayor James
Duane faced threats of removal from office. SeeJuLIus GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 13237 (1971); DAmIELJ. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEw YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 194-201 (2005);
MORRIS, supra note 44, at 126-27.
50. See Report of John Jay, supra note 48, at 870.
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the states repeal "improper" obstructive laws." Congress also approved a letter to be sent to each state along with the resolutions. The letter proclaimed that a ratified treaty is "binding on
the whole nation and superadded to the laws of the land, without the intervention of state legislatures," and it insisted that
questions of treaty interpretation "[i]n cases between individuals" were for the courts.52
At least six states acted to repeal legislation in conflict with
the treaty, although the extent to which state officials accepted
the legal assertions in the resolutions and letter is not clear, and
actual recovery of debts remained difficult.5" Scholars disagree
on whether this incident proves or disproves self-execution and
the supremacy of treaties under the Articles. 4 For his part, writing five years later, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson declared,
"It resulted from the instrument of Confederation among the
States, that treaties made by Congress, according to the confederation, were superior to the laws of the States." 5 Congress's
resolutions and the states' acts of repeal, he suggested, merely
demonstrated the truth of the principle.5 6 Four years after that,
Justice James Iredell reached a different conclusion: Congress's
request for repeal of inconsistent state laws was an admission
57
that state action was necessary.
51. See Resolutions of March 21, 1787, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 124-25 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).
52. See Letter to the States to Accompany the Resolutions Passed the 21st Day of
March 1787 (Apr. 13, 1787), reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
177-79.
53. See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
1411 n.l (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993); see also CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 36-42;
MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 169, 281 (1950); MORRIS, supra note 44, at 201-02.
54. Compare Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2019-20 (arguing
that it proved non-self-execution), with EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACV.
TREATY POWER VS. STATE POWER 27-28 (1913) (arguing that it proved supremacy of treaties), and CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 42 (arguing that it established self-execution). See
MOIS, supra note 44, at 202 ("This resolution laid the foundation for the inclusion in
the federal Constitution of the Supremacy Clause."). For a useful analysis of this incident from the perspective of the last-in-time rule, see Ku, supra note 15, at 365-69.
55. See Letter to [British Minister] George Hammond (May 29, 1792), in 23 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 551, 579 (Charles T. Cullen et al. eds., 1990).
56. See generally id. Discussing Article V of the Peace Treaty, Jefferson also noted
"the difference between enacting a thing to be done and recommending it to be done."
Id. at 555.
57. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 256, 276 (1796) (reprinting Iredell's
circuit opinion).
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These disagreements suggest several conclusions. First, the
status of treaties and the subsidiary question of self-execution
were controversial. Second, although few were willing to take a
legal stand against the supremacy of treaties, a difference remained between the form and practice of supremacy.5" Third,
and more important at the time, this incident confirmed that
the formal legal status of a treaty under the Articles mattered less
than the federal government's inability to enforce it. Compliance with treaties necessarily became a question of state politics,
which in turn reflected the goal of avoiding concentration of
power in the national government and resulting tyranny (or
trampling of state interests, which may have been the same thing
to many state officials). Under the Articles, in short, treaties
were generally not self-executing as a matter of practice, and
state legislative primacy was an important part of the reason.
The problem for opponents of self-execution is that the link
between the rights of state legislatures and non-enforcement of
treaties weakened both ideas during the Articles of Confederation period. In addition to problems with treaty enforcement,
the Articles period also witnessed what some observers characterized as abuses of legislative power by the states-in the form of
confiscation of property, overreaching debtor relief, and a
proliferation of changing laws-as well as aggregation of judicial
and executive power into the state legislatures. 9 Nascent Federalists in turn equated legislative primacy with too much democracy-that is, with legislative and, in particular, democratic tyranny. 60
The initial wave of state constitutions displayed relatively lit58. For a roughly similar view, see Vzquez, supra note 6, at 698 & nn.17-18.
59. See McDONALD, supra note 38, at 154-57, 164-65, 175-79; RAKovE, supra note 44,
at 250; WOOD, supra note 26, at 403-09.
60. See WOOD, supra note 26, at 409-13; see also RAKovE, supra note 38, at 390-93;
RAKOvE, supra note 44, at 44-45, 48-49 (discussing Madison's developing views on separation of powers). State constitution makers in this period tended to distrust and
sought to limit all forms of concentrated government power. Still, although state constitutions limited legislative power through bills of rights, restrictions on taxation and
amendments, annual elections, and the people's right to instruct representatives, see
KRUMAN, supra note 38, at 35-59, 76-86; see also HULSEBOSCH, supra note 49, at 173-89
(discussing 1777 New York Constitution, which gave greater power to the Governor and
a council of revision), legislatures were the primary wielders of power in most states,
especially under the early constitutions. See McDONALD, supra note 38, at 160. Legislative primacy did not always lead to populism, however; elites found ways to exercise
influence. See RAKovE, supra note 38, at 121-23.
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tle concern for separation or balance of powers.6 1 But by the
time of the 1783 peace treaty with Britain, some states had rewritten or given serious thought to changing their constitutions
to fix perceived imbalances of power.6 2 These efforts sought to
strengthen the executive at the expense of the legislature, while
also making the judiciary more independent. Meanwhile, judges
in other states were taking tentative steps towards enforcing constitutional limits on legislative power.63 In short, changing ideas
about separation of powers were beginning to result in qualified
rejection of legislative primacy. 64 Defenders of legislative primacy put up a bitter resistance that prefigured the debate over
the federal constitution.6 5
6

6
C. Writing the Constitution

State non-compliance with treaties was an important issue at
the Constitutional Convention, even as delegates sought to accommodate the interest of states in the treaty power.6 7 Efforts to
strengthen national power also show awareness of and desire to
avoid the perceived pitfalls of legislative primacy. Thus, the establishment of a stronger national government resulted in a net
shift away from legislative power and towards executive and judicial power, even as it also created a stronger national legisla61. See WOOD, supra note 26, at 409-13; see also RA&ovE, supra note 38, at 390-93;
RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 44-49.
62. See AoAms, supra note 38, at 264-73; BANNING, supra note 47, at 132; RAKovE,
supra note 44, at 252-53; WooD, supra note 26, at 430-37.
63. See generally RAKovE, supra note 44.
64. See AnDAs, supra note 38, at 264-73; BANNING, supra note 47, at 88, 132 (discussing the 1783 effort to revise Virginia Constitution); RAKovE, supra note 44, at 252-53;
WOOD, supra note 26, at 430-37, 446-63.
65. See WooD, supra note 26, at 437-38, 459.
66. This section and much of the next rely on notes taken by people who attended
the Constitutional Convention and state ratification conventions. James Hutson has
warned of the "problems with most of" these records; "some have been compromised-perhaps fatally-by the editorial interventions of hirelings and partisans. To recover
original intent from these records may be an impossible hermeneutic task." James H.
Hutson, The Creationof the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1986). The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution has
expanded the available materials, but it cannot fill all the holes or correct all the errors
and deliberate misstatements. These sections are therefore necessarily contingent in
ways familiar to historians but frustrating to lawyers.
67. See generally Solomon Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 434 (1975).
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ture.68 In some rough sense, then, the Constitutional Convention sought to create an efficient and forceful national govern69
ment while at the same time limiting legislative power.
The net shift in power away from legislatures provides a context for reading both the treaty clause and the Supremacy
Clause. Together, they give the President and Senate the power
to make treaties that will be the supreme law of the land, apparently on the same footing as the Constitution and federal statutes, while saying nothing about a role for the House in making
treaties. Read against the clear desire to ensure federal power to
implement treaties, one would expect to find the House mentioned if it were to have a significant role. The absence of any
obvious textual role supports at least a reasonable inference that
there would be nothing for the House to do with respect to the
legal status of treaties.7 °
This inference receives significant support from events at
the Convention. The problem of treaty implementation appeared quickly. Edmund Randolph raised it in his initial speech
on May 29, 1787, while Charles Pinckney and James Madison included state interference with treaties in their June 8 lists of reasons for giving Congress the power to negative state laws. 7' The
New Jersey plan of June 15 included a provision declaring treaties the supreme law of the land and would have established a
"federal Judiciary" to hear appeals in several categories of cases,
' 72
including those involving "the construction of any treaty.
The question of treaties emerged more fully during a debate on August 7 over a proposal that the House and Senate be
able to negative each other's actions. Gouverneur Morris sought
68. See Rogan Kersh et al., "More a Distinction of Words than Things": The Evolution of
Separated Powers in the American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 19-20 (1998).
69. See McDONALD, supra note 38, at 291; RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 254-87 (discuss-

ing sense that stronger executive was necessary); WOOD, supra note 26, at 503-08 (noting Madison's concern about property and Federalist desire for worthy people in government); id. at 551 (noting desire for stability and energetic executive).
70. For a similar view, see Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2123.
71. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19, 164, 316 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (Madison).
72. Id. at 244 (Madison). The Virginia plan did not include a Supremacy Clause
or a specific reference to federal court jurisdiction over treaties, but it provided for
appeals to a "National Judiciary" in cases that raised "questions which may involve the
national peace and harmony," and declared "the Legislative Executive &Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of
Union." Id. at 22 (May 29, 1787) (Madison).
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an amendment to limit the negative to legislative actions. Several delegates commented on the amendment, with George Mason objecting that it "extended too far."7 He explained, "Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they will be
therefore subjected to a negative, altho' they are to be made as
proposed by the Senate alone."7 4 Morris responded, "Treaties ... were not laws." 75 The delegates then rejected Morris's
amendment and approved an amendment by James Madison to
strike the entire clause, apparently because it was repetitive and
confusing.7 6
A week later, the status of treaties came up again. During a
debate on limiting the power of the Senate, Mason spoke in
favor of preventing it from originating revenue bills, and he said77
it "could already sell the whole Country by means of treaties.
John Mercer picked up on this reference and declared "the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged to the Executive department .... Treaties would not be
final so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative
authority. This was the case of treaties in Great Britain. '7 8 Mason clarified he "did not say that a Treaty would repeal a law; but
that the Senate by means of a treaty might alienate territory &c.
without legislative sanction. '79 The motion passed, and there is
no indication this exchange was critical to that decision, although it certainly indicates discomfort on Mercer's side with
what he saw as the scope of the treaty power, and a limited sense
73. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 196-97 (Max Far-

rand ed., 1966) (Madison).
74. Id. at 197. Sometime after August 6, Mason annotated his copy of the Committee of Detail's report with the following observation: "As treaties are to be laws of the
Land and commercial Treaties may be so framed as to be partially injurious, there
seems to be some necessity for the same Security upon the Subject as in the 6th section
of the 6th Article." SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 209 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT].
Mason
was referring to what was actually Article VII of the report. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at 177 n.3, 181 n.5. Section 6 of that

article provided, "No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of
the members present in each House." Id. at 183. For the link between treaties and
navigation laws, see Slonim, supra note 67, at 440-43.
75. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at 197

(Madison).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 297 (Madison).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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on Mason's part of how treaties-which he recognized would operate as law in some fashion-would interact with existing laws."0
After another week, and shortly after it approved an early
version of the Supremacy Clause,8 the Convention considered a
proposal to give Congress the power "[t]o call forth the aid of
the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce
treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. "82 Morris
moved to strike the words "enforce treaties" as "superfluous
since treaties were to be 'laws.'" 8' The motion passed without
dissent.8 4 Because the motion came almost immediately after
discussion of the Supremacy Clause, the inference seems clear
that the delegates understood treaties would have the same status as legislation-in other words, that they would be self-executing and enforceable where appropriate in judicial proceedings
or through executive action. The Supremacy Clause discussion
may also explain the shift in Morris's opinion about the legal
status of treaties.
At this point, however, the power to make treaties still belonged solely to the Senate. Soon after his first motion passed,
Morris proposed another:
Mr. Govr. Morris did not know that he should agree to refer
the making of Treaties to the Senate at all, but for the present
wd. move to add as an amendment to the section, after "Treaties"-"but no Treaty shall be binding on the U.S. which is
not ratified by a law."85
Morris's goal was to put obstacles in the way of making treaties.8 6
Madison objected that this requirement would be "inconvenien[t] ...for treaties of alliance for the purposes of war &c.
&c."" TJames Wilson agreed with Morris that allowing the Senate
alone to make treaties was risky:
In the most important Treaties, the King of G. Britain being
80. See id.
81. See id. at 389 (Aug. 23, 1787). For the background of the Supremacy Clause,
see Caleb Nelson, Preemption,86 VA. L. REV. 225, 235-53 (2000); Carlos Manuel Vhzquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies, supra note 7, at 1104-08.
82. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at 389 n.9.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id.at 389-90.
See id.at 390.
Id. at 392.
See id. at 392-93.
Id. at 392.
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obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of them, is
under the same fetters as the amendment of Mr. Morris will
impose on the Senate. It was refused yesterday to permit
even the Legislature to lay duties on exports. Under the
clause, without the amendment, the Senate alone can make a
Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some
one particular port."8
Despite concerns about the extent of the Senate's treaty power,
the motion lost by a vote of eight to one.8 9 Read together with
its unanimous adoption of Morris's first amendment, the Convention appears twice to have embraced an idea of self-execution
even when the treaty power was lodged in the Senate alone.9 °
Morris's motion was bracketed by James Madison's effort to
include the President in the treaty power. Immediately before
Morris's motion, Madison had suggested that "the President
should be an agent in Treaties."'
After the Convention defeated Morris's motion, Madison "hinted for consideration,
whether a distinction might not be made between different sorts
of Treaties-Allowing the President & Senate to make Treaties
eventual and of Alliance for limited terms-and requiring the
concurrence of the whole Legislature in other Treaties."9 2 The
Convention did not take up Madison's suggestion and instead
referred the clause to the committee of five for further consider-

ation.

3

But Madison's distinction would soon resurface.

88. Id. at 393. In response, William Johnson disputed Wilson's analysis of British
practice. See id.
89. See id. at 393-94. Yoo stresses the discussion of British practice during this debate and suggests Morris and Wilson spoke for the Convention when they sought to
limit the domestic status of treaties. SeeYoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7,
at 2033-34. Not only did every effort to impose such limits fail, but this discussion took
place against the assumption that only the Senate would make treaties, with the result
that much of the debate focused on a problem that was later addressed by including the
President in the treaty process rather than by including the House. Put differently,
Yoo's analysis proves dissatisfaction with Senate control over treaties but does not prove
the Convention opposed self-execution. At most, he demonstrates delegates were confused about British practice and some may not have understood the full implications of
the provisions they were adopting.
90. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2123-24 (making the same point).
91. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at 392
(Madison).
92. Id. at 394. On September 7th and 8th, Madison again distinguished between
types of treaties, with the goal of relaxing the ratification requirements for and the
President's involvement in peace treaties. See id. at 540-41, 547-49 (Madison); see also
BANNING, supra note 47, at 178.
93. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at 394
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Another two weeks passed, during which the Convention
modified the treaty power to give the President the ability to
make treaties with the Senate's advice and consent. Wilson then
moved to include the House in the advice and consent process.
He explained, "As treaties.., are to have the operation of laws,
they ought to have the sanction of law also." 4 The motion lost
ten to one, at least in part because the delegates believed the
larger House would not be able to maintain the secrecy required
for approval of some treaties.9 5 The Convention apparently also
discussed that day a proposal by Madison to require House consent to treaties that modified national boundaries or abridged
navigation or fishing rights. 96
The strongest interpretation of the available Convention
records is that a clear majority of delegates assumed, at least
once the Supremacy Clause was adopted, that treaties would immediately and automatically operate as enforceable federal
law.97 Several delegates opposed or raised questions about the
Constitution's approach to treaty implementation, or attempted
to distinguish between different kinds of treaties, but their concerns were brushed aside-perhaps ill-advisedly in light of later
developments. Critically, the records do not reveal any meaningful debate about how treaties would operate as law, and at least
some delegates appear to have been confused or uncertain on
this issue.9 8 Nor was there any exploration of how the treaty
power would interact with Congress's Article I powers. The Convention reached an agreement on treaties, but it failed to explore the implications of that agreement.
(Madison). Kesavan draws on McHenry's notes to suggest this episode can be seen as
the articulation by Madison, Morris, and Wilson of a doctrine of "partial self-execution."
See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1534-35.
94. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at 538
(Sept. 7, 1787) (Madison).
95. See id. For additional analysis of the Morris and Wilson proposals, see Vdzquez,
Laughing at Treaties, supra note 7, at 2160 n.20. For the importance of secrecy to the
decision to exclude the House from treaty-making, see Curtis Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mic. L. REv. 545, 629 (2004);
Hathaway, supra note 47, at 1278-79; Rakove, supra note 14, at 246-47. For stress on the
federalism aspects of excluding the House, see generally Slonim, supra note 67.
96. See SUPPLEMENT, supra note 74, at 262 (Sept. 7, 1787). Madison drafted a motion but did not move its consideration. See SUPPLEMENT, supra note 74, at 262 n.2.
97. See Rakove, supra note 14, at 264 ("Whatever uncertainty might have persisted
about the precise allocation of the authority to make treaties, the framers were virtually
of one mind when it came to giving treaties the status of law.").
98. See Ku, supra note 15, at 369-70 (noting lack of discussion of last-in-time issues).
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D. Ratification
Ratification revealed the complexities surrounding the legal
status and implementation of treaties, but the nature of the process complicates efforts to sort out who thought what about specific constitutional provisions and to determine the relative importance of topics such as treaty implementation.9 9 Nonetheless, concern about the treaty power was an important part of the
antifederalist critique of the proposed Constitution. Many Antifederalists believed the treaty power threatened individual liberty and risked tyranny, particularly because the Senate and President, neither of which would be popularly or directly elected,
would be able to make treaties that would have the force of
100
law.
1. George Mason's Objections
George Mason began the attack. He had refused to sign the
Constitution at the Convention, and he quickly became a leading antifederalist. °1 His Objections to the Constitution began circulating in manuscript soon after the Convention ended in midSeptember 1787 and was widely reprinted. 1 2 The document included the claim that, "[b]y declaring all treaties supreme laws
of the land, the Executive and the Senate have, in many cases, an
exclusive power of legislation; which might have been avoided by
proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be done
with safety. ' 103 This statement indicates Mason read the treaty
and Supremacy Clauses broadly, and his earlier support for bind99. See, e.g., Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 7, at 2162-65.

100. See BERNARD BAILYN, To BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 110 (2003); CORNELL, supra note 29, at 30-31; ROBERT
W. HOFFERT, A POLITICS OF TENSIONS: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL IDEAS 175-78 (1992); WOOD, supra note 26, at 513-16, 519-23; Flaherty, supra
note 7, at 2128; Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1542-48; Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution,

supra note 7, at 2041-43, 2045, 2048-49.
101. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at
648-49 (Sept. 17, 1787) (Madison).
102. With thirty reprintings, Mason's "Objections" was one of the most influential
Antifederalist publications. See CORNELL, supra note 29, at 309-15.

103. George Mason, Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

346, 350 (John

P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1981). "[P]roper distinctions with respect to treaties" likely refers to distinctions among different kinds of treaties, along the lines he and Madison
expressed at the Convention.
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ing the states to treaties under the Articles of Confederation
shows that he did not object to the idea of supremacy in general.
Instead, his objections went to the process by which some treaties would become supreme law. The House should be involved
where possible and depending on the kind of treaty. Further,
the role of the House should not merely be to participate in
passing legislation that implemented the treaty but to vote on
the treaty in the same way the Senate would.
Other writers quickly took up Mason's themes. An Old
Whig wrote in a Philadelphia paper that "the approbation of the
legislature ought to be had, before a treaty should have the force
of law." ' 4 He also contended "no treaty ought to be suffered to
alter the law of the land, without the consent of the continental
legislatures." ' 5 More significantly, the Federal Farmer declared:
[T]reaties also made under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law.., and when these treaties
shall be made, they will also abolish all laws and state constitutions incompatible with them. This power in the president
and senate is absolute, and the judges will be bound to allow
full force to whatever rule, article or thing the president and
senate shall establish by treaty, whether it be practicable to set
any bounds to those who make treaties, I am not able to say:
If not, it proves that this power ought to be more safely
lodged. 106
104. An Old Whig III (Oct. 20, 1787), reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 103, at 425, 426; see also Cato VI
(Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 428, 431-32 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983) (stating the House
should participate in making treaties).
105. An Old Whig III, supra note 104, at 426. For possible authors of the Old
Whig letters, see 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 103, at 376.
106. Letter from the Federal Farmer LV (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, at 42, 4344. Melancton Smith of New York may be the strongest candidate for author of the
"Federal Farmer" essays. See CORNELL, supra note 29, at 83, 88, 315 n.5; see also EMPIRE
AND NATION vii-viii (Forrest McDonald ed., 2d ed. 1999) (advocating Richard Henry
Lee); 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 104, at 16 (noting challenges to Lee); 19 The DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 205 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003) (suggesting
Smith and Elbridge Gerry). The significance of these letters to ratification outside New
York is unclear. Compare Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2058 &
n.490 (arguing they deserve special weight), with CORNELL, supra note 29, at 25-26, 88
(arguing their impact was "more circumscribed"). The first set of letters was reprinted
five times, but the second only once (compared to Mason's thirty). See CORNELL, supra
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Seven months later, after several states had ratified but
before the New York and Virginia conventions, the Federal
Farmer backed away from a general attack on the treaty
power. 10 7 Paralleling Mason's desire to make "proper distinctions" among different kinds of treaties, the Federal Farmer admitted the House should have no involvement with peace treaties or treaties of alliance.' 0 8 For commercial treaties, however,
the Federal Farmer claimed the Constitution would require the
consent of the entire Congress. He explained commercial treaties are more legislative and less executive than treaties of peace
or alliance because
they consist of rules and regulations respecting commerce;
and to regulate commerce, or to make regulations respecting
commerce, the federal legislature, by the constitution, has
the power. I do not see that any commercial regulations can
be made in treaties, that will not infringe upon this power in
the legislature: therefore, I infer, that the true construction is,
that the President and Senate shall make treaties; but all commercial treaties shall be subject to be confirmed by the legislature.10 9
In short, the Federal Farmer conceded that treaties automatically would operate as law in some instances, but he contended
that Congress's commerce power meant it would have to implement commercial treaties." 0
Leading antifederalist writers thus understood the
Supremacy Clause to mean that treaties would be similar to legislation even though they would be approved only by the Senate
note 29, at 309-15; see also EMPIRE AND NATION XV (Forrest McDonald ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(suggesting second series "was not nearly so successful as the first, and it soon fell into
obscurity.").
107. The Federal Farmer's overall stance toward ratification in the second series
was more nuanced: "[T]his system affords, all circumstances considered, a better basis
to build upon than the confederation." The primary issue was "whether we will put the
system into operation, adopt it, enumerate and recommend the necessary amendment,
which afterwards... may be ingrafted into the system, or whether we will make amendments prior to adoption." Letter from the Federal Farmer VI (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted
in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 268, 269
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1995).
108. See Letter from the Federal Farmer XI (Jan. 10, 1788), reprinted in 17 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 107, at
301, 308-09.
109. Id. at 309-10.
110. Id.
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and President, and that both would trump state law. The Federal Farmer, however, also drew on Mason to suggest a different
understanding for commercial treaties."1 His efforts may have
had an impact on the Virginia debates, and they later became an
important part of the republican approach to the treaty power.
In response, several Federalist writers reinforced a broad
understanding of supremacy and self-execution. Civis Rusticus,
for example, gave this response to Mason: "The infraction of the
present treaty [between the U.S. and Britain] shews the necessity
of treaties having the force of laws."" 2 The writer went on to
stress the foreign policy risks of requiring the popular branch of
a legislature to approve treaties." 3 James Iredell endorsedJohn
Jay's views on treaties as law of the land, noted the impracticability of involving the House in the treaty process, and insisted,
"from the nature of the thing, that when the constitutional right
to make treaties is exercised, the treaty so made should be binding upon those who delegated authority for that purpose."' 1'
These statements, however, do not represent the full range
of federalist responses on treaty issues. A broader, more ambiguous, and sometimes conciliatory set of interpretations emerged
as the debates continued. No Federalist denied treaties were
self-executing at the federalism level, but as some Antifederalists
reframed their federalism concerns about treaties in separation
of powers terms, many Federalists responded by suggesting an
important role for the House of Representatives in treaty implementation." 5
2. State Ratification Debates
Pennsylvania. At the Pennsylvania convention in late 1787,
several speakers raised concerns about the legal status and effect
of treaties. Some participants suggested that the President and
Senate acting together might have a greater treaty power than
111. Id.
112. Civis Rusticus, To Mr. Davis (Reply to Mason's Objections) (Jan. 30, 1788),
reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
331, 337 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988).
113. See id.
114. Marcus III (James Iredell), Answer to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New
Constitution (Mar. 5, 1788), reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 322, 325 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986).
115. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 95, and Kesavan, supra note 7, also describe
how the nature of the treaty power was an issue during ratification.
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the King of England, and for that reason they urged inclusion of
the House in the treaty process.1 1 6 But participants also appeared to understand that the process as set out in the Constitution would mean that treaties would be treated as supreme fed11 7
eral law.
James Wilson, who supported House participation at the
Constitutional Convention, admitted, "I wish the powers of the
Senate"-including its role in making treaties-"were not as
they are."' 18 Yet he spoke strongly in favor of ratification and
made long statements about the status of treaties. In one
speech, he noted the failure of the states to comply with the
1783 peace treaty and lauded the extension of the judicial power
to treaties, "for the judges of the United States will be enabled to
carry them into effect, let the legislatures of the different states
do what they may." 19
In a second speech, Wilson moved from federalism to separation of powers, and his comments were less clear. He began by
stating that, "under this constitution, treaties will become the supreme law of the land," but he continued with the assertion that
although "treaties are to have the force of laws," they are different from legislation because, as agreements with other countries
they are more like "contracts, or compacts. '120 Yoo suggests Wilson meant to say that treaties are not really laws at all, while Flaherty stresses Wilson's insistence that treaties are "supreme law"
121
and have the "force of laws.'
But Wilson was not finished. He went on to discuss the role
of the House of Representatives in treaty implementation:
It well deserves to be remarked, that though the house of representatives possess no active part in making treaties, yet their
legislative authority will be found to have strong restraining
influence upon both president and senate. In England, if the
116. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
459-61 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (Dec. 3, 1787) (William Findley, John Smilie, and
Robert Whitehill); id. at 512-14 (Dec. 7, 1787) (Whitehill) (expressing concern about
treaty power).
117. See id. at 460 (Dec. 3, 1787) (Whitehill and James Wilson), 466 (Dec. 4, 1787)

(Smilie).
118. Id. at 491 (Dec. 4, 1787).
119. Id. at 518 (Dec. 7, 1787).
120. Id. at 562 (Dec. 11, 1787).
121. Compare Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2046-47, with Fla-

herty, supra note 7, at 2132.
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king and his ministers find themselves, during their negociation, to be embarrassed, because an existing law is not repealed, or a new law is not enacted, they give notice to the
legislature of their situation, and inform them that it will be
necessary, before the treaty can operate, that some law be re-

pealed, or some be made. And will not the same thing take
place here? Shall less prudence, less caution, less moderation, take place among those who negotiate treaties for the
United States, than among 122
those who negotiate them for the
other nations of the earth?
Yoo argues this statement consciously avoided broad claims
for the legal status of treaties and instead reassured Antifederalists that treaties would need implementing legislation.1 23 Flaherty concedes Wilson's statement is ambiguous, but suggests
the best reading is simply that Wilson was advocating prudence
before agreeing to treaty provisions that would displace existing
laws. 124 As Kesavan recognizes, neither argument is entirely convincing.121 Wilson's statement is ambiguous precisely because he
appears to be hedging-first stating treaties are laws but then
suggesting they will not trump existing laws (although Wilson
also does not foreclose the possibility that some treaties could be
self-executing if no laws stood in their way-a point Yoo ignores).
After a 46-23 vote in favor of ratification, a minority published their dissenting views, which included the assertionroughly consistent with the statements of An Old Whig-" [t] hat
no treaty which shall be directly opposed to the existing laws of
the United States in Congress assembled, shall be valid until
such laws shall be repealed or made conformable to such treaty;
neither shall any treaties be valid which are in contradiction to
the constitution of the United States, or the constitutions of the
several states. '126 Flaherty's interpretation of Wilson's comments
122. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
supra note 116, at 562-63 (Dec. 11, 1787) (emphasis added).

OF THE CONSTITUTION,

123. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2047-48.

124. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2133.
125. See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1566-67, 1569-71.
126. Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 116, at 618, 624-25, 634-35. Cornell argues the "Dissent" was one of the most
.effective" Antifederalist documents; it was reprinted twenty times. See CORNELL, supra
note 29, at 26, 309.
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receives some support from the dissenters if one reads their
statement as a concession that treaties would trump state laws
and an effort to prevent them from also trumping federal law.
Perhaps they were simply seeking to clarify an ambiguity, but the
fact that they felt a need to propose a limit on the Supremacy
Clause suggests concern it would sweep broadly despite Wilson's
hedging. 127
Pennsylvania held a second convention-dominated by Antifederalists, including Albert Gallatin-in September 1788 to
consider amendments to the Constitution, in keeping with the
strategy of many Antifederalists of accepting ratification but
seeking a second constitutional convention to change the document.128 Among the amendments that the convention recommended was that no treaty could "alter or affect any law of the
United States, or of any particular State, until such treaty shall
have been laid before and assented to by the House of Representatives in Congress.' 1 29 This amendment went further than
the proposal in the Dissent, and it shows that the treaty power
remained an issue of concern for Antifederalists for some time
after ratification.
Connecticut. Connecticut's political class conducted little
discussion of the proposed Constitution, let alone of the treaty
and Supremacy Clauses. Writing as "A Landholder," Oliver Ellsworth offered a strong justification for the Supremacy Clause
and a federal judiciary that would help "carry into effect the laws
of the nation. " "' Responding specifically to Mason's Objections,
127. For William Findley's later explanation of the dissenters' intentions, which is
consistent with both possibilities, see 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 592 (1796). Kesavan suggests
the dissenters reflected a general view of the Pennsylvania convention in favor of partial
self-execution. See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1567-69. I think he tries to prove too much.
More likely, many of the participants came away with the belief that the House would
have some role with treaties but were uncertain about exactly what that role would be.
Nor does the second convention, which was largely an Antifederalist affair, assist his
assertion about the overall opinion of Pennsylvania ratifiers.

128. See

PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

1787-1788, at 553-64 (John

B. McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888); CORNELL, supra note 29, at 136-42;
Steven R. Boyd, Antifederalists and the Acceptance of the Constitution: Pennsylvania, 17871792, 9 PUBLIUS 123, 132-34 (1979).

129.

PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

supra note 128, at 564.

130. A Landholder V (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

480, 483 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978). For the

attribution of "A Landholder" to Ellsworth, see 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 398 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978).
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he declared the House could not be involved in making treaties
"which are often intricate and require much negotiation and sestate governments would adequately
crecy," and he suggested
31
check the Senate.
Little of the debate at the state ratifying convention survives
on any topic, but Ellsworth said in one speech that the failure to
perform treaties had been a problem under the Articles, andrepeating the point he had made as A Landholder-that the
United States needed "a power in the general government to enforce the decrees of the Union." 11 2 After a few days of proceedings, the convention approved the Constitution by a vote of 12840.133

Massachusetts. George Mason's arguments circulated
broadly in Massachusetts.' 3 4 Equally important, however, were
the objections of Elbridge Gerry, who-like Mason-had refused to sign the Constitution at the convention.135 Gerry
presented his objections at the convention and elaborated on
them in a letter to the Massachusetts General Court that subsequently appeared in all but one Massachusetts newspaper and in
numerous others outside the state.13 6 Two of his objections were
"that the Judicial department will be oppressive [and] that treaties of the highest importance may be formed by the president
with the advice of two thirds of a quorum of the Senate. 1 37 His
concern about treaties seems only to encompass the number of
senators (too few) who could approve a treaty, and it does not
131. A Landholder VI (Dec. 10, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
supra note 130, at 487, 490-91.
132. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 130, at 282-91 (Jan. 4, 1788). "[T]here were several speakers for and against
the Constitution," but "the newspapers reported only" six speeches by Federalists and "a
single-paragraph account of one" Antifederalist speech. See id. at 535.
133. See id. at 562 (Jan. 9, 1788).
134. See George Mason and the Constitution, 20 November-3 December, reprinted
in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 282-91
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1997).
135. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 73, at
648-49 (Sept. 17, 1787) (Madison). Ellsworth's "A Landholder V" was a response to
Gerry. See 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 130, at 476-77, 480.
136. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 134, at 96.
137. Elbridge Gerry, Letter to the General Court (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 134, at
94, 98-99.
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
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touch upon the role of the House or the legal status of treaties.
One could construe his concern about the judiciary as an attack
on the Supremacy Clause or Article III, but, even so, it is not
clearly directed at treaties. 138 Other writers also raised general
concerns about the Supremacy Clause.1" 9
Discussion of treaties is sparse in the surviving records of the
Massachusetts ratifying convention debates. On January 28,
1788, an "old man" declared, "When we give power to make treaties we give power to fulfill."1 4 ° He was referring to the federal
government's ability to use the militia and perhaps, therefore, to
the possibility of treaties being self-executing for the executive
branch. Theophilus Parsons responded with the assertion
"[lt]
hat treaties unless approved by the Legislature will be void,"
but William Wedgery contradicted him, stating "all treaties made
by the President & senate shall be the supream Law of the Land
& therefore need not the Legislature to Confirm it." '4 1 No other
significant discussion appears, and Massachusetts ratified the
Constitution by a vote of 187-168.142 The delegates proposed
138. Another writer recognized that the judicial power encompassed treaty issues,
and he claimed litigation in federal court would be "long and expensive" and "gives
every advantage to British and other foreign creditors to embarrass the American
merchant." Candidus I (Dec. 6, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 134, at 392, 397. The assumption that
treaties would be enforceable in federal courts suggests Candidus also thought treaties
would operate as law without Congressional intervention.
139. See Michael Allen Gillespie, Massachusetts: Creating Consensus, in RATIFYING
THE CONSTITUTION 138, 164 n.35 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds.,
1989).
140. Justus Dwight Journal, 7 January-9 February 1788, reprinted in 7 THE DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1814 (John P. Kaminski et
al. eds., 2001); see also 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1364 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2000) (official journal not available for
January 29).
141. 7 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 140, at 1814-15.
142. See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 140, at 1487 (Feb. 6, 1788). During the Jay Treaty debates, William Lyman
quoted statements that he said came from the Massachusetts convention:
In those debates, one member, Mr. [Rufus] King, said: "That the Treaty-making power would be found as much restrained in this country as in any country
in the world." Another member, Mr. (John] Choate: "That as the regulation
of commerce was under the control of Congress, it could not be regulated by
Treaty without their consent and concurrence."
5 ANNALS OF CONG. 608 (1796). Lyman was not a delegate to the convention, and I
have not found either statement in the records of debates. Yet Fisher Ames and Theodore Sedgwick were at the convention and also took part in the Jay Treaty debate, and
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several amendments, but none
of them touched the treaty power
143
Clause.
Supremacy
or the
South Carolina. No reported discussion of treaties survives
from the South Carolina convention, which approved the Constitution by a vote of 149-73 on May 23, 1788.144 But the status of
treaties came up in the legislative session that established the
convention. Rawlin Lowndes objected to the Supremacy Clause
because, "when the Constitution came to be established, the
treaty of peace might be pleaded against the relief which the law
afforded." 145 Later in the debate, "He explained his opinion relative to treaties to be, that no treaty concluded contrary to the
express laws of the land could be valid."' 4 6 Several members of
the legislature disagreed with Lowndes. On the first point,
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney declared the peace treaty was already the law of the land in South Carolina, and he denied "any
individual state possessed a right to disregard a treaty made by
Congress" under the Articles.' 4 7 The Supremacy Clause, he insisted, "is only declaratory of what treaties were, in fact, under
the old compact. They were as much the laws of the land under
that Confederation as they are under this Constitution. '"148
Charles Pinckney also made clear his understanding that the status of treaties as law made them judicially enforceable, for "with'
out it we could not expect a due observance of treaties." 149
Yet
two other members of the legislature provided more ambiguous
endorsements. John Pringle observed: "[a] lthough the treaties
neither of them disputed Lyman's quotations, even though they and Lyman were on
opposite sides. In any event, the statement by King-who attended the Constitutional
Convention, joined with Hamilton to write the Camillus essays, and cast votes inconsistent with a role for the House during the 1816 debate, see 29 ANNALS OF CONG., (1816)
(voting to reject House implementing legislation)-is too general to be useful. Choate's
statement, on the other hand, tends to support later republican claims.
143. See Form of Ratification [Massachusetts], 6-7 February, reprinted in 6 THE DocUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 140, at 1468.
144. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 338-41 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (May 23, 1788).
145. Id. at 266 (Jan. 16, 1788).
146. Id. at 271.
147. Id. at 266.
148. Id. at 278 (Jan. 17, 1788). David Ramsay supported Pinckney by asking what
the point would be of having treaties that were not superior to local laws. See id. at 270
(Jan. 16, 1788); see also id. at 293 (Jan. 17, 1788) (Robert Barnwell) (treaties were meant
to be law).
149. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 258 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).

1238

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:1209

they [the President and Senate] make may have the force of laws
when made, they have not, therefore, legislative power. It would
be dangerous indeed to trust them with the power of making
laws to affect the rights of individuals." 5 ' John Rutledge agreed
that "every treaty was law paramount and must operate," but he
also insisted "there was an obvious difference between treaties of
peace and those of commerce, because commercial treaties frequently clashed with the laws upon that subject." ''
At least some of the issues raised by the treaty and
Supremacy Clauses were clear, therefore, when the South Carolina ratifying convention took place, and there seems to have
been a basic acceptance that treaties would trump state law. The
details of treaty implementation, however-apparently including
the role of the House and the relationship of treaties to existing
1 52
federal law-were less clear.
Maryland. The Maryland convention lasted only a few days,
and Federalists prevailed by a vote of 63-11.153 Records are
sparse, but at least two Antifederalists spoke against the treaty
power. John Mercer, who had attended the constitutional convention but left before its completion, objected to the status of
treaties as supreme law.1 54 His Address to the Members of the New
York and Virginia Conventions probably overlaps with what he said,
and it also indicates he adhered to his views at the constitutional
convention: "Treaties are expressly declared paramount to the
Constitutions of the several States & being the supreme Law, must
150. Id. at 269.
151. Id. at 267.
152. Some of South Carolina's support for the treaty power hinged on the belief
that the two-thirds requirement in the Senate would prevent treaties that limited slavery
or the slave trade. See Robert M. Weir, South Carolina: Slavery and the Structure of the
Union, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 201, 219-20 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael
Lienesch eds., 1989). Whether Pringle's and Rutledge's hesitations also derived from
concern about slavery is unclear.
153. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 547-56 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1836); Gregory Stiverson,
Necessity, the Mother of Union: Maryland and the Constitution, 1785-1789, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADopTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 131, 147 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski

eds., 1988) [hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES].
154. See Gregory A. Stiverson, Maryland's Antifederalists and the Perfection of the U.S.
Constitution, 83 MD. HIST. MAG. 18, 29 (Spring 1988) [hereinafter Stiverson, Maryland's
Antifederalists]. For Mercer's decision to leave the Constitutional Convention, see Letter
from J.B. Cutting to Thomas Jefferson (July 11, 1788), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 339 (Max Ferrand ed., 1966).
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of course control the national legislature .... 11115
Perhaps more important are the statements of future Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. In his speech against ratification, he objected that "2/3 of the Senate present and the president may make treaties of commerce, and the treaties are to be
the supreme law of the land." Although Chase disliked the fact
that federal courts would have 'jurisdiction in controversies between our citizens and subjects of Great Britain or any other foreign state," he admitted the judicial power should include (in
fact, be "confined to") "the decision of cases arising on trea' 15 6
ties.
Federalists closed debate and conducted a vote before Antifederalists could offer amendments; Chase and Mercer voted
against ratification. 5 7 After the vote, Federalists agreed to a
committee that would consider amendments, and Chase and
Mercer were two of the four Antifederalists on the committee. 5 8
Their colleague William Paca offered an amendment that addressed part of Mercer's concern and was also similar to the
amendment urged by the Pennsylvania dissent: "No Law of Congress, or Treaties, shall be effectual to repeal or abrogate the
Constitutions, or Bill of Rights, of the States, or any of them, or
any Part of the said Constitutions or Bills of Rights." 59 A major155. Address to the Members of the New York and Virginia Conventions, reprinted
in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 107, at 255, 259. Luther Martin's twelve-part The Genuine Information, Delivered
to the Legislature of the State of Maryland, was more important as a statement of Maryland Antifederalist views, and it says nothing about the treaty power or the Supremacy
Clause. For a general discussion of The Genuine Information, see 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 146 (John P. Kaminski et al.
eds., 1984). Martin also attended and left the Constitutional Convention. See Letter
from J.B. Cutting to Thomas Jefferson (July 11, 1788), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 339 (Max Ferrand ed., 1966).
156. James A. Haw, Samuel Chase's "Objections to the Federal Government," 76 MD.
HIST. MAC. 272, 279, 282 (Fall 1981).. For an account of the speech, see Stiverson,
Maryland's Antifederalists, supra note 154, at 26, 28.
157. See 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 103, at 453 n.15.
158. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 549 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1836); Stiverson, Maryland's Antifederalists, supra note 154, at 30-32.
159. See Amendments of the Minority of the Maryland Convention (Apr. 29, 1788),
reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 107, at 236, 241; Stiverson, Maryland'sAntifederalists, supra note 154, at 34-35
n.25. On the use of the word "repeal" to describe the impact of federal law on state law
and of later in time statutes on earlier statutes, see Nelson, supra note 81, at 252-53.
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ity of the committee rejected the treaty amendment (and most
others) .160 The available records do not reveal specific votes, but
Chase, Mercer, and Paca later declared that they "remain persuaded [of] the importance of the alterations proposed."16' 1
Three points deserve mention. First, participants in the Maryland debates probably had at least a bare understanding of the
legal status of treaties, and Antifederalists lost overwhelmingly
on all issues, including this one. Second, the process and outcome of the Maryland convention was an important lesson for
Virginia Antifederalists.' 6 2 Third, future Justice Samuel Chase
did not like the way in which treaties would become the law of
the land; he was willing to consider distinctions between different kinds of treaties; and he supported an amendment to limit
the federalism aspects of the treaty power. Yet he also was comfortable with federal court adjudication of treaty questions,
which almost certainly means he contemplated that federal
courts would be able to implement at least some treaty provisions against states.
Chase's later opinion on the treaty power in Ware v. Hylton 163 partly reflects and partly is in tension with his views during
ratification. His biographers suggest adoption of the Bill of
Rights and Washington's election as President helped reconcile
Chase to the new federal government, even though he retained
his concerns about its broad powers.16 4 The French revolution,
support among some Americans for French revolutionary ideas,
and resulting hostility in some quarters toward England (including in Baltimore, Chase's home) helped drive Chase into Federalist arms, and he became a strong proponent of upholding a
properly ordered and British-derived liberty over French-in160. See 2

THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 552-53 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1836).

161. Id. at 556.
162. See Stiverson, Maryland's Antifederalists, supra note 154, at 33 (showing that
Chase and Paca made sure their list of amendments was "distributed in Virginia"); see
also Gregory A. Stiverson, "To Maintain Inviolate Our Liberties": Maryland and the Bill of
Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 370, 394 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds.,
1992) [hereinafter THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES].

163. See generally Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796); see infra notes 274-306
and accompanying text (discussing the case).
164. See generally JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE

165 (Md. Hist. Soc'y, 1980).
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16 5

spired radicalism.
Virginia. The treaty power played its most prominent role in
the Virginia ratification debates. George Mason had already
made treaties an issue in his Objections.16 6 Writing to Governor
Edmund Randolph a month after the constitutional convention,
Richard Henry Lee continued the theme with the observation,
"In the new constitution, the president and senate have all the
executive and two thirds of the legislative power. In some
weighty instances (as making all kinds of treaties which are to be
the laws of the land) they have the whole legislative and executive powers."'1 67 For his part, Randolph-who like Mason and
Gerry had attended the convention but not signed the Constitution-had previously written that he hoped for "abridging the
power of the Senate to make treaties the supreme laws of the
land" and "limiting and defining the judicial power, " "' and his
sentiments were reprinted two months later in pamphlet
form. 6 9 Several people also wrote privately to James Madison to
complain about exclusion of the House from making treaties
170
that would be the supreme law of the land.
Although the Federalist essays were written primarily for a
New York audience, some of the essays on the treaty power and
165. Id. at 169-70. For a discussion of Chase's "ideological odyssey" that focuses on
his judicial career, see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING:

THE EN-

37 (1991).
166. George Mason, Objections to the Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 103,
at 346.
167. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 104, at 364, 367.
168. Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates (Oct.
10, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION SUpra note 104, at 117, 134; see also 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 73, at 648-49 (Sept. 17, 1787) (Madison) (discussing Randolph's
decision not to sign).
169. Edmund Randolph, Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27,
1787), reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 112, at 260, 273.
170. See Letter From Joseph Jones to James Madison (Oct. 29, 1787), reprinted in 8
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 112,
at 129; Letter from George Lee Turberville to James Madison (Dec. 11, 1782), reprinted
in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
112, at 231; Letter fromJoseph Spencer tojames Madison (Feb. 28, 1788), reprinted in 8
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 112,
at 425.
GLISH, THE AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE
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Supremacy Clause, including those by Madison, had circulated
in Virginia by the time the ratifying convention began.' 7 1 Discussing the Supremacy Clause in Federalist44, Madison stressed it
was necessary to ensure "a treaty or national law of great and
equal importance to the States" would be equally valid and applicable in all of them. 17 2 Writing in Federalist53 about the powers
of the House of Representatives and against annual elections,
Madison stated:
In regulating our own commerce [a member of the House]
ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the
United States and other nations, but also with the commercial
policy and laws of other nations.... And although the House
of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign
negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those
particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the
ordinary course of legislation and will sometimes
demand
7
particular legislative sanction and co-operation.' 3
This statement does not deny the legal status of treaties as
supreme law once ratified, which Madison had affirmed in Federalist 44, but one easily can read it as consistent with Madison's
suggestion at the convention that commercial treaties might require different treatment.
As the state ratifying convention drew closer, other writers
joined the fray. "Cassius" declared that in most countries the
executive alone makes treaties, so including the Senate in the
process was a democratic innovation. 1 74 His claim drew a response from "Brutus," who insisted that allowing only the Senate

TION,

171. See 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUsupra note 103, at 490-92. Despite their wide circulation, the importance of The

Federalist to ratification is far from
ing that "[a]s campaign material,
that it "did not affect ratification
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 44

clear. See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 49, at 209-10 (stat-

The Federalist failed" in New York, and it is possible
elsewhere, either.").
(James Madison) (Jan. 25, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 155, at

469, 474. Madison also referred to treaties in The Federalist No. 42. 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 155, at 469, 474.
173. THE FEDERALIST No. 53 (James Madison) (Feb. 9, 1788), reprinted in 16 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 114, at

97, 100.
174. Letter from Cassius To Richard Henry Lee (Apr. 2, 1788), reprinted in 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 641, 644-45 (John P.

Kaminski et al. eds., 1990).

20091

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES

1243

to participate in making treaties would not protect the interests
of the people.17 5 A "Society of Western Gentlemen" repeated
the call for including the House in the treaty-making process.' 7 6
Alexander White wrote that including treaties in the
Supremacy Clause "is no more than declaring that the law of
nations shall take place in America" and insisted "if you do not
provide the means to carry

. . .

treaties into effect, you subject

yourself to all the horrors of war.' 7 7 "A Native of Virginia" approved of making treaties the law of the land but muddied the
issue by giving reasons similar to those of South Carolina's John
Pringle: "When we consider the subject matter of treaties are always of national import, and cannot affect the interests of individuals, we have no reason to fear that they will be made improvi'
dently, or converted into instruments of oppression. "178
On the eve of the convention, Madison wrote a letter to
George Nicholas that went further than his discussion three
months earlier in Federalist 53:
It is true that [the House of Representatives] is not of necessity to be consulted in the forming of Treaties. But as its approbation and co-operation may often be necessary in carrying treaties into full effect; and as the support of the Government and of the plans of the President & Senate in general
must be drawn from the purse which they hold, the sentiments of this body cannot fail to have very great weight, even
when the body itself may have no constitutional authority....
[U]nder the new System, every Treaty must be made by 1. the
authority of the Senate in which the States are to vote equally.
2. that of the President who represents the people & the
States in a compounded ratio. And 3. under the influence of
the H. of Reps. who represent the people alone.17 9
Again, Madison did not deny the words of the Supremacy
175. Brutus, VA. INDEP. CHRON. (May 14, 1788), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HisTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 174, at 798, 801.

176. Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, VA. Indep. Chron. (Apr. 30,
1788), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 174, at 769, 777.
177. Alexander White, To the Citizens of Virginia (1788), reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 112, at 438,
442.
178. A Native of Virginia, Observations upon the Proposed Plan of Federal Government, reprinted in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 174, at 655, 690.
179. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), reprinted in 9
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Clause, but he anticipated a role for the House before some treaties could fully be law of the land. To at least some extent, this
statement is consistent with his suggestion at the Constitutional
Convention, as well as Wilson's statement at the Pennsylvania
Convention, but it may also have responded to more recent Antifederalist concerns.
At the convention, Antifederalists raised a series of objections to the treaty power. The first was that only two-thirds of a
quorum of the Senate would be enough to ratify a treaty. a8 0 This
concern shaded into a second issue, that the treaty power would
allow the federal government to relinquish rights to navigate the
Mississippi, which was a subject of deep concern in Virginia.'8 1
Responding to these concerns, Madison argued-as he had
in Federalist 53 and his letter to Nicholas-that the House "will
have a material influence on the Government" with respect to
1 82
treaties "and will be an additional security in this respect.
Patrick Henry immediately objected:
The Honorable Gentleman has said, that the House of Representatives would give some curb to the business of treaties,
respecting the Mississippi. This to me is incomprehensible.
He will excuse me, if I tell him, he is exercising his imagination and ingenuity. Will the Honorable Gentleman say, that
the House of Representatives will break though their balances
and checks, and break into the business of treaties? He is
obliged to support this opinion of his, by supposing, that the
supra note 174,
at 804, 808-09.
180. See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 965 (June 5, 1788) (Patrick Henry); 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1192 (June 12, 1788)
(William Grayson); 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1211 (June 12, 1788) (Patrick Henry).
181. See 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1230-35 (June 13, 1788) (Patrick Henry); 10 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1243-44 (June 18,
1788) (William Grayson); 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1380 (June 18, 1788) (George Mason); see also supra
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

note 47 and accompanying text (noting the importance of this issue).

182. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 53, at 1241 (June 13, 1788) (James Madison); see also BANNING, supra note 47,
at 257 (arguing for the importance of Madison's speech); HUGH BLAIR GRIGSBY, THE
HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1788, at 232 (R.A. Brock ed., 1890)
(asserting this sequence of speeches was "one of the most intensely interesting and
thrilling scenes in our history.").
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checks and balances of the Constitution are to be an impenetrable wall for some purposes, and a mere cobweb for other

purposes. What kind of Constitution
can this be? I leave
83
Gentlemen to draw the inference.1

Henry had gotten to the heart of the issue. He understood the
text to mean the President and Senate alone would be able to
make treaties that would have the force of law. He objected precisely because the text gave the House no role, and he rejected
184
Madison's effort to explain the problem away.
Critically, however, Henry did not go unanswered. George
Nicholas responded that the House would have an influence,
just as Parliament had an influence on the King of England's
treaty power.1 8 5 Francis Corbin went further: "Treaties are generally of a commercial nature, being a regulation of commercial
intercourse between different nations. In all commercial treaties
it will be necessary to obtain the consent of the representatives. ''1 86 While intended as a defense of Madison's position,
Corbin seemed to adopt some of the arguments made by Mason
and the Federal Farmer.
Treaties also came up during the convention's discussion of
the Supremacy Clause. Henry objected that under the Constitution, "Treaties were to have more force here than in any part of
Christendom.... To make them paramount to the Constitution
and laws of the states, is unprecedented."1 8' 7 Madison responded, "If they are to have any efficacy, they must be the law of
the land," 8 and Nicholas repeated the point.1 9 But Randolph's effort to provide a more conciliatory response recalled
the pamphlet by A Native of Virginia: "neither the life nor property of a citizen .

.

. can be affected by a treaty .

.

. which [is]

binding on the aggregate community in its political, social capacity." 19 Corbin then stated that treaties "are to be binding on the
states only." 19 1 He went on to assert "the difference between a
183. 10

THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 53, at 1247 (June 13, 1788) (Patrick Henry).
184. For Henry's insistence on giving a role to the House, see id. at 1395.
185. See id. at 1251.
186. Id. at 1256.
187. Id. at 1382.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1383; see also id. at 1389.
190. Id. at 1385.
191. Id. at 1392.
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commercial treaty and other treaties," and repeated his point
that commercial treaties require "the consent of the House of
Representatives . . . because of the correspondent alterations
that must be made in the laws. 19 2
At that point Madison again stressed the supremacy of treaties over state law-without mentioning their relation to federal
statutes-and he declared Corbin's statement that treaties were
binding only on the states was "rational."1 9 3 Madison seems to
have been reaching for a middle position, one that preserved
the federalism function of the Supremacy Clause without taking
a clear stand on the separation of powers aspects of the treaty
power. It is difficult to know the impact of Madison's statements-or those of Corbin. Indeed, no clear understanding of
the treaty power and Supremacy Clause emerges from this part
of the debate beyond the federalism idea that treaties would
bind the states.1 94
As the Convention wound to a close, Antifederalists continued to object to the treaty power and Supremacy Clause. Henry
insisted that because treaties would be the supreme law of the
land, "[o] ne amendment which has been wished for... is, that
no treaty shall be made without the consent of a considerable
majority of both Houses."19 5 On June 24, he proposed a list of
amendments that included alterations in the treaty power, and
he asserted adoption of these amendments should be a requirement of ratification.1 9 6 Madison objected to conditioning ratifi192. Id. at 1392-93.
193. Id. at 1395-96.
194. Julian Ku draws the conclusion that Virginia Federalists supported the last-intime rule. See Ku, supra note 15, at 373-75. However, I read these statements differently,
especially in light of Madison's later statements in the Jay Treaty debates.
195. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 53, at 1535-36 (june 25, 1788) (Patrick Henry). In a statement that seems
more directed at federalism than separation of powers concerns, John Tyler declared
"the supremacy of the laws of the Union, and of treaties, are exceedingly dangerous."
10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
53, at 1528 (June 25, 1788) (John Tyler). Not surprisingly, many of the Antifederalist
statements blended federalism and separation of powers criticisms.
196. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 53, at 1479 (June 24, 1788) (Patrick Henry). Henry's amendments were not
included in the journal of that day's proceedings. The reporter noted they were "nearly
the same as those ultimately proposed by the Committee." Id. The amendments were
based on a list prepared by a group of Antifederalists in early June and shared with
Antifederalists in New York. See Letter from George Mason to John Lamb (June 9,
1788), repinted in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
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cation on acceptance of amendments and spoke against some of
Henry's amendments (none involving treaties). But he also expressed his willingness to support amendments "as seemed in his
judgment, to be without danger." 197
On June 25, the convention voted 89-79 to ratify the Constitution unconditionally but with proposed amendments.1 9 The
vote on proposing amendments does not survive, but James
Madison, John Marshall, and George Nicholas (as well as William Grayson, Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph) were appointed to the committee that drafted them.1 99
Two days later, the committee reported a list of recommended
amendments. 20 0

The whole convention approved them the

same day, and again no record exists of the exact vote.20 1
TION, supra note 174, at 818; 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF

supra note 53, at 1514 (discussing the similarities); Alan V. Briceland, Virginia: The Cement of the Union, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, Supra
note 153, at 201, 217. The amendments in the Mason letter include an amendment
about treaties, "not yet finally agreed upon by the Committee," that is very similar to the
one ultimately proposed by the convention except that it would have required House
approval of all commercial treaties. See Letter from George Mason to John Lamb (June
THE CONSTITUTION,

9, 1788), reprinted in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Supra note 174, at 822.

197. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 53, at 1507 (June 24, 1788) (James Madison) (stating he would accept
amendments that are "not objectionable or unsafe ....Not because they are necessary,
but because they can produce no possible danger.").
198. See id. at 1540.
199. See id. at 1541.
200. The records do not reveal divisions of opinion within the committee, but
Madison, Marshall, Nicholas, and Randolph later voted to strike one of the amendments. See The Virginia Convention Debates, reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION supra note 53, at 1556-57. After the conven-

tion, Madison wrote that "several" or "many" of the amendments were "highly objectionable." Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (june 27, 1788), reprinted
in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Supra
note 53, at 1688; James Madison, Letter to George Washington (June 27, 1788), reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 53, at 1688. Corbin wrote, "This whole business was ludicrous and is absurd
in the Extreme.... I wish our friend Madison had not been of the Committee-I am
sure he blushes when it is talked of." Letter from Francis Corbin to Benjamin Rush (July
2, 1788), reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1697. As I suggest in the text, however, it is less likely that
all of the treaty amendments would have been "highly objectionable" to Madison or to
Corbin.
201. The Virginia Convention Debates, reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1558 ; see also RICHARD R.
BEEMAN, THE OLD DOMINION AND THE NEW NATION, 1788-1801, at 11-12 (1972).
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The proposed seventh amendment dealt directly with treaties:
That no commercial treaty shall be ratified without the concurrence of two-thirds of the whole number of the Members
of the Senate; and no treaty, ceding, contracting, restraining,
or suspending the territorial rights or claims of the United
States, or any of them, of their, or any of their rights or claims
to fishing in the American seas, or navigating the American
rivers, shall be made, but in case of the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any such treaty be ratified without
the concurrence of three fourths of the whole number of the
Members of both Houses, respectively.2" 2
This amendment covers some of the issues about navigation and
fishing that Madison raised at the Constitutional Convention. It
also addressed antifederalist concerns about approving treaties
by a two-thirds vote of a quorum and navigation rights on the
Mississippi. It is plainly a compromise, however, because it failed
to satisfy all of the antifederalist concerns about the House's role
in making treaties. Commercial treaties would require House
participation only if they regulated rights to fish American seas
or navigate American rivers, and the House would have no role
in treaties left out of the amendment. Further, any treaty that
did not require House participation would be supreme law upon
ratification.
The fourteenth proposed amendment touched more tangentially on treaties. It addressed concern that the Supremacy
Clause would subject people to suit in federal courts that had
not existed when they took actions (presumably including the
failure to pay British creditors) that formed the basis of a cause
of action: "the Judicial power of the United States shall extend to
no case where the cause of action shall have originated before
the ratification of the Constitution."2 ' Finally, the convention
instructed its representatives in Congress that, until these
amendments were adopted, they were "to conform to the spirit
202. The Virginia Convention Debates, reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
supra note 53, at 1554.
203. Id. at 1555. For Henry's speech on this issue, see 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 53, at 1422 (June 20, 1788)
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

(Patrick Henry). Rhode Island proposed the same amendment when it ratified in 1790.
IN THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1765-1790, at

See WILLIAM R. STAPLES, RHODE ISLAND
678 (1870).
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20 4
of [them] as far as the said Constitution will admit."
By the end of debate, any delegate paying attention probably had a general understanding of what was at stake with the
treaty and Supremacy Clauses. But the numerous evasions, odd
statements, or inconsistencies undermine the likelihood of a
clear and specific understanding of these issues. Lance Banning's conclusion about the convention in general applies
equally well to this specific issue: "The victory at Richmond was
conditional and incomplete. ' 20 5 The delegates voted to ratify
with proposed amendments that would alter a treaty power that
was not fully understood, and they agreed Virginia's members of
Congress would adhere to those amendments to at least some
20 6
extent.
New York. Whatever their importance in other states, the
Federal Farmer essays, which raised a series of concerns about
the treaty power, were important in New York.2 7 Expressing
views similar to those of the Federal Farmer, Cato (who was likely
Governor George Clinton or Abraham Yates, Jr.), stated the
House of Representatives should participate in making treaties if
they are to be supreme law.20 8 Writing in support of the Constitution, Americanus defended the power of the President and
Senate to make treaties that would be the supreme law of the
land, but he admitted, "So far as an article of a treaty may be
opposed to, or in any way contravene an existing law of the land,
so far perhaps the concurrence of the whole Legislature might
204. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 53, at 1556.
205. BANNING, supra note 47, at 264; see also BEEMAN, supra note 201, at 12, 21-23
(reaching a similar conclusion). I agree with Kesavan that other commentators overstate the ability of this evidence to support a presumption for or against self-execution
and that a middle position is more reasonable, but I disagree that the best conclusion is
clear support for partial self-execution in the sense Kesavan defines it. See Kesavan,
supra note 7, at 1584-86. Uncertainty demands a far larger share in any conclusion.
206. Madison's work on behalf of a bill of rights is consistent with this pledge, and
one could interpret his role in the Jay Treaty debates in the same way.
207. For the importance of the first series in New York, see 19 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 106, at 203-07. For the
second series, see 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-

TUTION 553 (John P. Kaminski ed., 2004).

For a useful overview of the dominant
themes in the New York ratification debate, see HULSEBOSCH, supra note 49, at 209-53.
208. Cato VI, N.Y.J. (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 106, at 416, 419-20. For attribution,

19 THE DOCUMENTARY
note 106, at 58-59.
see

HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

Supra
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be proper to give it validity. "209
Writing in support of a bill of rights, Brutus (who was likely
Robert Yates or Melancton Smith) also objected to the treaty
power. He could "not find any limitation, or restriction, to the
exercise of this power," even though treaties would "supersede
the constitutions of all the states. '21 0 He later made clear his
understanding-and his objection based on it-that treaties
would be enforceable by individuals in judicial proceedings: "For
as treaties will be the law of the land, every person who have
rights or privileges secured by treaty, will have aid of the courts
of law, in recovering them. ' 211 Another writer expressed concern about the relationship of the Constitution, laws, and treaties under the Supremacy Clause. He wondered how they could
all be supreme at the same time, and whether treaties or laws
would trump provisions of the Constitution.21 2 DeWitt Clinton
worried about the ability of treaties and laws to override state
constitutions under the Supremacy Clause.2 13
In Federalist 64, John Jay drew a clearer line, consistent with
his earlier views: "Some are displeased with" the treaty power
"because, as the treaties, when made, are to have the force of
laws, they should be made only by men invested with legislative
authority. ' 214 Analogizing the treaty power to the power of
209. Americanus VII, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, (Jan. 21, 1788), reprinted in 20 THE
207, at
629, 632. There is no evidence this series of letters had significant impact. See 19 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 106, at
171.
210. Brutus II, N.Y.J. (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 106, at 154, 159. For attribution,
see 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note

note 106, at 103.

211. Brutus XIII, N.Y. J., (Feb. 21, 1788), reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 207, at 795. Cincinnatus
objected that "the unlimited power . . . of making treaties," threatened freedom of

speech. Cincinnatus I, To James Wilson, Esq., N.Y.J. (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 19 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Supra note 106, at
160, 163.
212. A Countryman IV (Hugh Hughes), N.Y.J. (Dec. 15, 1787), reprinted in 19 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 106, at
424, 426.
213. A Countryman IV (DeWitt Clinton), N.Y.J. (Jan. 19, 1788), reprinted in 20 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 207, at
597.
214. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (JohnJay) (March 5, 1978), reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Supra note 114.
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courts to make binding decisions, Jay observed that not all legal
rules must be created by legislatures. 215 He went on to address
the concern that treaties would be "the supreme laws of the land"
and the claim that "treaties, like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. 2 1 6 He responded by arguing that, because
"a treaty is only another name for a bargain," the consent of
both parties to a treaty is "essential . . . to alter or cancel
them. ' 21 7 This characteristic, combined with their status as supreme law, put them "beyond the lawful reach of legislative
acts. ' 218 That is to say, Jay asserted treaties would trump federal
and state legislation, but neither state nor federal laws could affect a treaty.
For his part, Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 22
about the struggle to obtain state compliance with treaties. The
primary difficulty, he wrote, was "the want of a judiciary power
[in the Articles of Confederation]. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation."219 Hamilton then laid down what he believed was the essential rule:
The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all,
must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true
import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws,
be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uni215. See id.
216. See id. (emphasis in original).
217. Id.
218. Id. Kesavan and Ku suggest this passage applies only to state law. See Kesavan,
supra note 7, at 1552; Ku, supra note 15, at 376. I do not find their arguments persuasive in light of Jay's assertion that only the treaty partners could "alter or cancel" a
treaty. My interpretation also makes Jay's views consistent with later Federalist positions. Worth noting is that Jay's "Address to the People of the State of New York" was
probably more influential in the New York ratification debate. In that essay, he mentioned "treaties of commerce" briefly, when describing the problems of treaty enforcement under the Articles of Confederation. See A Citizen of NewYork, An Address to the
People of the State of New York (April 15, 1788), reprinted in 20 THE DOcUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 207, at 922, 930. The
general thrust of his essay was pragmatic: whatever its flaws, the proposed constitution
was the best that could be expected, and it was unlikely anything better would result
from starting over. Melancton Smith's important essay opposing unconditional ratification, which does not mention treaties, argued that a better deal was possible. See A
Plebian, An Address to the People of the State of New York (April 17, 1788), reprinted in
20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUpra note
207, at 942-62.
219. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Dec. 14, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 104, at 437, 442.
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formity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted
in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be instituted under
the same authority which
22 0
forms the treaties themselves.
Hamilton's focus was on the federalism aspects of the treaty
power under the Supremacy Clause, in light of the need to make
treaties directly enforceable. But his broad language seems to
encompass separation of powers issues as well, such that treaties
simply will be federal law, will apply directly to individual legal
rights, and will be enforced by federal courts.2 2 1
220. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (May 28, 1788),
reprinted in 18 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
96, 98 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1995) (giving federal courts jurisdiction over treaties was appropriate because "the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal
of a part"). Yoo argues Hamilton was addressing the deficiencies of the Articles of
Confederation in Federalist22, and non-self-execution was irrelevant to Hamilton's concern about uniform interpretation of federal law. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution,
supra note 7, at 2056-57. As Flaherty points out, Yoo's argument can succeed only by
ignoring Hamilton's specific assertion that treaties would be the law of the land, subject
to interpretation by courts, "as far as respects individuals." See Flaherty, supra note 7, at
2135-36.
221. In Medellin v. Texas, the Supreme Court cited Hamilton's Federalist33, which
the Court described as "comparing laws that individuals are 'bound to observe' as 'the
supreme law of the land' with 'a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties."' Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 33

(Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 2, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 155, at 216, 222. But Hamilton was not
discussing the status of treaties under the Supremacy Clause in Federalist 33. He was
discussing the importance of the Supremacy Clause, and he insisted federal laws must
be supreme if they are to be laws at all. He illustrated his point in the following way:
A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule
which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. This results from
every political association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws
of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of
political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter
may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom they are
composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith
of the parties, and not a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jan. 2, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 155, at 216,
222. Hamilton plainly is not referring to the legal effect of treaties under the Constitution. Rather, he is distinguishing the impact of the Constitution from that of a treaty.
Treaties in general, without regard to the Supremacy Clause, do not create governments, whereas the Constitution would. As a result, it and the laws enacted under it
must be supreme. The Medellin majority distorted Hamilton's meaning by using it as
raw material for a more useful quotation, which allowed it to cite The Federalist as clear
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On the role of the House, however, Hamilton arguably
hedged a bit in Federalist 69. Discussing the British version of the
treaty power, he observed:
The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing itself
in altering the existing laws to conform them to the stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given birth to
the imagination that its co-operation was necessary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity of
adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and
commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new state of things, to keep the machine from
running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is no
comparison between the intended power of the President
and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can
do with the concurperform alone what the other can only
2 22
rence of a branch of the legislature.
Hamilton seems to admit U.S. treaties would have the same force
as British treaties, but only with Senate consent, while in England the King did not need Parliamentary consent. Congress as
a whole might also have a role in treaty implementation-in "adjusting" the laws-although that role, like Parliament's, would
be supplementary. Hamilton likely was admitting simply that
some treaties require legislation to be implemented fully and
was not adopting Madison's comments in Federalist 53.22s
Hamilton's final significant statement on treaties is enigmatic. He wrote in Federalist 75 that the treaty power "partake [s]
more of the legislative than of the executive character, though it
does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of either of
them.

'224

The goals of treaties:

are CONTRACTS with foreign nations which have the force
of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They
are not rules prescribed from the sovereign to the subject but
support for its conclusion. Although other passages of The Federalist provide modest
support for the Court's reasoning, the Court's version of The Federalist is inaccurate.
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Mar. 14, 1788), reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY
supra note 114, at 387, 390.

HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

223. See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1553-55.
224. THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mar. 26, 1788), reprinted in 16
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Supra note 114,
at 481, 482.
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agreements between sovereign and sovereign.... [T]he vast
importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws,
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a part of
2 25
the legislative body in the office of making them.

Although the Senate was well suited for this task, the House was
not, because its members would not be as wise, and its numbers
would create "inconvenience and expense. ' 226 This passage
seems to assume treaties would operate directly as laws but obfuscates the issue by suggesting they would not operate as rules
binding on individuals.2 2 7

The records of the New York convention are incomplete.
Antifederalists held a large majority as the convention began,
but most of them supported the general idea of the Constitution
and sought primarily to condition ratification on a series of prior
amendments. 228 Robert Livingston led off the proceedings with
a lengthy speech in support of the Constitution. Among other
things, he noted the problem that under the articles, Congress
could make treaties, "but of what avail is it for Congress to make
229
treaties without being able to compel an observance of them?"
225. Id.
226. Id. Hamilton assumed the Senate's power of advice and consent would include participation in negotiations, so that including the House in a process of this kind
would indeed add "inconvenience and expense."
227. See Flaherty, supra note 7, at 2138-39 (arguing Federalist 75 did not back away
from self-execution). In Federalist 78 Hamilton discussed the last-in-time rule in the
context of statutes and said it would not apply between the Constitution and federal
statutes because "the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act
of an inferior and subordinate authority." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (May 28, 1788), reprinted in 18 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THIE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 220, at 87, 90.
Kesavan takes this as instructive for

treaty-statute conflicts. See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1492-93. Hamilton's later Camillus
essays suggest he thought treaties were superior to federal statutes and the last-in-time
rule did not apply to conflicts between them. See 1 CHARLdES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATYMAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 449-450 (1902) (arguing Hamilton believed trea-

ties to be superior to statutes).
228. See LINDA GRANT DE PAUw, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR: NEW YORK STATE AND THE

CONSTITUTION 175-79 (1966);John P. Kaminski, New York: The Reluctant Pillar, in THE
RELUCTANT PILLAR:

NEW YORK AND THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 48,

114 (Stephen L. Schechter ed., 1987); cf Robin Brooks, Alexander Hamilton, Melancton
Smith, and the Ratification of the Constitution in New York, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 340, 344, 346
(1967) (questioning De Pauw's assertions that issue of when to amend "'was almost
trivial'" and Antifederalists intended to ratify in any event," but also noting "many Antis
could live with the Constitution, whereas Federalists could not or would not live without
it-a factor which told in the end.").
229. 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 228, at 1694.

2009]

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES

1255

He also declared a federal judiciary was necessary for "the construction of treaties and other great national objects. ' 2 0 But the
convention quickly bogged down in a clause-by-clause examination of the constitution-urged by Federalists who wanted to
draw out the proceedings while waiting for word first from New
Hampshire and then from Virginia.2 31
On July 2, news arrived that Virginia had ratified. It was
now clear not only that the Constitution would go into effect
(thanks to New Hampshire's ratification), but also that the other
pivotal states had signed on. Federalists stopped debating (and
delaying), and they made little response to the series of amendments submitted by Antifederalists. 23 2 Thus, when John Lansing
proposed an amendment on July 7 that would modify the
Supremacy Clause with respect to treaties-"no treaty ought to
operate so as to alter the constitution of any state; nor ought any
commercial treaty to operate so as to abrogate any law of the
United States " 233-no
response appears in the Convention
records. Lansing's proposal had common elements with the suggestion of the Pennsylvania minority but did not go as far.
Over the next two days, Antifederalists caucused and agreed
to support ratification on the condition that the federal government's power over the state would be limited until four specific
amendments were adopted after a second convention. 234 They
also submitted a long list of explanatory statements and recommended amendments. One of the recommended amendments
was a less aggressive revision of the treaty amendment: "That no
treaty is to be construed to operate so as to alter the Constitution
of any state." 2 35 The reasons for the change are unclear. Deletion of the clause on commercial treaties may have been strategic, or Antifederalists may have determined it was not necessary.
230. Id. at 1687.
231. See DE PAUW, supra note 228, at 193.
232. See 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
TION, supra note 228, at 107; DE PAUW, supra note 228, at 216.

OF THE CONSTITU-

233. 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 228, at 2108.
234. See 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 228, at 107-08; DE PAUW, supra note 228, at 219-20; see also 22 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 228, at
2113-14 (reprinting relevant portions of newspaper reports).

235. 22

THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

supra note 228, at 2121.
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The remaining days of the convention were devoted to the
form of ratification. Eventually, a handful of Antifederalists led
by Melancton Smith decided to vote for ratification without specific conditions precedent or subsequent-not because they converted to the federalist cause, but because they concluded a defective constitution was better than nothing. 23 6 On July 26, the
Convention voted 30-27 to ratify "in confidence" that the proposed amendments, including the treaty amendment, would "receive an early and mature consideration. '"237 Linda De Pauw suggests the thirty-two recommended amendments, which included
the treaty amendment, were not as important as the twenty-three
explanatory amendments (many of which ended up in the Bill of
Rights).z3 Whether or not she is correct, adoption of the Bill of
Rights undermined efforts to seek more fundamental changes in
239
the document.
North Carolina. Treaties were a frequent topic of debate during the first North Carolina convention. William Lenoir led off
by objecting that the President could join the Senate in making
treaties "which are to be the supreme law of the land. This is a
legislative power given to the President. "240 Although Lenoir appears to have thought treaties would have the same status as laws,
the response from Archibald Maclaine confused the issue. In
part repeating the claim made in South Carolina byJohn Pringle
and in Virginia by A Native of Virginia and Edmund Randolph,
Maclaine declared treaties were supreme law "for the most obvious reasons":
that laws, or legislative acts, operated upon individuals, but
that treaties acted upon states-that, unless they were the supreme law of the land, they could have no validity at all-that
this case as a legislator, but rather
the President did not act in
241
in his executive capacity.
236. See Brooks, supra note 228, at 356;

DE PAUW,

supra note 228, at 252-54; 22 THE
supra note 228, at

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

114.
237. See New York Ratifies the Constitution (July 26, 1788), reprinted in 18 THE
supra note 220, at
294, 300.
238. DE PAUW, supra note 228, at 259-60.
239. See id. at 274.
240. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 27 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (July 24, 1788).
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

241. Id. at 28.
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Responding to the ambiguities of Maclaine's statement, James
Iredell stated that Lenoir's understanding was correct (even as
he disagreed with Lenoir on the larger issue): "When treaties are
made, they become as valid as legislative acts. I apprehend that
if
every act of the government, legislative, executive, or judicial,242
in pursuance of a constitutional power, is the law of the land.
At this point, according to the notes, "[s]everal members expressed dissatisfaction at the inconsistency (as they conceived it)
of the expressions.

243

On July 28, William Porter objected:
IT]here is a power vested in the Senate and President to
make treaties, which shall be the supreme law of the land.
Which among us can call them to account? I always thought
there could be no proper exercise of power without the suffrage of the people; yet the House of Representatives has no
power to intermeddle with treaties. 4 4
Porter later repeated his point with greater clarity: "as treaties
were the supreme law of the land, the House of Representatives
ought to have a vote in making them, as well as in passing
them.124 5 William Davie conceded the premise that treaties are

"the supreme law of the land" and "paramount to an ordinary
act of legislation," but he insisted the same was true in "[a] 11 civilized nations. '24 6 He added that the peace treaty was also the
supreme law of the land under the Articles, even though some
states disagreed or (in North Carolina) treated it as such only
after passing implementing legislation, 247 but he never ad-

dressed Porter's conclusion that the status of treaties as supreme
law made the House's involvement necessary.
As the Convention went on, Iredell continued to assert that
treaties automatically would operate as enforceable law, but he
softened the argument with an analogy to British practice, which
he understood to include a role for Parliament in adjusting the
laws "to make alterations in a particular system which the change
of circumstances requires. "248 Addressing the more general
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id. (parenthetical in original).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 119.
Id.
See id. at 120.
Id. at 128.
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question of the relative powers of the House and Senate, he suggested the House would be as powerful as the Senate because
the House would have the appropriations power and "may at any
time compel the Senate to agree to a reasonable measure, by
withholding supplies till the measure is consented to. '249 Samuel Spencer responded, "If the whole legislative body-if the
House of Representatives do not interfere in making treaties, I
think they ought at least to have the sanction of the whole Senate."2 50
Treaties came up again during discussion of the Supremacy
Clause. Defending the clause in its entirety, Iredell asked, "What
is the meaning of this, but that as we have given power we will
support the execution of it?" 251 Davie made clear the legal status
of treaties as supreme law equated with the ability of courtspreferably federal courts-to implement them: "It was necessary
that treaties should operate as laws upon individuals. They
ought to be binding upon us the moment they are made....
[T]here ought, therefore, to be a paramount tribunal, which
252
should have ample power to carry them [treaties] into effect.
Maclaine agreed that "[t] he treaty of peace with Great Britain
was the supreme law of the land; yet it was disregarded, for want
of a federal judiciary. "253 On July 30, William Lancaster summed
up the antifederalist view of these assertions:
Treaties are to be the supreme law of the land. This has been
sufficiently discussed: it must be amended in some way or
other. If the Constitution be adopted, it ought to be the supreme law of the land, and a perpetual rule for the governors
and governed. But if treaties are to be the supreme law of the
land, it may repeal the laws
of different states, and render
254
nugatory our bill of rights.
249. Id. at 129. Note Iredell did not speak of "influence" in the way that Wilson,
Madison, Nicholas, and Corbin had. His statements are more in line with Hamilton's in
Federalist69. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Mar. 14, 1788), reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 114, at 387, 390.
250. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 131 Uonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
251. Id. at 178 (July 29).
252. See id. at 158, 160 ("It is necessary that the Constitution should be carried into
effect, that the laws should be executed, justice equally done to all the community, and
treaties observed. These ends can only be accomplished by a general paramountjudiciary.").
253. See id. at 164; id. at 188 (Samuel Johnston).
254. Id. at 215 (July 30).
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The convention rejected ratification by a vote of 184-84.255
It also insisted on several amendments as a condition of any future ratification. Two of the amendments were identical to Virginia's proposals on adoption of treaties and the judicial
power. 256 The North Carolina convention added a third that was
similar to the one proposed by the Pennsylvania dissenters and
the initial version of the New York proposal:
That no treaties which shall be directly opposed to the existing laws of the United States in Congress assembled shall
be valid until such laws shall be repealed, or made conformable to such treaty; nor shall any treaty be valid which is contradictory to the Constitution of the United States.2 57
These proposed amendments arguably suggest a shared understanding that, unless changed, the proposed Constitution would
make treaties self-executing and superior to federal statutes to at
least some degree. But the amendments also reflect the concern
and uncertainty attached to these issues and could simply have
sought to achieve clarity about the interaction of treaties with
state and federal law. 58
North Carolina ultimately ratified by a large margin in November 1789. No records were kept of the debates at the second
convention, 259 but treaties remained an issue. James Gallaway
sought to make ratification conditional upon the adoption of
five amendments, including the earlier proposed amendment
on the relationship between treaties and federal statutes. 2 6' The
convention soundly rejected the proposal and voted to accept
255. See id. at 250-51.
256. See North Carolina Convention Amendments (Aug. 2, 1788), reprinted in 18
supra note 220,
at 204-205, 312, 317-18; 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 245-46 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
257. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 246 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)).
258. Yoo suggests Iredell's and Davie's statements have little value because they
contributed to North Carolina's initial decision not to ratify. See Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution, supra note 7, at 2070-72. The treaty power was obviously controversial, but
other writers identify economic concerns, fear of centralization, and support for a bill
of rights as key factors in the convention's decision. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note
29, at 59, 62; WILLIAM S. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES 226-27
(1989); WILLIS P. WHICHARD, JUSTICE JAMES IREDELL 65-67, 69, 85 (2000).

259. See POWELL, supra note 258, at 228-29.
260. Journal of the Convention of the State of North Carolina, Nov. 21, 1789, at 6

(1789).
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the Constitution.2 6 1 Gallaway then moved to recommend the
same five amendments to Congress, and his proposal was referred to a committee.2 6 2 Two days later, the committee proposed eight amendments to which the convention agreed-but
the treaty amendment was not in the final list. 263 To the extent
that amendment had reflected concerns about regulation of
commerce, its place may have been taken by the sixth proposed
amendment, which declared "[t]hat no navigation law, or law
regulating commerce, shall be passed, without the consent of
'264 Of
two-thirds of the members present in both Houses.
course, the amendment on commercial legislation would likely
satisfy concerns about treaties only if the delegates believed commercial treaties would not be self-executing.
Several years later, during the Jay Treaty debates, James Holland gave a version of how concerns about the treaty power were
resolved, and his version provides a link between commercial
treaties and commercial legislation:
at the Convention of North Carolina, this clause, which gives
the Treaty-making power to the President and Senate, was
considered by some as an exceptionable part, on account of
the indefiniteness and generality of the expression. It was
said, that the President, with two-thirds of the Senate, could
make Treaties and make stipulations unfavorable to commerce. But those in favor of its adoption (of which I had the
honor to be a member) said, that commercial regulations
had been previously and expressly given to Congress, and to
them secured. Under that conception I was in its favor; but
should5 have been opposed to it upon the other construc26
tion.
Holland's account is consistent with the convention journal and
with the attitudes of many North Carolina Federalists.26 6 Beyond
that, its accuracy is difficult to confirm or challenge.
Most histories of North Carolina ratification suggest the
state's change of heart had little to do with the treaty power and
261. Id. at 6-7, 13.
262. Id. at 13-14.
263. Id. at 15 (Nov. 23).
264. Id. The link between treaties and navigation acts was a concern of Mason's at
the Constitutional Convention and resurfaced at the Virginia Convention.
265. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 546 (1796).
266. See Powell, supra note 258, at 230-31.
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instead derived from Congress's approval of the proposed Bill of
Rights in September 1789 and the fact that the new nation had
established a working government. Because much antifederalist
rhetoric in North Carolina had focused on the absence of a bill
of rights, its imminent inclusion in the Constitution made their
continued opposition politically impossible in the now isolated
state-even though many of the amendments they had demanded, including the treaty amendments, involved structural
*
267
issues.
The Remaining States. A writer in the NewJerseyjournaladmitted that the President and Senate might abuse their power to
make treaties that would be the supreme law of the land, but he
insisted that abuse was possible under any system of government
and the remedy for such abuses lay with the people. 26 8 The published proceedings of the remaining states do not reveal any discussions of the Supremacy Clause or treaty power; nor is there
any evidence that either topic was an important issue.2 6 9
267. See Whichard, supra note 258; Michael Lienesch, North Carolina: Preserving
Rights, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 343, 363-64 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael
Lienesch eds., 1989); William S. Price, Jr., "There Ought to Be a Bill of Rights": North
CarolinaEnters a New Nation, " in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES, supra note 162, at
424, 438-40; Alan D. Watson, States' Rights and Agrarianism Ascendant, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 153, at 251, 264-65; see also POWELL, supra note 258, at
228-29 (suggesting Bill of Rights was not as powerful as an influence).
268. Reply to George Mason's Objections to the Constitution, N.J. J., Dec. 26,
1787, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 130, at 154, 159. The New Jersey convention proceedings reveal no
substantive debate of any kind and there was little opposition or conflict. See 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 130, at

177-88; see also Sara M. Shumer, New Jersey: Property and the Price of Republican Politics, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 71 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds.,
1989); Eugene R. Sheridan, A Study in Paradox: New Jersey and the Bill of Rights, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES, supra note 162, at 246, 270.

269. Ratification materials from Delaware are "scant." "Both political factions supported the Constitution, and the vote ... was unanimous." Gaspare J. Saladino, Delaware: Armed in the Cause of Freedom, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES, supra note

162, at 274, 298. Political self-interest, financial implications, and economic connections with Pennsylvania appear to have been controlling. See Gaspare P. Saladino, Delaware: Independence and the Concept of a Commercial Republic, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 29, 43-46 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). Georgia also
ratified by a unanimous vote, and "[1]ittle is known about the public debate over the
Constitution or the debate that took place in the state ratifying convention." Kenneth
Coleman, Frontier Haven: Georgia and the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
STATES, supra note 162, at 455; see also Edward J. Cashin, Georgia: Searchingfor Security, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 93, 111 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds.,

1989) (asserting the primary issue "was a search for security, not only freeing them from
very immediate fears, but also opening them to vast new opportunities."). New Hamp-
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The question, then, is what this silence means. These states
voted to ratify without conditions, which indicates at least general agreement with the terms of the Constitution. But the failure to debate specific issues suggests many people in these states
never became aware of or grappled with the ambiguities of the
document, including the complexities of the treaty and
Supremacy Clauses that emerged in other state debates. In the
absence of a clear default position-such as adopting or rejecting a clearly understood British practice-the existence of
some kind of public debate is critical to recovering a useful original understanding in these states. Without that debate, no specific set of understandings may ever have existed. Nor can the
debates in other states simply substitute for this absence. In a
critical number of states, all we have are generalities that undermine the effort to apply original understandings to specific issues of constitutional interpretation.
E. Summing Up
The extant debates reveal several federalist positions on implementation of treaties. First, nearly everyone who addressed
federalism issues agreed treaties would bind the states and override conflicting state law. Second, several argued simply that
treaties would be self-executing as federal law. Many of these
participants suggested that treaties would trump federal statutes.
Others, such as Hamilton, Iredell, Madison, and Wilson, affirmed self-execution while also stressing the practical power the
shire held an initial convention, at which it became clear there were not enough votes
to ratify. The delegates adjourned for several months before ratifying in June 1788 by a
vote of 5747, with proposed amendments that ignored the treaty power and Supremacy
Clause. No record of proceedings was kept. The debates in Massachusetts were influential "because ties between the two states were close, and Massachusetts newspapers
circulated widely in New Hampshire," but religion, slavery, and the lack of a bill of
rights were the primary issues. Jean Yarbrough, New Hampshire:Puritanism and the M oral
Foundations of America, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 235, 236-37 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). In Rhode Island, the primary issues were state
debt and paper money. See John P. Kaminski, Rhode Island: protecting State Interests, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 368 ((Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds.,
1989)); see also PATRICK T. CONLEY, First in War, Last in Peace: Rhode Island and the Constitution, 1786-1790, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 153, at 269, 285.
For ratification proceedings in Rhode Island, see Staples, supra note 203, at 633-80; see
generally THEODORE FOSTER'S MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION HELD AT SOUTH KINGSTOWN, RHODE ISLAND, IN MARCH, 1790, WHICH FAILED TO ADOPT THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (Robert C. Cotner ed., 1929).
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House would possess. Importantly, this position need not imply
that legislative implementation is necessary for a treaty to become law. More likely, it reflects an appreciation of the practical
realities of governing and legislating. Full implementation
might require legislation-such as the creation of administrative
mechanisms for efficient enforcement-but the treaty would be
law whether or not these steps were taken.
This focus on practice shades into a final position that
emerges in some of Madison's statements and in those of several
other participants: the possibility that many treaties cannot be
enforced without legislation, especially in the separation of powers context, because appropriations and administrative arrangements will be a necessary part of their implementation-something which seems particularly true of commercial treaties. For
people with these views, the interaction between treaties and existing federal statutes under the Supremacy Clause was also unclear. More generally, as the debate shifted from federalism and
general theoretical claims to separation of powers and the practical implications of declaring treaties to be supreme law, many
participants suggested more nuanced positions that were not always internally consistent or consistent with the views of their
allies.2 7 °
Antifederalists such as the Federal Farmer went through a
similar process from a different direction. By the end of ratification, participants on both sides appear to have concluded that
treaties would trump state law under the Supremacy Clause and
would at least sometimes be enforceable in judicial proceedings
regardless of state law. 2 7 1 On other issues, such as the role of the
House of Representatives and the interaction between treaties
270. Madison continued to mull over these issues. Two years after ratification, he
shifted his position on the Supremacy Clause and seemed to assume self-execution
would be the norm: "As Treaties are declared to be the supreme law of the land, I
should suppose that the words of the treaty are to be taken for the words of the law,
unless the stipulation be expressly or necessarily executory." He went on, "[t]reaties as
I understand the Constitution are made supreme over the constitutions and laws of the
particular States, and, like a subsequent law of the U.S., over pre-existing laws of the U.S.
provided however that the Treaty be within the prerogative of making Treaties, which
no doubt has certain limits." Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 2,
1791), reprinted in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,

CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 342-44

(1981) (emphasis added). Five years later, however, in the Jay Treaty debates, he argued that the Supremacy Clause was about federalism and rejected the idea that treaties
displace federal statutes. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 488-93 (1796).

271. See Golove, supra note 7, at 1132-33.

1264

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:1209

and federal law, no consensus emerges, in part because some
Antifederalists turned their federalism concerns into separation
of powers arguments. 2 72 Numerous participants agreed that
some treaties could not function as law by themselves, with the
result that legislation-and thus House participation-would be
necessary. Although tensions existed in the federalist position,
and some points of agreement were loose and tentative, the turn
to a more nuanced view of treaty implementation prefigured the
self-execution doctrine ultimately adopted by the Supreme
Court, while the lack of any consensus on the interaction between treaties and federal statutes set the stage for the last-intime rule.
Every state ultimately adopted the Constitution as written.
Although the treaty power and Supremacy Clause were controversial, and amendments were proposed, no changes were made
to the document. Yet Federalists made enough ambiguous statements about treaties that the ultimate failure to enact an amendment cannot be conclusive. Further, the close votes in several
states made many participants aware that compromises would
have to emerge as the new government got underway-a government whose ranks would include Antifederalists as well as Federalists. That is to say, Federalists won the important victory of getting the Constitution ratified, but their victory was less clear on
the equally important questions of what it would mean in practice. Indeed, the idea that the meaning of the Constitution
should emerge from the dialogue between Federalists and Antifederalists had resonance well beyond the debate over treaties
and became an important part of the Jeffersonian realignment
273
of American politics that began in the late 1790s.
III. INTERLUDE: WARE V. HYLTON-TREATIES
AND FEDERALISM
During the Revolution, many states confiscated the property
of loyalists and interfered with efforts by British creditors to col272. See id. at 1132-34.

273. For an insightful discussion of these issues, including the reminders that
neither "Federalists" nor "Antifederalists" were fixed groups with defined memberships
and consistent ideologies, and that the process of putting the Constitution into practice
created realignments and comprises almost immediately, see DAVID J. SIEMERS, RATIFYING THE REPUBLIC: ANTIFEDERALISTS AND FEDERALISTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2002);
see also Cornell, supra note 29, at 189, 191, 225-26, 244-45.
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lect debts.2 7 4 In response, the 1783 peace treaty declared, "It is
agreed that creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful
impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money,
of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted. ' 275 State enforcement of this provision was spotty under the Articles, but after
adoption of the Constitution some creditors saw a new opportunity to obtain payments. 276 Artful litigation and judicial reluctance to decide constitutional issues delayed the day of reckoning,27 7 and the debt issue was ultimately resolved by subsequent
treaties.2 78
The conflict among the 1783 treaty, the Supremacy Clause,
and state law came to the Supreme Court in 1796, in Ware v.
Hylton.2 79 A British creditor sued a Virginia debtor in the federal
circuit court, seeking payment on a 1774 debt. The debtor argued the debt had been partially discharged by his compliance
with the Virginia sequestration statute-which allowed debtors
to pay some or all of the debt to the state and receive a discharge-while the creditor claimed the peace treaty repealed
the Virginia statute and nullified all proceedings under it. The
circuit court agreed with the debtor's discharge claim.28 °
274. See ELKINS & MCKTIrRiCK, supra note 29, at 90-91; GOEBEL, supra note 40, at
749-50; JENSEN, supra note 53, at 276, 278; McDONALD, supra note 38, at 151-52.

275. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 45, art. 4.
276. See GOEBEL, supra note 49, at 742; R. KENT NEW-YEAR,

JOHN MARSHALL AN D THE

HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 97 (2001).

277. See id. at 101; DAVID ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE'S PROGRESS: JOHN MARSHALL
FROM REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA TO THE SUPREME COURT 133-35 (2000). In addition,
Congress's decision not to provide federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over federal questions, and its imposition of a US$500 amount in controversy requirement for diversity cases, meant that many-perhaps most-cases that implicated
the treaty were relegated to state court. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark,
The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 44 (2009).
278. TheJay Treaty of 1794 created an arbitration commission for unsettled debts,
with payment by the government rather than by the debtors. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of
America, U.S.-U.I., art. 6, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, 119-20; GOEBEL, supra note 49, at 749. The
commission ran into problems, and an 1802 treaty provided for a lump sum payment by
the United States to settle outstanding claims. See Convention Between the United
States and Great-Britain, U.S-U.K, 1802, 8 Stat. 196; GOEBEL, supra note 49, at 755-56.
279. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
280. See GOEBEL, supra note 49, at 748, 750. On the discharge issue, Justice Iredell
and District Judge Cyrus Griffin sided with the debtor (Hylton), while Chief Justice Jay
dissented in favor of the creditor (Ware). The court found for Ware on the remaining
issues. See id. at 750. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, Jay had resigned, and Chief Justice Ellsworth had yet to take his seat. See id. at 749, 751 & n.126.
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The Supreme Court reversed. As the junior member of the
Court, Justice Chase delivered the first opinion. On the question of the treaty's impact on Virginia law, he declared it was
"superior to the laws of the states" under the Articles of Confederation. 21' Even if there were doubts on that issue, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution had settled the matter: "A
treaty cannot be the Supreme law of the land, that is of all the
United States, if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its
way." 28 2 He went on to emphasize the sweeping nature of the
Supremacy Clause: "on the same ground that a treaty can repeal
a law of the state, it can nullify it."28 3 The result was that the
1783 treaty did not merely preempt the Virginia sequestration
statute; it also retroactively nullified all acts taken under it that
were inconsistent with the treaty.
Even as he espoused a strong view of the Supremacy
Clause-consistent with his interpretation of the Constitution at
the Maryland convention-Chase also gestured toward a more
complex position. Twice, he distinguished between treaty provisions that merely agree certain actions shall be taken, and provisions that provide a clear directive courts can apply immediately. 28 4 Chase appears to have accepted the rule of treaty interpretation that the language of a treaty provision might indicate it
Ellsworth's opinion in Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F. Cas. 336, 339-40 (C.C.D. N.C. 1796) (No.
5980), suggests he would have voted to reverse.
281. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 236.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 242. On the use of the word "repeal," see Amendments of the Minority
of the Maryland Convention, reprinted in 17 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 107.
284. See id. at 240:
It is expressly contracted . . . that certain things shall not take place. This
stipulation is direct. The distinction is self-evident, between a thing that shall
not happen, and an agreement that a third power shall prevent a certain thing
being done. The first is obligatory on the parties contracting. The latter will
depend on the will of another; and although the parties contracting, had
power to lay him under a moral obligation for compliance, yet there is a very
great difference in the two cases.
See id. See also id. at 244:
The fourth article .. .is not a stipulation that certain acts shall be done, and
that it was necessary for the legislatures of individual states, to do those acts;
...it is an express agreement, that certain things shall not be permitted the
American courts ofjustice; and ... it is a contract, on behalf of those courts,
that they will not allow such acts to be pleaded in bar, to prevent a recovery of
certain British debts.
See id.
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requires implementation by the political branches, but that provisions capable of operating without legislation go into effect immediately. 2 5 While plainly an endorsement of the view that
some treaty provisions will therefore be self-executing in constitutional terms, Chase also recognized the Supremacy Clause
2 6
could not convert treaty language into something it was not.
Moreover, Chase suggested that self-execution doctrine-consistent with the Supremacy Clause-would operate most powerfully
at the federalism level, so that states are more likely than Congress to be bound by treaty provisions. 2 7 This approach to selfexecution is consistent with and may draw on Chase's past concerns about commercial treaties.
With the exception of James Iredell, the other justices were
more succinct. Justice Patterson, for example, declared "Congress could, by treaty, repeal the act, and annul every thing done
under it." 28 8 Because the clear aim of the treaty was "to restore
the creditor and debtor to their original state" by "repeal[ling]
the legislative act of Virginia . . . and with regard to the creditor
annul[ling] every thing done under it," 289 he voted to reverse.
Justice Wilson-who had made nuanced statements about the
treaty power at the Pennsylvania convention-said simply, "Independent of the Constitution," the treaty "annuls the confiscation" because the state of Virginia "was a party to the making of
the treaty. ' 2 0 Justice Cushing observed that Virginia could
make whatever rules it pleased, "[b]ut here is a treaty, the su285. See Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 7, at 19-21 (noting the importance of
this distinction for treaty interpretation).
286. As Yoo observes, Chase's opinion "contained language that suggests that treaties calling for legislative action still must be implemented by Congress." Yoo, supra
note 7, at 2080.
287. Thus, Chase's insistence that in the revolutionary era Congress possessed "the
great rights of external sovereignty," while the states "retained all internal sovereignty,"
supports his self-execution discussion. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 232 (1796).
The states, having no foreign policy power, would be bound by treaties, while Congress
would be less likely to be bound since it shared federal power over foreign affairs. He
did suggest the treaty could override "the common law, or acts of Parliament, or acts of
Congress, or acts of any of the States, then in existence, or thereafter to be made,"
which can be read to reject a last-in-time rule for treaties and federal statutes and would
be consistent with Chase's conversion from antifederalism to strong federalism. Id. at
240.
288. Id. at 249. Whether Patterson meant to say the Senate instead of Congress, or
that Congress could pass a statute to implement the treaty, is unclear.
289. Id. at 251, 256.
290. Id. at 281; see also Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies, supra note 7, at
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preme law, which overrules all State laws upon the subject, to all
intents and purposes; and that makes the difference. '291 Aside
from Chase, none of the voting justices gave extended consideration to the complexities of treaty interpretation or the implications of those complexities for judicial enforcement of treaties
under the Constitution.
Adhering to the Court's early practice, Justice Iredell did
not cast a vote, but he read his opinion from the circuit court
and confirmed that his view of the case remained the same.29 2
Iredell first considered the treaty's effect under the Articles of
Confederation, stating the provision on debts "could not at that
time be carried into effect in any other manner, than by a repeal
of the statutes of the different States ... and the passing of such
other acts as might be necessary to give the recovery entire efficacy, in execution of the treaty. "293
Iredell then discussed the nature of treaties, "speaking generally, independent of the particular provisions on the subject,
in our present Constitution, the effect of which I shall afterwards
observe upon. "1294 In general, treaty provisions could be divided
into two categories, roughly similar to those described by Chase.
The first was "executed articles," so-called "because, from the nature of them, they require no further act to be done. ' 295 The
second category was "executory," which divided into three parts:
"Those which concern either, 1t, the Legislative Authority. 2nd .
The Executive. 3 r" . TheJudicial. '29 6 The debt article, in his view,
was addressed to the legislature, so that "the manner of giving
effect to this stipulation is by that power which possesses the Legislative authority, and which consequently is authorized to prescribe laws to the people for their obedience. '297 He added that
a treaty is always "valid and obligatory, in point of moral obliga1112 n. 120 (suggesting Wilson believed the treaty was directly binding on the individual
debtor).
291. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 282; see also id. at 284 (invoking Supremacy Clause
again).
292. See id. at 256. Iredell explained he would have participated in the decision
only if the court had been evenly divided without his vote. See id.
293. Id. at 271.
294. Id. at 271-72.
295. Id. at 272.
296. Id.; see also Sloss, Non-Self-Executing, supra note 7, at 19-21 (canvassing sources
to conclude "executed" meant self-execution, while "executory" meant non-self-execution).
297. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 272.
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tion, on all, as well on the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
Departments . . .as on every individual of the nation .... 298
Iredell also contended his general view of treaties "derives considerable weight from the practice in Great Britain," which he
interpreted as rejecting self-execution.29 9
Iredell next considered the impact of the Supremacy Clause
on these general interpretive principles. Noting the inadequacies of treaty implementation under the Articles, he conceded,
"Under this Constitution therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally is binding, upon principles of moral obligation, it is also
by the vigour of its own authority to be executed in fact. It
would not otherwise be the supreme law in the new sense provided for, and it was so before in a moral sense."3 ° Applying this
principle, which "extends to subsisting as well as to future treaties," Iredell asserted that "the case as to the treaty in question
stood upon the same footing, as if every act constituting an impediment to a creditor's recovery had been expressly repealed,
and any further act passed, which the public obligation had
before required, if a repeal alone would not have been sufficient. "301
Iredell turned finally to the words of the treaty, to see what
impact they would have under the Supremacy Clause. He insisted treaties should be construed with a presumption against
the relinquishment of private rights, such as the rights of debtors
3 02
under the Virginia sequestration statute:
If [the treaty makers] wanted a further act of legislation,
grounded not merely on ordinary legislative authority, but
upon power to destroy private rights acquired under legisla298. See id. Iredell asserted a treaty provision requiring the freeing of prisoners of
war would be executory with respect to the executive branch, so that the commander in
chief could not release prisoners without authority from Congress, and an inferior officer could not release prisoners without authority from the commander in chief. See id.
at 273. Similarly, judges could not order the release of prisoners pursuant to a treaty
without legislation or an executive pardon. See id. at 273. Executed provisions included
"the acknowledgment of independence," "the permission to fish," in certain areas, and
"the acknowledgment of the right to navigate the Mississippi." See id. at 272.
299. See id. at 273. With this statement, Iredell departed from his assertion in the
first North Carolina ratification convention that treaties were largely self-executing in
Britain. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 128 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
300. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) at 277.
301. See id.
302. See id. at 279.
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rive faith, long since pledged and relied on, very special words
were proper to effect that object, and neither in one country
nor the other could it have been effected with the least colour of justice, but by providing
at the same time the fullest
30 3
means of indemnification.

Iredell concluded that the treaty, through the Supremacy
Clause, effectively repealed all statutes that blocked recovery of
debts, but he denied the language of the treaty also nullified
rights that had become vested under those statutes. 30 4 Thus, an

executory treaty provision that in other countries would require
legislative implementation would be immediately enforceable
under the Supremacy Clause-at least so long as it did not conflict with vested rights.30 5
These opinions-particularly those of Chase and Iredellgenerate strong controversy among commentators who view the
case as a critical precedent.3 6 And the case offers something to
both sides of the self-execution debate. Ware confirmed that the
Supremacy Clause makes provisions of some treaties self-executing without legislation, but Chase and Iredell made clear distinctions between types of treaty provisions, and Chase also stated
that some treaty provisions would require implementation by
Congress or the President and could not be implemented directly by courts. 30 7 Further, the Court applied the treaty to over303. Id.
304. See id. As a southerner, Iredell may have been sensitive to the issue of pre-war
debts and concerned about debtors. See WHICHARD, supra note 258, at 171. As North
Carolina Attorney General, Iredell had defended specific seizures of British property.
See id. at 11. In private practice, however, Iredell represented British landowners whose
property had been confiscated. See id. at 7-8. As in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), and consistent with other North Carolina Federalists, he also sought to
protect state sovereignty. See POWELL, supra note 258, at 230-31; WHicHARD, supra note
258, at 110-11, 130, 166, 170-71.
305. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 279. Iredell was less clear about executory provisions that required executive or judicial action. When he considered examples in his
general discussion, he was emphatic about the need for legislative authority in addition
to treaty authority, and he never returned to those examples in his discussion of the
Supremacy Clause. See id. at 273.
306. Compare Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2079-80 (arguing
Iredell concluded treaty was not self-executing and was unclear on whether Supremacy
Clause changed British practice), with Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies, supra
note 7, at 1111-12 (contending Iredell concluded treaty execution in the United States
depended largely upon treaty language and Supremacy Clause, which departed from
British law), and Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 7, at 2196-97, 2217 n.172
(same), and PAUST, supra note 3, at 56-57 (similar).
307. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199.
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ride state law, but it did not discuss the impact of treaties on
federal law."' 8 Nor did it discuss the role of the House of Representatives in treaty implementation beyond recognizing that federal legislation would sometimes be necessary.
Even as the Court embraced self-execution in a federalism
context,3 0 9 therefore, the search for an accommodation between
federalist and antifederalist visions of the treaty power continued. Chase and Iredell's discussions in particular set the stage
for subsequent separation of powers debates. First, if some treaties require legislation to be supreme law of the land, what is
Congress's role? Must it pass such legislation, or may it decide
for itself whether to take the final steps to carry a treaty into
effect? The House debate over the Jay Treaty and the 1816 debate over the commercial treaty-and to some extent the debate
over the Robbins extradition-would address this issue. Second,
how much power does the President have to implement a treaty
if Congress has not legislated? The Robbins debate would turn
squarely on that point. Third, if some treaties are self-executing,
what happens when they conflict with existing federal law? The
Jay debates and the 1816 debate would address that issue repeatedly. By the time the Court returned to these issues, the result
was not in serious doubt.
Ware contains a further wrinkle. John Marshall, then a state
legislator and lawyer in private practice, represented the
debtor-indeed, representation of debtors against British creditors was a large part of his practice.3 10 Yet to the extent his sympathies lay with his clients, the causes likely were concerns about
vested legal rights (including discharges of debts) and the economic well-being of Virginia-not opposition to treaty self-execution. 1 1 Moreover, at the same time he was representing a
debtor in Ware, Marshall was also representing a British landowner. Marshall had a personal interest in upholding the landowner's interests, because he had negotiated the purchase of
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See NEWMYER, supra note 276, at 97; ROBARGE, supra note 277, at 132-33.

311. See NEWMYER, supra note 276, at 97-98; ROBARGE, supra note 277, at 133; see
also infta notes 348-50 and accompanying text (discussing Marshall's views during the
Jay Treaty debates). Whether this means Marshall supported Virginia's fourteenth proposed amendment that would have limited federal court jurisdiction in cases of vested
rights is unclear.
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land contingent on the validity of the title. 2 Relying on this
information, as well as Marshall's political activities and his reputation as a solid, if somewhat moderate, federalist, his biographers conclude that at that time he did not oppose judicial enforcement of treaties to preempt state law under the Supremacy
Clause.31 3
Notably, Marshall did not even ask the Court to deny its
ability to enforce the treaty notwithstanding state law. He first
argued compliance with the Virginia statute had extinguished
the debt.3 1 4 He then declared the treaty could not repeal the
Virginia statute without express language, and he suggested that
the government's ability to take away the debtors' vested rights
was "questionable." Any recovery on debts extinguished by the
sequestration statute should come directly from Virginia. 1 5
Marshall's argument is broadly consistent with Iredell's opinion.316 And Iredell, in turn, noted the distinction between executory and executed treaty provisions that Chief Justice Marshall
would later draw upon in Foster v. Neilson;3 1 7 he also supported
what appears to be a presumption in favor of self-execution
while making room for vested rights claims. To the extent Marshall's experience in Ware-perhaps combined with his experiences in Virginia politics-affected his views on self-execution,
it supports the conclusion that he recognized both the significance of the Supremacy Clause and a need for pragmatic approaches to the problems of treaty implementation.

312. See ROBARGE, supra note 277, at 165-72. This was an early part of the protracted litigation that resulted in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816). For extensive discussion, see Golove, supra note 7, at 1192-1205.
313. See NEWMYER, supra note 276, at 100; ROBARGE, supra note 277, at 169. Al-

though he does not say so directly, Yoo leaves open the possibility that Marshall's participation on the debtor's side is consistent with his later opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), and thus that Foster should be read to create a presumption
against self-execution. See Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2077-78.
314. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 212-13 (1796); see also GOEBEL, supra
note 49, at 750 (stating notes of Marshall's argument are sketchy and unreliable).
315. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 213-14.
316. Cf ROBARGE, supra note 277, at 135 (noting Iredell was impressed by arguments of Marshall and his co-counsel).
317. See Sloss, supra note 7, at 19-21. Iredell's category of executory treaties in
Ware was larger than Marshall's in Foster, however, because it included treaties that required judicial or executive acts. See id. at 23-24.
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IV. CONGRESS DEBATES THE TREATY POWER
Beginning in 1796, a series of foreign policy issues led members of Congress into extensive debates about the place of treaties in the U.S. constitutional order, particularly at the separation of powers level. Building on moderate federalist statements
during ratification and possibly also the opinions of Chase and
Iredell in Ware v. Hylton,3 18 these debates prefigured the Supreme Court's decision in Foster v. Neilson3 19 and its adoption of
the last-in-time rule.
A. Prologue: Neutrality and the Pacificus-HelvidiusDebate
On April 22, 1793, President Washington issued the Neutrality Proclamation, which declared the United States would not
take sides in the conflict between England and France.3 2 0 Although the idea of neutrality was not controversial, the President's decision to proclaim it in an official executive branch document raised separation of powers issues.
The debate over the proclamation included a series of opposing essays by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. Although most of their debate focused on other issues, both writers also addressed the treaty power. Writing as "Pacificus," Hamilton stated the executive branch is "the interpreter of the
National Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is not
competent, that is in the cases between Government and Government .... ",321 This statement assumes some treaties will operate as law that courts can apply, but concedes that not all treaty
provisions will work in this way. For these other provisions, the
President's constitutional duty to execute the laws includes the
power to interpret and execute treaties. 22 Implicit in this statement is not only the idea that treaties are largely self-executing
318.
319.
320.
note 20,

See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199.
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
See Proclamation of Neutrality, 11 Stat. 753 (1793); see also Flaherty, supra
at 23-26.

321. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number I, in THE PACiFICus-HELVIDius DEBATES OF 1793-94: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 8, 11 (Morton

J. Frisch ed. 2007) [hereinafter THE PACIFICuS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES]. For discussion of
how Hamilton's stress on executive power in these essays departs from his views of the
treaty power in Federalist 75, see Rakove, Solving a ConstitutionalPuzzle, supra note 14, at
254-55.
322. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus Number I, in THE PACIFIcus-HELVIDIUS DE-

BATES, supra note 321, at 16. This argument is roughly consistent with Iredell's state-
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at the separation of powers level, but also that under the
Supremacy Clause a treaty can be self-executing as a grant of
power directly to the President.
For his part, writing as "Helvidius," Madison sought to
counter Hamilton's conception of executive power with a strong
defense of legislative power. He agreed the President had the
power to execute treaties, but he constrained that power by
drawing a distinction between making and executing treaties. 2 3
He also discussed the impact of treaties, stating that "treaties,
particularly treaties of peace, have sometimes the effect of
changing not only the external laws of the society, but operate
also on the internal code, which is purely municipal, and to
which the legislative authority of the country is of itself competent and [complete]."324

Madison went on to say that "treaties

when formed according to the constitutional mode, are confessedly to have the force and operation of laws, and are to be a rule
for the courts in controversies between man and man, as much
as any other laws. They are even emphatically declared by the
constitution to be 'the supreme law of the land."' 3

25

Madison

thus agreed that treaties could be self-executing-indeed, to a
degree that arguably creates tension with his arguments in the
later Jay Treaty debates-but he also continued to qualify that
position with the idea that not all treaties have the same kind of
impact on domestic law.3 26 Flaherty suggests that Madison's "catment in Ware that some treaty provisions require executive action to go into effect. See
Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 272.
323. See James Madison, Helvidius Number I, in THE PACIFICus-HELVIDIUS DEBATES,

supra note 321, at 55, 59; see alsoJames Madison, Helvidius NumberIII, in THE PACIFICUsHELVIDIUS DEBATES, supra note 321, at 74.

324. See Madison, Helvidius Number I, in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES, supra
note 321, at 59.
325. See id. at 61. This statement is generally consistent with but certainly more
vague than Madison's 1791 letter to Edmund Pendleton. SeeJames Madison, Letter to
Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 13, 1791), in 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 528 (1865); see also supra note 270 and accompanying text.
326. See Madison, Helvidius Number I, in THE PACIFIcUs-HELvIuS DEBATES, supra
note 321, at 61. Madison also suggested requiring consent to treaties by two-thirds of
the Senate is "a substitute or compensation for the other branch of the legislature,.
which on certain occasions, could not be conveniently a party to the transaction." See id.
This statement arguably conflicts with his support for requiring House approval for
commercial treaties-after all, there is no need for the House if the supermajority requirement in the Senate already compensates for the absence of the House. See id.
Madison created additional problems when he stated, "A concurrent authority in two
independent departments to perform the same function with respect to the same thing,
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egorical arguments about core legislative powers" helped "estabcongressional authority based
lish the convention of defending
3 27
upon specific grants of power.
Thomas Jefferson also articulated a larger role for Congress.
In 1792, as Secretary of State, he advised President Washington
that:
A treaty is a law of the land, but prudence will point out this
difference to be attended to in making them, viz. where a
treaty contains such articles only as will go into execution of
themselves, or be carried into execution by the judges, they
may be safely made: but where there are articles which require a law to be passed [afterwards] by the legislature, great
caution is requisite.328
This distinction between types of treaties is not very different
from Justice Chase's subsequent opinion in Ware and seems
based on the same interpretive idea that Chase and Iredell both
articulated. More to the point, Washington relied on this advice
and included the House in the treaty process by requesting an
appropriation of funds before negotiating a treaty for the ransom and return of Americans held hostage in Algiers. 2 9
More than a year later, during a cabinet debate over the
Neutrality Proclamation, Jefferson wrote that Hamilton "entered
pretty fully into all the argumentation of Pacificus," including
the argument that the treaty power allowed the President and
Senate to "take from Congress the right to declare war" and "exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively given by the
would be as awkward in practice, as it is unnatural in theory." See Madison, Helvidius
Number II, in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES, supra note 321, at 65, 68-69. He was
discussing the power to make war and the risk of contradictory statements by the legislature and executive, but the statement is in tension with his support for giving the House
a role in implementing commercial treaties. Federalists would later argue that requiring legislative approval for treaties would violate separation of powers, create tensions,
and undermine the conduct of foreign affairs. See infra notes 355-75 and accompanying
text.
327. See Flaherty, supra note 20, at 49; see also Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 95, at
685 (suggesting Madison's Helvidius arguments were "atypically .. . essentialist" and
"formal").
328. Thomas Jefferson, Memorandum of Conference with the President on Treaty
with Algiers (Mar. 11, 1792), in 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 55, at
256.
329. For a narrative of these events, see Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTVE
PRIVILEGE 30-33 (2004).
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const[itution] to the H[ouse] of representatives." ' Jefferson
contended in response that the treaty power should be construed narrowly to include only the powers that the President
and Senate could exercise-which did not include "treaties of
neutrality, treaties offensive and defensive."33' 1 He ultimately
sided with Attorney General Edmund Randolph, however, who
articulated a position somewhere between Jefferson's 1792 view
and one of the arguments republicans later made in the Jay
Treaty debates:
where they undertook to do acts by treaty (as to settle a tariff
of duties) which were exclusively given to the legislature, that
an act of the legislature would be necessary to confirm them,
as happens in England
when a treaty interferes with duties
33 2
established by law.
According to Jefferson, Washington "did not decide" between
333
Hamilton's and Randolph's arguments.
B. The Jay Treaty Debates
1. The Beginning of the Controversy
Soon after the neutrality debate, and at the same time the
Supreme Court was considering the status of treaties in Ware v.
Hylton, controversy broke out over the 1794 Jay Treaty between
the United States and Great Britain. 34 The Jay Treaty generated
opposition in many parts of the country for a variety of reasons,
including the mere fact of concluding a friendly treaty with
330. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Cabinet Meeting on the President's Address to
Congress (Nov. 21, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 411-12 (John Catanzariti ed., 1997). The cabinet also touched on separation of powers issues during a
November 18 discussion of the proclamation, but Jefferson's notes reveal no specific
discussion of the treaty power. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Cabinet Meetings on Edmond
Charles Genet and the President'sAddress to Congress (Nov. 18, 1793), in 27 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 399-401.

331. See Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Cabinet Meeting on the President'sAddress, in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 330, at 412.

332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See generally Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 278. Ware
v. Hylton received little mention in the House debate over the Jay Treaty. See GOEBEL,
supra note 49, at 754-55. James Hillhouse cited it as confirming treaties bind the states
and are superior to state law. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 665 (1796). James Holland may
have had it in mind when he suggested that "the late determinations in the Federal
Courts... are in favor of Treaties and ancient claims" to property. See 5 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1137 (1796).
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Great Britain and the commercial concessions Jay made to the
British. 3 5 Concern also arose from the decision to keep the
treaty's text secret until after the Senate had given its advice and
consent.33 6 Once the text became public in July 1795, opponents organized protests and published numerous petitions and
pamphlets against it, but President Washington ratified it on August 14.
At the same time, Alexander Hamilton and Rufus King developed a forceful defense of the treaty in a series of essays written under the name Camillus.3
Most of the essays focused on
the general desirability of the treaty, but Hamilton also discussed
the treaty power and its interaction with legislative authority. On
the scope of the treaty power, Hamilton was uncompromising:
A power 'to make treaties,' granted in these indefinite terms,
extends to all kinds of treaties and with all the latitude which
such a power under any form of Government can possess.
The power 'to make,' implies a power to act authoritativelyand
conclusively; independent of the after clause which expressly
places treaties among the Supreme Laws of the land. The
thing to be made is a Treaty; With regard to the objects of the
Treaty, there being no specification, there is of course a charte
blanche.... The only constitutional exception to the power of
making Treaties is that it shall not change the constitution ....
He rejected the idea that treaties cannot regulate commerce
with foreign nations: "This is equivalent to affirming that all the
objects upon which the legislative power may act in relation to
our own Country are excepted out of the power to make Treaties. . . . [T]he construction resulting from such a doctrine
would defeat the power to make Treaties. "340
335. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 29, at 415, 417-18; Golove, supra note 7, at
1155-56.

336. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 29, at 417-21. The Senate did not consent
to Article 12 of the treaty. See id. at 419.
337. See id. at 426. For discussion of reactions in Kentucky and Virginia, including
the Virginia legislature's proposal of a constitutional amendment requiring House consent to treaties, see Golove, supra note 7, at 1162 n.261; Terri D. Halperin, The Special

Relationship: The Senate and the States, 1789-1801, in

THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE

1790s 287-90 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002).
338. For the division of labor, see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 29, at 435.
339. Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVI (Jan. 2, 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 6 (Harold R. Syrett ed., 1974).
340. See id. at 7.
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Hamilton explained legislation "can have no obligatory action whatsoever upon a foreign nation or any person or thing
within the jurisdiction of such foreign Nation," while treaties "establish rules binding upon two or more nations their respective
citizens and property." '' Treaties are contracts with other countries and as such are a different kind of government power from
legislation. Although "a Treaty may effect what a law can" do, a
treaty can also "do what [legislation] cannot do." 3 4 2 Therefore,
the fact that the Jay Treaty regulated commerce was not a valid
basis for objecting to it, because the treaty regulated by means of
a contract between nations and accomplished what a congressional statute could not. Not even the claim that a treaty sought
to appropriate funds would suffice. The treaty power is "concurrent and coordinate" with the legislative authority over "expenditures of money," although Hamilton conceded "[a]n appropria31' 4 3
tion by law will still be requisite for actual payment.
Hamilton then explained what was left for Congress once a
treaty had regulated in an area of concurrent authority:
[T] he Power of Treaty is the power of making exceptions in
particular cases to the power of Legislation. The stipulations
of Treaty are in good faith restraints upon the exercise of the
last mentioned power. Where there is no Treaty it is completely free to act. Where there is a Treaty, it is still free to act
in all the cases not specially excepted by the Treaty. 44
These statements suggest Congress has no legitimate power to
legislate contrary to a treaty. But Hamilton was very clear about
the impact of a treaty on federal statutes. "In our constitution,
which gives ipso facto the force of law to Treaties, making them
equally with Acts of Congress, the supreme law of the land, a
Treaty must necessarily repeal an antecedent law contrary to it;
according to the legal maxim that 'leges posteriorespriores contrarias
abrogant.', 345 Going further, and perhaps responding to republican arguments derived from the Virginia debates on the treaty,
341. See id. at 8.
342. See id.
343. See Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII (Jan. 6, 1796), in 20 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 339, at 13, 20-21.
344. Id. at 21. Kesavan and Ku's analyses of Hamilton as open to the last-in-time
rule do not address this passage and focus instead on the quotation that follows. See
Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1607; Ku, supra note 15, at 382.
345. See Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII, in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 339, at 16. Hamilton made the same point in a July 1796
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he insisted Congress had "a constitutional obligation to observe
the injunctions of a preexisting law [specifically including treaties] and to give it effect. If they act otherwise they infringe the
constitution; the theory of which knows in such case no discretion on their part. '3 4 6 In light of his statements about appropriations, it seems clear that he thought Congress also had no discretion concerning appropriation of funds authorized by a treaty or
necessary to its implementation.
In other words, Hamilton argued the treaty power and the
Supremacy Clause create a one-way ratchet. Treaties override
legislation and bind Congress to implement or support them
where necessary. They also strip Congress of its legislative power
over issues already covered by treaties. Hamilton further insisted
these conclusions were consistent with the intentions of the
framers and the understandings of the ratifiers. 34 7 These
ideas-including the original understanding claim-would recur in the statements of Federalists during the House debates,
and Republicans would strive to refute them.
Hamilton's arguments were roughly consistent with those of
Jay in Federalist 64. But his was not the only influential view in
circulation. The Virginia House of Delegates debated the constitutionality of the treaty, and opponents contended a treaty that
overlapped with legislative powers required House participation
or consent-a view that ultimately led to a proposed constitutional amendment requiring House consent to treaties. 3 4 8 In response, John Marshall asserted the discussion was inappropriate,
primarily because-like Hamilton-he believed the treaty power
encompassed commercial issues. If opponents wanted to pursue
their goals in a constitutional manner, he declared, they should
ask the federal House of Representatives "to render the treaty
inoperative by refusing to appropriate the necessary funds for its

memorandum to President Washington supporting ratification of the treaty. See Golove,
supra note 7, at 1160-61.
346. See Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXW, in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 339, at 4; see also Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVII, in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 339, at 16 (Congress is
"bound in good faith ... to lend its authority to remove obstacles.").
347. See Alexander Hamilton, The Defence No. XXXVIII (Jan. 9, 1796), in 20 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 339, at 22-25.
348. See supra note 337.
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implementation."3 4' 9 Marshall presumably believed-contra
Hamilton-that the House had the discretion to refuse funds,
but his goal was to forestall action at the state level in the hope
350
that Federalists would prevail in Congress.
2. The Jay Treaty in the House of Representatives
On February 29, 1796, after ratification by Britain, Washington issued a proclamation that the Jay Treaty had entered into
force, and he asked Congress to appropriate funds to implement
the treaty.35 1 On March 2, Representative Edward Livingston of
New York introduced a motion requesting documents about the
treaty negotiations from the President.35 2 Federalists demanded
the reasons for requesting documents about negotiation of a
treaty that was already ratified. Livingston explained he sought
information, and the "principal reason" was his "firm conviction
that the House were vested with a discretionary power of carrying the Treaty into effect, or refusing it their sanction. '5 3 For
the next two and a half weeks, the House debated its role in
making and implementing treaties, including whether it was obligated to appropriate the necessary funds or whether it could
make its own independent assessment of the treaty when it considered implementing legislation. The discussion of the treaty
power, Supremacy Clause, and treaty implementation was far
more extensive than any of the framing or ratification debates.35 4
349. See BEEMAN, supra note 201, at 145-46; see also ALBERT BEVERIDGE, 2 THE LIFE
OFJOHN MARSHALL 133-35 (1916); ROBARGE, supra note 277, at 157.
350. See BEEMAN, supra note 201, at 146.
351. See ELKINS &cMCKITRICK, supra note 29, at 444.
352. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 424, 426 (1796). The Annals of Congress "were compiled between 1834 and 1856, using the best records available, primarily newspaper
accounts. Speeches are paraphrased rather than presented verbatim." See Annals of
Congress-Home Page, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html.
353. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 427-28 (1796); see also 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 428 (William Lyman, stating that "another consideration of vast importance... was, whether the
Treaty had not encroached upon the Legislative powers of the Constitution."). Livingston and his older brother Robert had already written a series of essays raising this issue
as well as states-rights claims largely abandoned by the time the House debate began.
See Golove, supra note 7, at 1164-66.
354. See CORNELL, supra note 29, at 222-30; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 212-13 (1997); ELKINS & MCKITRICK,
supra note 29, at 433-36, 444; JosEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 141-60 (1999); RAKovE, supra note 44, at 357-

58; GOLOVE, supra note 7, at 1174-78; Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1583-86. The issue of
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Federalist arguments often paralleled earlier statements by
Hamilton, Iredell, and Jay, as when William Vans Murray responded to Livingston by asserting the House had "no right to
investigate the merits of the Treaty" unless there was some basis
to believe it was contrary to the Constitution."' If the Treaty was
valid, "then there was no discretionary power in the House. '"356
Other federalists insisted variously that the House was "bound,"
"obliged," or had a "duty" to implement treaties in nearly all circumstances regardless of the terms or merits of the treaty."5 7
To counter these claims, Republicans noted, in the words of
Albert Gallatin, that:
[C]ertain powers are delegated by the Constitution to Congress. They possess the authority of regulating trade. The
Treaty-making power delegated to the Executive may be considered as clashing with that. The question may arise whether
a Treaty made by the President and Senate containing regulations touching objects delegated to Congress, can be considHouse discretion over implementation of funds, including the contention that treaties
of commerce should be treated differently from treaties of peace, first came up in Congress in 1789, when the House debated whether to appropriate funds to implement a
number of Indian treaties. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 719-20 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
355. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1796)
356. See id. at 429-30, 436-37.
357. See id. at 439 Ueremiah Smith, stating House has "no right to investigate the
merits of the Treaty; it is the law of the land, and they are bound to carry it into effect,
unless they intended to resist the constituted authorities"); id. at 456 (Nathaniel Smith,
noting the House is "bound" to consider the treaty "as well done" and has no right "to
judge of its merits"); id. at 481 (Roger Griswold, emphasizing it is "their duty and their
business to make the necessary appropriations ... if they did not execute it, they violated the trust reposed in them"); id. at 498 (William Smith, stating "when a Treaty was
concluded.., the discretion of the House (unless it was intended to violate our faith)
could not determine whether the moneys contracted for should be paid, but the mode,
the fund, and such questions of detail, would alone be considered"); id. at 529 (Theodore Sedgwick, pointing out that treaties "might require Legislative provision to carry
them into effect; but this neither implied nor authorized the exercise of discretion, as
to refusal"); id. at 531 (Samuel Lyman, arguing the House has only "ministerial" power
and is "bound to obey" the treaty "and to carry it into complete execution"); id. at 647,
650 (John Williams, emphasizing the House is "obliged" and "implicitly bound" to implement "all Treaties constitutionally and completely made"); id. at 655-56 (Joshua
Coit, highlighting the "duty" or "obligation" to implement a treaty unless it was "ruinous" or corruptly made); id. at 683 (Ezekiel Gilbert, noting the "duty" to execute); id. at
696 (Murray, using similar language of "duty" and "bound"); id. at 714 (Daniel Buck,
emphasizing the House has a "duty" to appropriate); id. at 725 (Chauncey Goodrich,
using the phrase "a perfect obligation"). Robert Goodloe Harper was more nuanced:
the House was not bound, but the fact that "the national faith" had been pledged by a
treaty "will always, and with all persons, be a powerful reason for it; in almost every case
the reason would be conclusive." See id. at 750-51.
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ered binding
without Congress passing laws to carry it into
58
effect.

3

As the debate continued, they sharpened this argument into a
theory, first, that treaties could not provide for or override
House discretion to decide on appropriations3 59 and, second,
that no treaty could go into effect without House consent if it
sought to regulate an area-such as the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations" 3 6 -that fell within the enumerated legislative powers of Congress.
Thus, again according to Gallatin:
[I]f a Treaty embraces objects within the sphere of the general powers delegated to the Federal Government, but which
have been exclusively and specifically granted to a particular
branch of Government, say to the Legislative department,
such a Treaty, though not unconstitutional, does not become
the law of the land until it has obtained the sanction of that
branch.361
Madison generally agreed with Gallatin and noted, "taken literally, and without limit," the treaty and legislative powers "must
necessarily clash with each other."362 William Giles suggested
the primary check on the treaty power:
[C]onsists in the necessary concurrence of the House to give
efficacy to Treaties; which concurrent power they derive from
the enumeration of the Legislative powers of the House.
Where the Treaty-making power is exercised, it must be
under the reservation that its provisions, so far as they interfere with the specified powers delegated to Congress, must be
358. Id. at 437; see also id. at 437-38 (James Madison, stating the issue was "whether
the general power of making Treaties supersedes the powers of the House of Representatives, particularly specified in the Constitution, so as to take to the Executive all deliberative will, and leave the House only an executive and ministerial instrumental
agency?").
359. See id. at 509 (William B. Giles, noting appropriations power is a check on the
treaty power); id. at 565 (John Page, making a similar point); id. at 583 (William Brent,
stating the same). John Nicholas, whose brother George had played an important role
alongside Madison at the Virginia Convention, declared "the House had a voice" on
treaties and the treaty-making power was subject to "qualifications in matters of money;
and unless the House chose to grant that money, it was so far no Treaty." See id. at 444,
446.
360. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
361. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 465 (1796); see id. at 483-84 Uonathan N. Havens, agreeing with Gallatin).
362. See id. at 488.
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so far submitted to the discretion of that Department of the
3 63
Government.
Gallatin and Giles stressed they "did not claim for the
House a power of making Treaties, but a check upon the Treatymaking power-a mere negative power; whilst those who are in
favor of a different construction advocate a positive and unlimited power."3 64 Speaking in support of these points, several rep-

resentatives analogized to British practice, which they understood to require parliamentary assent to most treaties, 3 65 or relied on the idea that a specific grant of power-the detailed list
of enumerated legislative powers-must necessarily control the
more general grant of the treaty power.36 6

In an effort to defeat the republican suggestion of Congressional power over treaties that regulated areas within Congress's
legislative powers, most federalists argued-again tracking Hamilton-that the treaty power was virtually unlimited in scope.3 67
A few hedged on the issue of appropriations by falling back on
the claim that the House was bound to assist a treaty,3 6 8 and
363. Id. at 508; see id. at 575-76 (Brent); id. at 632-33 (Livingston); id. at 651 (John
Milledge).
364. See id. at 467, 513 (Giles, arguing he was merely claiming a negative for the
House, in contrast to the Federalist claim that the treaty power can "supersede the
specific authority delegated to the Legislature in all cases whatever."); id. at 745 (Gallatin, repeating the claim).
365. See id. at 540 (Abraham Baldwin); id. at 543 (James Holland); id. at 633 (Livingston); id. at 728-29 (Gallatin).
366. See id. at 540 (Baldwin, asserting treaty power is "qualified by the powers specifically given to Congress."); id. at 560 (Page); id. at 576 (Brent); id. at 589 (William
Findley); id. at 602 (William Lyman).
367. See id. at 517 (Sedgewick, stating treaty power is "unlimited by the Constitution, and he held too, that in its nature . . . it was illimitable."); id. at 597 (jeremiah
Smith, stating treaty power extends "to most, if not all," of the legislative powers and is
limited by the inability to alter the Constitution); id. at 614-15 (Uriah Tracy, stating
treaty power is not limited); id. at 679. Gilbert, stating that treaty power:
[I]s the power of the nation, to be exercised for the nation, it has a right to
use all the things or means belonging to the nation, reasonable and fit, and
which are necessary to accomplish the great objects of the nation, beyond the
jurisdiction and power of any other national power, or organ ....
Id. at 689 (Murray, stating every nation must have the complete treaty power lodged
somewhere). James Hillhouse was more modest:
Nothing can.., come within the Treaty-making power but what has a relation
to both nations, and in which they have a mutual interest ....
All laws regulating our own internal police, so far as the citizens of the United States alone
are concerned, are wholly beyond its reach.
Id. at 662.
368. See supra notes 356-57; see also 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 598 (1796) (Jeremiah
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others tried to argue the treaty power was not truly legislative
and so did not conflict with congressional power. 6 9 They cited
antifederalist complaints during ratification about the scope of
the treaty power as proof that their claims, which confirmed
those fears, best reflected the meaning of the Constitution."'
They also rejected analogies to British practice. 37' Not only did
treaties automatically become law by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause, but they also "repealed" or "annulled" prior inconsistent
federal statutes, such that, "in the exercise of that power which
related to the intercourse with foreign nations, the Treaty-making was paramount to the Legislative power; and ... the positive

institutions of the Legislature must give place to compact. "372
Implicit in this version of the treaty power was the inability of
Congress to override treaties through legislation, and some
members made the point explicitly. 373 The federalist position,
in short, was that treaties could be made on any subject, once
made they trumped federal legislation, federal legislation was inSmith, indicating a treaty can stipulate for payments but Congress retains the power to
pass the actual appropriation).
369. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 596 (1796). Chauncey Goodrich suggested-consistent with Hamilton-that although treaties and statutes are both legislative in some
sense, they are ultimately different kinds of power and operate in different ways and on
different objects, and thus the specific legislative powers could not limit the general
treaty power. See id. at 718, 722-23. Harper once again followed a more nuanced line of
argument than most of his fellow Federalists. He suggested treaties are laws with respect to the law of nations, but that on other topics:
Treaties... can never, in their nature, operate as laws, can never produce the
effect of legislation: they are compacts and nothing more, and, in the sphere
of compacts, they are supreme and unlimited.... [B]ut they cannot encroach
on the Legislative power, cannot produce a Legislative effect.
See id. at 749.
370. See id. at 495-96 (William Smith); id. at 520-25 (Sedgwick); id. at 567-72 (Benjamin Bourne); id. at 616-17 (Tracy); id. at 649 (Williams); id. at 667-68 (Hillhouse); id.
at 700-01 (Murray); id. at 703 (Buck).
371. See id. at 454 (Nathanial Smith); id. at 647 (Williams); id. at 659 (Coit); id. at
698 (Murray); id. at 710 (Buck); id. at 751-52 (Harper).
372. See id. at 477 (Griswold); id. at 531 (Samuel Lyman); id. at 549, 552-53 (Theophilus Bradbury); id. at 595 (Jeremiah Smith); id. at 670 (Hillhouse); id. at 680 (Gilbert); id. at 688, 696 (Murray); id. at 712 (Buck). Again, Harper took a different
course, suggesting the issue whether a treaty repeals a law was not necessary to the
debate and was in any event a judicial question, and he suggested that although the
doctrine appeared to be that treaties could repeal state and federal laws, he had doubts
about it. See id. at 755, 758.
373. See id. at 499 (William Smith); id. at 595 (Jeremiah Smith); id. at 644 (Williams).
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effective against them, and Congress was bound to pass laws to
assist the execution of treaties.
One Federalist gave a suggestive spin to his reasoning. In
the course of explaining the interaction of the treaty and legislative powers, Chauncey Goodrich declared:
Treaties in other countries, by binding the public faith, impose an obligation on the body politic to provide law; with us,
so far as they are perfect, and the provisions can execute
themselves, they need no auxiliary laws. If imperfect and destitute of necessary provisions, like other
laws in themselves
374
imperfect, they require further laws.
3 75
This statement may have drawn on Chase's opinion in Ware,
and it is generally consistent with Jefferson's views as Secretary of
State, but the structure of the passage is also striking for its similarity to Chief Justice Marshall's language years later in Foster v.
Neilson.3 76 The difference-and it is an important one-is that
Goodrich also argued, as Iredell seems to have done in Ware,
that the House was bound to pass any laws necessary to implement the treaty. Marshall, by contrast, was already on record in
favor of discretion-at least on the issue of appropriations.
None of these arguments swayed the republicans, who continued to insist treaties could not go into effect without House
approval if they sought to regulate topics within the enumerated
powers of Congress.3 77 Any other view would lead to executive
aggrandizement. 37 Thus Gallatin gave up a bit of ground in
concession to the text of the Supremacy Clause but reasserted
his basic point that a treaty that touched on legislative power was

in some respects, an inchoate act. It was the law of the land,
and binding upon the American nation in all its parts, except
so far as related to those stipulations. Its final fate in case of
refusal, on the part of Congress, to carry those stipulations
379
into effect, would depend on the will of the other nation.
374. Id. at 722.
375. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 240, 244 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
376. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
377. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 741-42 (1796) (Gallatin, arguing the Federalist view
assumed its conclusion by starting from the position that treaties can bind the nation in
areas within the legislative power).
378. See id. at 467 (Gallatin); id. at 727 (Gallatin); id. at 490-93 (Madison); id. at
506 (Giles).
379. Id. at 745 (Gallatin).
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Several speakers rejected the claim that their assertion of discretionary authority would destroy the treaty power, stressed that
much room remained for executive action, and noted that their
interpretation of the Constitution still allowed certain treaties,
such as peace treaties, to become law without congressional intervention. 3810
Republicans also dismissed the idea that treaties could override existing federal statutes. The Supremacy Clause, they
noted, was directed at the states and said nothing about the relative priority of different sources of federal law.3"' Indeed, they
suggested their claim of House authority obviated the
Supremacy Clause argument, because treaties that trespassed on
legislative territory would need legislative sanction, which would
remove most conflicts between treaties and statutes. 8 2 As for
the ratification debates, Republicans relied on the conciliatory
arguments in various states by proponents of the Constitutionstatements that conflicted with the claims Federalists were mak83
ing in the current struggle.
Almost no one on either side of the debate spoke in support
of a last-in-time rule for conflicts between treaties and statutes.
380. See id. at 546-47 (Holland); id. at 576 (Brent); id. at 653 (Aaron Kitchell).
Gallatin, for example, insisted the power claimed for the House had no impact on
peace treaties or on aspects of commerce and navigation treaties that dealt with the law
of nations. All of these would be supreme law of the land without legislative intervention. "Within that class might be included all those conditions, which provided for the
cases of shipwrecks, salvage, assistance to be given vessels driven in ports, and all the
duties of neutral nations within their territory," as well as "the use of what belonged to
all, of the sea, and consequently the rights of fisheries," and
the duties and rights of neutral nations, in their intercourse out of their own
territory, with nations at war; which included all the stipulations relating to
what should be deemed contraband goods, to the question whether free bottoms should make free goods ....
Id. at 744-45. He also admitted that although a treaty provision stipulating Congress
would not take certain actions might not be binding, "the House had not the power to
impede its execution." See id. at 745.
381. See id. at 450 (John Swanwick); id. at 468-69 (Gallatin); id. at 488 (Madison);
id. at 506 (Giles); id. at 539 (Baldwin); id. at 558 (Page); id. at 577 (Brent). Livingston
suggested that if the Supremacy Clause was at all relevant, then it clearly placed federal
statutes ahead of treaties. See id. at 631-32; see also id. at 450 (Swanwick, arguing
Supremacy Clause made treaties inferior to federal statutes by placing them last).
382. See id. at 575-77 (Brent); id. at 590 (Findley); cf id. at 493 (Madison); id. at
738-45 (Gallatin).
383. See id. at 502 (Giles); id. at 546 (Holland); id. at 564 (Page); id. at 579-82
(Brent); id. at 592 (Findley); id. at 608 (William Lyman); id. at 635 (Livingston); id. at
734-37 (Gallatin); see also id. at 487 (Havens).
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Gallatin declared laws could not repeal treaties and treaties
could not repeal laws because the last-in-time rule works only
within categories of legal regulation, not across them."8 4
Madison asserted the last-in-time rule "involved the absurdity of
an imperium in imperio, of two powers both of them supreme, yet
each of them liable to be superseded by the other."3 5 The dominant federalist position-that treaties trumped laws but laws
could not trump treaties-also had no room for the last-in-time
rule. As Daniel Buck explained, even if Congress had the raw
power to override treaties, the actual exercise of that power
would "break and violate the treaty," and undermine "the
plighted faith of the nation pledged in the most solemn manner."38 6 Only Federalist James Hillhouse spoke in favor of a lastin-time rule.38 7
Ultimately, the House voted 62-37 to request the papers.38 8
Despite the fact that he had shared documents with the House
about the treaty negotiations over American hostages,38 9 President Washington refused to provide the Jay Treaty documents.
He gave several reasons but paid particular attention to the
House's role in implementing treaties. He asserted every treaty
"becomes the law of the land ....

[W] hen ratified by the Presi-

dent, with the advice and consent of the Senate, they become
obligatory. 3'

90

Accusing the House of departing from past prac-

tice, Washington claimed that, "until now, without controverting
the obligation of such Treaties, they [the House] have made all
the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect."39 ' Finally,

relying on the records of the Constitutional Convention, he
stated "the assent of the House of Representatives is not necessary to the validity of a Treaty. "392
384. See id. at 466, 742.
385. See id. at 489.
386. See id. at 712.
387. See id. at 670. Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott also accepted the legitimacy

of a last-in-time rule. See infra note 392.
388. See id. at 759 (1796); see also id. at 760 (request sent to Washington).
389. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 20-21 (1793); see alsoJOsEPH RALSTON HAYDEN, THE
SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789-1817: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY-MAKING FUNcrIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE DURING THEIR FORMATIVE PERIOD 48, 51-52 (1920).

390. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 761 (1796).
391. See id.
392. See id.

Washington consulted with Hamilton, the cabinet, and newly ap-

pointed Chief Justice Ellsworth, all of whom agreed the House request was inappropriate, the treaty power was exclusively vested in the President and Senate, and "treaties
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The House then considered how to respond to Washington.
During the debate, Madison denied the records of the Constitutional Convention were useful or relevant to constitutional interpretation; "the sense of that body could never be regarded as the
oracular guide in expounding the Constitution."3 93 Instead,
Madison argued the ratification debates provided the key evidence of the Constitution's meaning, and he cited the debates in
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina as evidence that
Washington's interpretation was incorrect. 39 4 He also deriied
that the House sought any role in consenting to or ratifying treaties.3 95 At the same time, however, he asserted "no Treaty shall
be operative without a law to sanction it... in any case.., where
Legislative objects are embraced by [it]. ' ' 396 Madison insisted
this position was consistent with principles of separation of powers and limited government:
[T]hat construction ought to be favored which would preserve the mutual control between the Senate and House of
Representatives, rather than that which gave powers to the
Senate not controllable by, and paramount over those of the
House of Representatives, whilst the House of Representatives could in no instance exercise their powers without the
participation and control of the Senate.39 7
thus concluded were legally binding on all bodies of men within the jurisdiction of the
United States." See CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 120; Ku, supra note 15, at 378-83. Ellsworth strongly rejected the last-in-time rule, but Treasury Secretary Wolcott accepted it.
See Ku, supra note 15, at 379-81. Not surprisingly, Thomas Jefferson, who was no longer
part of the administration, wrote several letters stating that treaties overlapping with
legislative powers required some kind of House consent. See CRANDALL, supra note 41, at
122-23; Golove, supra note 7, at 1178-79 (suggesting Jefferson's views changed). His
subsequent Manual of ParliamentaryPractice, written while he was Vice-President under
John Adams, makes an awkward gesture at evenhandedness without distinguishing between making and implementing treaties. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIA
MENTARY PRACTICE:

FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES §

52 (2d ed.

1812); see also Golove, supra note 7, at 1187-88.
393. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796). Madison also noted his own reference to

the Constitutional Convention during the debate over the Bank of the United States,
and he claimed other members had reacted negatively at the time. See id. at 775-76. For
sympathetic accounts of Madison's attempts in Congress to articulate a coherent theory
of constitutional interpretation, see BANNING, supra note 47, at 382-84; SIEMERS, supra
note 273, at 105-21, 132-33. For critical assessments, see Golove, supra note 7, at 1183
n.333.
394. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 775-79 (1796).
395. See id. at 774-76.
396. See id. at 776.
397. Id. at 780; see CORNELL, supra note 29, at 223 (noting that the Republican
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Finally, Madison denied there was any relevant past practice to
serve as a precedent for the House's proper role, because "this
was the first instance in which a foreign Treaty had been made
since the establishment of the Constitution; and ... this was the

first time the Treaty-making power had come under formal and
39 8
accurate discussion.
On April 6, William Blount proposed two resolutions that
responded to Washington's denial. The first, which the House
approved the following day by a vote of 57-35, declared the scope
of its power over treaties that encroach on the legislative powers
of Congress:
[T] he House of Representatives do not claim any agency in
making Treaties; but, that when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to
the power of Congress, it must depend, for its execution, as to
such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by Congress.
And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the House of
Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and
to determine and act thereon, as, in their judgment, may be
most conducive to the public good.3 99
This resolution is more moderate than some republican statements during the debate. Perhaps recognizing some force in
Washington's letter but also consistent with Madison's reply, the
resolution stops short of embracing all of Gallatin's views, and it
says nothing about the interaction of treaties and existing federal statutes. Indeed, its basic claim overlaps with Marshall's argument in the Virginia legislature. Still, the resolution plainly
repudiates federalist claims of a broad treaty power that could
displace legislative power-including by annulling existing federal statutes-and relegate the House with a ministerial role in
treaty implementation.
Having asserted its power, the House turned to the question
of appropriating funds to implement the treaty. Early on, the
position sought to harmonize the treaty power with the House's constitutional function).
398. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 781 (1796); id. at 539 (Baldwin, insisting that this was
the first full discussion of the issue).
399. See id. at 771, 782-83. The reporter declared that six of the absent members
would have voted for the resolution and one would have voted against. See id. The
second resolution, approved by the same vote, related to the form of requests for information from the President. See id. at 771, 783.
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Committee of the Whole voted 48-40 to change the language of
the pending resolution from a statement proposed by Massachusetts federalist Theodore Sedgwick-that "provision ought to be
made by law" to carry the treaty into effect-to one that read "it
is expedient to pass the laws necessary" to do so.4" 0 Gallatin explained the original wording was flawed because it "seemed to
imply that they were not at liberty to pass or not to pass laws or
carry the Treaties into effect," while the new language would
match the resolution that had just passed the House.4 °1 The
House confirmed the committee's vote by a larger margin.4 °2 After more than two weeks of debate on the merits of the treaty4°3
with some additional discussion of the constitutional issues the House passed a resolution to carry the treaty into effect by a
vote of 5148.04 The House passed an appropriations bill on
400. Compare id. at 940 ("provision ought to be made by law") (emphasis added),
with id. at 943, 950 (motion and successful committee vote to substitute "it is expedient"
for treaty with Spain) (emphasis added), and id. at 966 (motion and successful vote to
substitute "it is expedient" for remaining three treaties). There was also extended debate about whether to vote appropriations for four treaties at once, or to proceed one
by one, and the latter view prevailed. See id. at 966.
401. See id. at 966. As Jeremiah Crabb declared earlier in the debate, "this House
may save the Constitutional principle, and feel themselves at perfect liberty to pass the
necessary laws to carry these Treaties into complete effect, without conveying the implication, that they think they are bound so to do, and have not a Constitutional right to
reject and refuse." Id. at 766.
402. See id. at 974 (rejecting Federalist effort to restore original wording by 55-37
vote).
403. For federalist statements, see id. at 1016-17 (Zephaniah Swift, stating "a
Treaty can repeal an act of Congress" but "Treaties with foreign nations cannot be
repealed by an act of the Legislature," and the House was "bound to make all the appropriations necessary."); id. at 1105 (Bourne, stating a ratified treaty is "binding" on
the House); id. at 1160-62 (Thomas Henderson, stating treaties are supreme law, require nothing from the House, and are superior to federal statutes, while republican
view finds no support in text and would destroy checks and balances); id. at 1243-44
(Fisher Ames, stating a treaty is already binding law, House is obliged to implement it,
and British practice is not a good analogy and does not support the republican position); id. at 1269 (Nathaniel Smith, stating the house is bound by the treaty). For Republican statements, see id. at 1107 (Findley, stating the House has discretion because
the test of the Constitution is explicit when House lacks discretion); id. at 1133 (Holland, denying broad treaty power and insisting on House discretion).
404. See id. at 1291. The vote in the committee of the whole was 4949, and the
chairman cast the tie-breaking vote to send the treaty to the House. See id. at 1280. The
reporter suggested there would have been "an actual majority of the House against the
expediency of carrying the Treaty into execution" if absent members had voted. See id.
On the question whether voting to appropriate funds was consistent with voting for the
resolution declaring the House's discretion, consider the comments of Samuel Smith:
he did believe that [voting in favor of the appropriation] would tend to re-
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May 3 by an unrecorded vote, and the Senate quickly agreed.4" 5
In an odd conclusion, Charles Butler declared this episode
"a distinct victory for the Executive. ' 40 6 His claim is true only in
the sense that the House voted the necessary appropriations.
But his claim that the House "recognized the sound basis on
which the President's reply was based"4 7 finds little support in
the records of the debates and votes.40 8 Still, the debate over the
Jay Treaty was one of the most partisan episodes in Congress's
then-short history. Republicans were looking for ways to limit
store harmony and unanimity to our public measures; a House so nearly divided against itself could never thrive: Because the most material articles will
expire in two or three years; and, from the great and serious opposition to
them, as well among the people, as in this House, he did not believe they
would ever again be renewed: Because, he did believe that the President and
Senate had conceived that they had a right to make all Treaties, without the
concurrence of this House, and had, under that impression, committed the
faith of the nation: and, because, that he believed it to be the opinion of the
great majority of the people of Maryland, whom he had the honor to represent, that, although their dislike to the Treaty continues, yet that less evils
will grow out of its adoption than may be apprehended from its rejection.
Id. at 1157. Aaron Kitchell, who did not vote on the resolutions but apparently would
have voted yes, said "[h]e felt himself under a moral obligation to vote for the Treaty,
because he believed it for the good of the United States that it should go into effect."
See id. at 783, 1175. But, "if he supposed a principle was to be sanctioned by carrying
[it] into effect.., that the House had not the right to deliberate upon the propriety of
passing laws to carry into effect all Treaties which came before them, he would also vote
against it." See id. at 1175; CURRIE, supra note 354, at 215 (as Congress debated, "petitions began to pour in, most significantly from the republican West, urging that Congress appropriate the necessary funds."); ELINS & McKITRICK, supra note 29, at 432
(suggesting increases in trade and prosperity shifted in popular sentiment in favor of
the treaty).
405. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1295 (1796); id. at 80; 1 Stat. 459 (1796).
406. See 1 BUTLER, supra note 227, at 428.
407. See id.
408. Other commentators take a variety of positions. Because he focuses on the
federalism aspects of the debate, Golove treats this episode as a victory for Federalists.
He is correct that House Republicans did not advance the states-rights arguments made
in earlier pamphlets and the House ultimately voted to appropriate funds to implement
the treaty, but he also recognizes that the separation of powers debate was more significant. See Golove, supra note 7, at 1157-58. Michael Ramsey admits the arguments of
House republicans were "not without some basis," but he suggests the vote to appropriate was more important. See MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 316 (2007). David Currie's assessment seems most apt: "the episode ended in a
standoff on the constitutional questions." CURRIE, supra note 354, at 215 (suggesting
Republicans were correct about appropriations and similar Congressional prerogatives
but incorrect about commerce); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 194-95, 204-06 (2d ed. 1996) (articulating a similar view); Vtzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 7, at 2177-78, 2181 (distinguishing appropriations
from treaty provisions that contemplate legislation).
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executive power and gain issues for use in the next election, and
they employed arguments selectively and instrumentally to advance these goals.40 9 Washington disagreed with the House majority, many Senators likely disagreed as well, the Supreme Court
that had just decided Ware was unlikely to accept the republican
position wholesale, and not all republicans agreed with the most
far-reaching claims of people like Gallatin. In addition, and critically, nothing in the debates undermined the founding understanding that treaties would override state law and bind the
states, including through judicial enforcement in cases brought
by or against individuals.
But federalists also played politics with their arguments, and
many of their claims were at least as extreme as those of the most
partisan republicans. At the crucial points, a large majority of
House members voted to limit the treaty power by restricting the
ability of treaties to be self-executing at the separation of powers
level. While the focus was on appropriations, the discussion and
resolution covered broader territory and sought to limit the
power of the President and Senate to make law through the
treaty power. 410 The House debate did not explicitly concern
self-execution in the sense in which we now discuss it-that is,
with reference to the courts-because the focus was on the allocation of power between the President and Congress (or, more
precisely, between the President and Senate as treaty-makers,
and the House as essential part of the legislative process). Yet
the House resolution, if accepted as the proper interpretation of
the treaty power and Supremacy Clause, would also limit the
ability of treaties to be self-executing as rules of decision when
their provisions overlap with congressional power and in so doing would also obviate the need for a last-in-time rule in most
instances.
In short, the House was working out the details of the treaty
power and separation of powers doctrine in the middle of a po409. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 29, at 441-42; LYNCH, supra note 354, at
141-60.
410. Indeed, Butler recognized that the House gained something from the debate:
it was practically decided that although a treaty becomes the supreme law of
the land as soon as it is ratified as to every provision which can be enforced
without legislation, it remains ineffectual as to those matters which do require
legislation, or the appropriation of money, and can only be enforced after both
Houses of Congress enact appropriate legislation ....
1 BUTLER, supra note 227, at 430.
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litical debate.4 1 1 The result was partisan rancor but also serious
constitutional debate that set the stage for the series of compromises that are familiar today as settled doctrine: the last-intime rule, reliance on congressional-executive agreements, and
the doctrine that some but not all treaties are self-executing.
The full scope of the republican position would not survive, but
they won on the issue of appropriations. Their insistence that
treaties often require discretionary House participation to be
fully implemented as supreme law would persist and ultimately
prevail. Portions of the federalist position also survived. For example, a few years later the Supreme Court appears to have extended Ware and allowed a treaty establishing the "rights of parties litigating" in court to override a decision based on a prior
federal statute. 4'2
But the House decisively rejected
Hamiltonian federalist claims of how the treaty power, legislative
power, and Supremacy Clause interact.
The House's action quickly became an article of republican
faith. Going beyond the text of the resolution-perhaps to include Gallatin's views-St. George Tucker wrote in his View of the
Constitution of the United States that a treaty containing "stipulations on legislative acts" is an "inchoate act. '4 15 Tucker explained such a treaty "is the law of the land, and binding upon
411. See Gerhard Casper, Executive-CongressionalSeparation of Powers Duringthe Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 47 STAN. L. REv. 473, 473 (1995) ("In the early years ... under
the Constitution, there was no consensus about the precise institutional arrangement
required to satisfy the separation of powers concept."); see also supra note 20.
412. See United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 103, 110 (1801).
For the argument in favor of interpreting United States v. The Schooner Peggy in this way,
see David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical
Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 497, 510-11 (2007). Chief Justice Marshall included the following comments:
The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme law
of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United States
must be admitted ....
[W]here a treaty is the law of the land, and as such
affects the rights of the parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds
those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress
5 U.S. at 109-10; see Sloss, supra note 15 (discussing lower court decisions in 1790s that
applied a treaty provision to limit the scope of subject matter jurisdiction granted by
federal statutes). Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), may be the only Supreme
Court decision clearly to decide that a treaty trumped a statute.
413. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
276 (1803) (Liberty Fund 1999). Tucker's discussion of the Constitution originally appeared as appendices to his edition of Blackstone's Commentarieson the Laws of England.
See id. at vii.
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the nation in all its parts, except so far as relates to those stipulations," which in turn become the law of the land only if Congress
"carr[ies] those stipulations into effect."4 14 In short, the first influential treatise on constitutional law-and one self-consciously
opposed to federalist claims-took the position that any doctrine of treaty self-execution must be limited to matters that do
not overlap with the powers of Congress.
Soon after Tucker wrote, the executive branch adopted a
more moderate approach during the Louisiana Purchase. In the
draft of his message to Congress about the purchase, and to
some extent consistent with his views as Secretary of State, President Jefferson "indicated his intention of laying the treaties
before both Houses of Congress at once."415 Secretary of State
Madison objected, stating the House should not influence the
Senate's deliberation on a treaty, but he also noted the House
would have its own role to play after ratification.4 1 6 Treasury
Secretary Gallatin agreed that "[t] he rights of Congress in its legislative capacity do not extend to making treaties," but he went
on to stress the House's constitutional role of "giving or refusing
their sanction to those conditions [of a treaty] which come
within the powers granted by the Constitution to Congress."417
Gallatin had backed away from some of his claims during the Jay
Treaty debate, but he adhered to the central one-that Congress
had a role in implementing treaties that overlap with legislative
power, regardless of what the Supremacy Clause seems to say.
Jefferson agreed with their advice, and his October 17, 1803,
message to Congress stated that, once the Senate had given its
advice and consent, the treaty would "without delay be communicated to the Representatives also for the exercise of their functions as to those conditions which are within the powers vested
by the Constitution in Congress."418
414. See id. at 276. Tucker also urged adoption of an amendment to require Congressional consent for commercial and some other treaties, as the Virginia Convention
and the initial version of the New York treaty amendment had urged, and roughly consistent with the proposals of the Pennsylvania minority and the first North Carolina
convention. See id. at 308. For the importance of Tucker's View, see CORNELL, supra
note 29, at 263-72.

415. See HAYDEN, supra note 389, at 139; see also CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 172-73;
Casper, supra note 411, at 492-94.
416. See HAYDEN, supra note 389, at 140.
417. See id.
418. See id. at 142. Some Federalists who opposed the purchase also sought consis-

2009]

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES

1295

C. The Robbins Affair: Treaties and Executive Power
The Jay Treaty required the extradition of murderers and
forgers, but Congress never passed legislation to implement the
extradition article.4 1 9 The process for-indeed, even the possibility of-extraditions thus remained unclear when Thomas
Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, was arrested in 1799 in Charleston, South Carolina and held by federal authorities on the
charge that he committed murder during a mutiny on the British ship Hermione.4 2 ° Although British officials sought custody of
Robbins, District Judge Thomas Bee made clear he wanted to
hear from the administration before complying.4 21 Soon thereafter, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering transmitted to Judge
Bee the "advice and request" of President Adams that Robbins
4 22
be handed over.
In the subsequent proceedings, Robbins challenged the
court's jurisdiction and made several other arguments against
extradition, all of which Judge Bee rejected in the course of ordering Robbins' surrender to British authorities (who promptly
tried, convicted, and executed him) .423 On the issue ofjurisdiction, Judge Bee declared:
When application was first made, I thought this a matter for
the executive interference, because the act of congress respecting fugitives from justice, from one state to another, refers it altogether to the executive of the states; but as the law
and the treaty are silent upon the subject, recurrence must be
had to the general powers vested in the judiciary by law and
tency. One stated he was bound by a ratified treaty to support implementation, while
others argued they could vote against implementation only because the treaty was unconstitutional. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANs, 1801-1829, at 99 & n. 95 (2001). In 1834, President Andrew Jackson apparently
adopted a view similar to that of Jefferson. See 1 BUTLER, supra note 227, at 437.
419. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 278, art. 27. By
contrast, Congress consistently passed legislation to implement agreements for the re-

turn of deserting sailors to their home countries. See John T. Parry, The Lost History of
InternationalExtradition Litigation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 93, 114 n. 111 (2002).
420. Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE
L.J. 229, 237, 286-87 (1990) (discussing the Robbins extradition); see also Parry, supra
note 419, at 108-14. The convention among commentators is to use "Robbins" to refer
to Thomas Nash/Jonathan Robbins even though his name is spelled "Robins" in the

case caption. See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799); Parry, supra note
419, at 108-09.
421. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 288.
422. See id. at 288-92.
423. See Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 825.
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the constitution, the 3d article of which declares the judicial
power shall extend to treaties, by express words. The judiciary have in two instances in this state, where no provisions
were expressly stipulated, granted injunctions to suspend the
sale of prizes under existing treaties.
If it were otherwise,
42 4
there would be a failure of justice.
Because there was no statute implementing the treaty and
no general federal question statute in 1799, Judge Bee's jurisdictional ruling meant either that Article III was self-executing for
lower federal courts under some circumstances-which is the
natural reading of his holding-or that the treaty itself was selfexecuting as a conferral of subject matter jurisdiction. His decision to hand over Robbins depended on the assumption that the
extradition article of the treaty was also self-executing as a rule of
decision.
The Robbins extradition sparked a political firestorm.42 5 Although controversy centered on the possibility that Robbins was
a citizen,Judge Bee's jurisdictional holding also came in for criticism. 42 6 In his widely-circulated Letters of a South CarolinaPlanter
of October 1799, Senator Charles Pinckney argued "no possible
construction" of Article III could justify judge Bee's assertion of
jurisdiction because Article III "leaves the boundaries of [federal
court jurisdiction] to be ascertained by Congress. 42 7 Pinckney
called for Congress to fix the extradition process by passing legislation to govern future cases. 42' But he also argued that other
provisions of the Jay Treaty should serve as rules of decision for
British judges hearing cases about the seizure of American vessels. 429 Thus, some provisions of the treaty were self-executing
for courts, while others-perhaps specifically those that impact
424. Id. at 833.
425. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 304-08, 321.
426. See id. at 303-04. Judge Bee decided several years earlier that a treaty could
limit the scope of subject matter jurisdiction conferred by a statute. See Sloss, supra note
15, at 33-34. As the quotation from Robins indicates, he seems to have believed that
allowing the treaty to expand the jurisdictional grant was a natural corollary. See
THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

399-400 (1822).

427. CHARLES PINCKNEY, THREE LETTERS, WRITTEN AND ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED,
UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF A SOUTH CAROLINA PLANTER 12-13 (1799); see also Wedgwood,
supra note 420, at 331-32 (discussing Pinckney's arguments).
428. See PINCKNEY, supra note 427, at 3, 19-20. Pinckney argued Congress should

require a grand jury indictment as a prerequisite to extradition. See id. at 19-20.
429. See id. at 32-33.
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constitutional arrangements involving individual liberty or federal court jurisdiction-were not.
Soon thereafter, Congress convened, and on February 4,
1800, Edward Livingston offered a resolution "[t]hat provision
ought to be made, by law, for carrying into effect" the extradition provisions of the Jay Treaty.43 0 On February 20, he intro-

duced an additional resolution to censure President Adams for
his "dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial decisions. "431
Albert Gallatin took the lead for the republicans in the subsequent debate.432 He contended the President had no inherent
power to execute the treaty's extradition provisions and should
have waited for Congress to implement that portion of the treaty
through legislation.433 Although the President had a duty to execute the laws-including treaties-the power to execute did
434
not include the power to fill gaps or "defect[s]" in the law.
Any executive power to implement a treaty, therefore, was limited to provisions that were clear, complete, and specifically directed to the executive-and the extradition article did not meet
this standard.435
John Marshall's prominent role on the federalist side began
before he took his seat in Congress, when he wrote a "Communication" to the VirginiaFederalist in response to attacks on Adams
in other papers.43 6 His argument centered on a strong view of
430. See generally 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 511 (1800). As he had during the Jay Treaty
debate, Livingston also sought documents from the President concerning the extradition, which Secretary Pickering provided later that week. See id. at 511-15. Much of the
reported debate consists of impassioned speeches about whether the House should
seek additional documents. See id.
431. See id. at 533.
432. See id. at 586.
433. See id.
434. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 336-37 (analogizing to legislation implementing obligation to return deserting French sailors). The Annals do not reproduce
Gallatin's primary speech on these issues, but Wedgwood reconstructed it from his personal papers. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596 (1800) ("Mr. Gallatin rose, and entered generally into the argument, in a speech of about two hours ....); Wedgwood, supra note
420, at 335-36.
435. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 336. After further criticizing Adams for

interfering with the judiciary, Gallatin also asserted Judge Bee improperly decided the
jurisdictional issues. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 338; see also 10 ANNALS OF CONG.

594 (1800) ("this man, by the advice of the President, was taken out of the hands of the
Judiciary.").
436. SeeJohn Marshall, Communication, in 4 THE PAPERS OFJOHN MARSHALL 23-28
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presidential power to execute a ratified treaty. Because the
treaty gave Britain the right to demand Robbins, "[t]here must
therefore have been some mode of carrying the provision of the
treaty in this respect into execution, or else the articles would be
nugatory; and it would be absurd to suppose the parties meant
to stipulate for a thing which could not be performed. 4 3 7 Marshall asserted the executive-"the only channel of communication between the nations"-was the obvious choice for "carrying
the provision ...into execution," and the executive had "a right
to decide whether a fugitive should be delivered up or not. For
it is a mere question of state ...

438

Judge Bee was involved

simply because he was the federal officer responsible for Rob4 9
bins' custody. 1
Marshall recognized Judge Bee had asserted jurisdiction
over the extradition as a case within the meaning of Article III.
But he declared "this is a part of the opinion of the Judge, which
seems liable to be questioned."4 4 Contrary to the republican
argument, however, the flaw was not the absence of a jurisdictional statute. Rather:
The Judge probably meant to say, that he once thought it a
question which exclusively belonged to the Executive, and
therefore, that he, as a Judge, could not in any manner be
required to aid in the execution of the treaty. But finding, by
recurrence to the Constitution, that the Judicial power extended to Treaties, he was then satisfied that the Judges
might be called on where circumstances rendered it proper,
to take the necessary steps, in order to have the Treaty carried
into effect .... 441

Notably absent in Marshall's first defense of Adams is any
reference to Congress or federal legislation. For Marshall, the
treaty was self-executing as a grant of power to the President,
(Charles T. Cullen & Leslie Tobias eds., 1984); see also Wedgwood, supra note 420, at
339 n. 422 (discussing attribution of the essay).
437. SeeJohn Marshall, Communication, in 4 THE PAPERS OFJOHN MARSHALL, supra
note 436, at 24.
438. See id. at 24-26.
439. See id. at 26-27. Indeed, the extradition was not properly before Judge Bee
until he received the President's letter, which was "the very process, if I may use the
expression, which brought the case before the Judge." See id. at 27.
440. See id. at 28.
441. Id.
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who could implement the treaty by enlisting judges to perform
executive duties, even if those duties restricted individual liberty.
Marshall reprised his defense of Adams after he joined Congress. On March 7, 1800, Marshall argued extradition is "a case
for Executive and not Judicial decision. 44 2 He recognized Article III extends to cases arising under treaties, but he insisted an
extradition decision is not "[a] case in law or equity" because it
does not "assume a legal form for forensic litigation and judicial
decision. 4 43 He admitted a case "may arise under a treaty,
where the rights of individuals acquired or secured by a treaty
are to be asserted or defended in court"-and he cited cases for
recovery of debts under the 1783 treaty as an example.4 44 Yet
Marshall contrasted provisions creating individual rights with
"political compacts; as the establishment of the boundary line
between the American and British dominions... [or] the case
of the delivery of a murderer under the twenty-seventh article of
our present Treaty with Britain," to which "the Judicial power
cannot extend,"4 45 to which "the Judicial power cannot ex44 6
tend."
To buttress his case for executive power, Marshall articulated a strong view of self-execution and its relationship to executive power. First, he distinguished extradition under the Jay
Treaty from return of deserting sailors under the 1788 Convention with France, because the Convention specified that return
"shall be performed.., through the medium of the courts; but
this affords no evidence that a contract of a very different nature
is to be performed in the same manner. ' 447 He admitted "some
legislative provision is requisite to carry the stipulations of the
convention into full effect," but he insisted the desirability of legislation was separate from the power and necessity of executing a
442. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 605 (1800).
443. See id. at 606; see also Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 345 (suggesting these
claims are "the least successful ... part of his House argument.").
444. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 606 (1800). That is, Marshall appears to concede
such provisions are self-executing, as the Supreme Court held in Ware. See id.
445. Id. at 607; see also Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 349 (agreeing not all treaties
create individual rights but suggesting Marshall erred applying that idea to extradition).
446. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 607; see Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 349 (agreeing not
alltreaties create individual rights but suggesting Marshall erred in applying that idea
to extradition).
447. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 608 (1800).
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treaty. 448 Indeed-and in tension with the Supreme Court's
much later executive power ruling in Medellin-the failure of
Congress to pass appropriate legislation "by no means declar[es]
the incompetency of a department to perform an act stipulated
by treaty.

449

Second, Marshall asserted that the need to decide "points of
law" to resolve an issue arising under a treaty does not make that
issue into ajudicial matter. 450 After all, "[a] variety of legal questions must present themselves in the performance of every part
of Executive duty, but these questions are not therefore to be
decided in court. ' 45 1 Picking up again on the distinction between enforceable rights and political obligations, Marshall insisted the issues in the Robbins extradition "were questions of
political law, proper to be decided, and they were decided by the
Executive, and not by the courts."452
The central question, for Marshall, was whether "the nation
has bound itself to act. '453 Put differently, "[t]he case was in its
nature a national demand made upon the nation. ''41 4 Not only
must such a demand be made upon the President as "the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations," but because he is
also the wielder of the executive power, "any act to be performed
4 55
by the force of the nation is to be performed through him.
Echoing Hamilton's and to some extent Iredell's earlier statements, Marshall reminded the House that treaties are laws under
the Supremacy Clause. Because the President "conducts the foreign intercourse" and has the constitutional duty to execute the
laws, he was bound to execute the treaty and extradite Robbins:
448. See id.
449. Id.; see Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367-72 (2008). This seems roughly
consistent with Justice Iredell's statement in Ware that an executory treaty might require
action by the executive, judiciary, or legislature, although Marshall seemed less concerned than Iredell about the need for legislative authority as a precondition to executive action in some instances. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272-73 (1796).
450. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 612 (1800).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 613.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id. The Supreme Court has cited this passage numerous times to support
broad executive power over foreign affairs, but it rarely considers the context. See Parry,
supra note 419, at 113-14. Williams Vans Murray of Maryland used similar language in
the Jay Treaty debate. See 5 ANNALs OF CONG. 692 (1796) (describing the President as
'the organ of the nation's sovereignty").
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The means by which it is to be performed, the force of the
nation, are in the hands of this person. Ought not this person to perform the object, although the particular mode of
using the means has not been prescribed? Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve
on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till this be
done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.45 6

In other words, Britain had asserted its rights under the treaty,
and the President acted to fulfill the national obligation. Implementing legislation may have been desirable, but the treaty was
self-executing as a grant of power directly to the
President, even
457
liberty.
and
life
individual
involving
in a case
In sum, Congressman Marshall argued treaties bind the nation and are the supreme law of the land, but not all treaties are
automatically enforceable in court. The President may be vested
with power to execute certain treaty provisions, and others require congressional implementation. Further, if Congress fails
in its duty to implement a treaty, then as a matter of necessity the
President must execute it to avoid defaulting on an obligation to
another nation. 4 5' Thus, not only may a treaty grant power to
456. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1800). Marshall went on to assert the executive was
the proper department for the execution of extradition obligations because it had discretion to depart from treaty obligations in appropriate cases. See id. at 614-15; see also
Parry, supra note 419, at 150-53, 160-69 (discussing the importance of executive discretion to disputes over the nature ofjudicial involvement in extraditions). On the judicial
role in extradition, Marshall largely repeated his earlier argument. Deflecting Judge
Bee's jurisdictional ruling, he suggested that, because the judicial power extends to
treaties, judges may "perhaps ...be called in" to help implement them. See 10 ANNALS
OF CONG. 615 (1800). Similarly, he admitted an individual facing extradition "may perhaps bring the question of the legality of his arrest before a judge, by a writ of habeas
corpus." Id. He also insisted President Adams had not interfered with Judge Bee's decision, because he simply determined Robbins should be extradited if sufficient evidence
of his alleged conduct existed. See id. at 615-16.
457. David Barron and Marty Lederman suggest this statement is consistent with
an idea of Congressional control over executive foreign affairs activity. See DavidJ. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: A Constitutional
History, 121 HARv. L. REv. 941, 970 n.88 (2008). I agree, but Marshall's claim that the
executive, in the course of carrying out a treaty, may summarily dispose of the liberty of
a citizen if Congress has done nothing is also consistent with a default presumption of
broad sovereign discretion. As with so many separation of powers issues, the overlap in
power provides opportunities for conflict or cooperation.
458. See NEWMYER, supra note 276, at 130, 140 (suggesting Marshall responded to a
.crisis in social order" of the 1790's, which demanded "forceful and decisive executive
leadership"); Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 339 (suggesting Marshall supported efficacy in the exercise of power).
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the executive, but the President also has power to fill an enforcement vacuum left by congressional inaction. In this sense, Marshall's argument was the counter to Gallatin and Madison's arguments during the debate over the Jay Treaty: if the House
claimed a role in the implementation of treaties, the President
too could claim a role if Congress failed to act. Further, treaties
not only require the House to pass implementing legislation but
they also require the President to implement them where possible.
This version of self-execution doctrine looks very different
from the one at the center of contemporary debates. Courts
enter the picture largely at the behest of the President, who may
ask them for assistance with the executive task of treaty implementation, and they act more as adjuncts or administrators than
as independent judges.4 5 9 Courts will sometimes hear cases arising under treaties, but those cases are more the exception than
the rule. Compare this view of the role of courts to the one suggested by Judge Bee, who arguably allowed the treaty to substitute for ajurisdictional statute. Few if any defended this holding
on its own terms, and the idea that treaties can create federal
subject matter jurisdiction has largely dropped from view.4 6 °
Marshall's argument changed few minds.4 6 t Republicans already had argued that not all treaties could operate as law without legislation, and his concession that Congress played a legitimate role in implementing treaties nodded in their direction.
Similarly, republicans were unlikely to disagree with the relatively limited role he envisioned for courts. But although Gallatin admitted-as Madison had in his Helvidius essays-that the
President had a duty to execute treaties in some instances, the
459. Marshall's argument that "the Judicial power cannot extend to political compacts" and does not include the power "to seize any individual and determine that he
shall be adjudged by a foreign tribunal," 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 607 (1800), suggests that
the judicial role in treaty implementation that he envisioned would include activities
outside Article III. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 349-50.
460. For further discussion, see generally John T. Parry, No Appeal: The U.S.-U.K.
Supplementary Extradition Treaty's Effort to Create FederalJurisdiction, 25 Loy. L.A. INr'L &
COMP. L. Rv. 543 (2003).
461. The Committee of the Whole had already voted 58-34 to reject Livingston's
censure resolutions. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 595 (1800). On the day after Marshall's
speech, the House concurred by 61-35. Id. at 619; see also id. at 621 (62-35 Committee
vote to end discussion). The margin of victory in these votes was not much larger than
the federalists' 20 seat majority. See ROBARGE, supra note 277, at 207, 209 (discussing
federalist strength in the Sixth Congress).
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debates reveal no reason to believe republicans accepted Marshall's much broader views on the extent of this power. That is
to say, although the Robbins affair confirmed that a treaty can be
self-executing as a grant of power to the President, the more important question of the permissible scope of such grants re4 62
mained unclear.
Congress subsequently considered legislation to regulate extradition,4 63 and the Robbins affair provided an important and
recurring issue for the election of 1800, which soundly rejected
Adams and the high federalist executive power claims with
which-perhaps unfairly-he was associated.4 6 4 Thus, while
Marshall's speech has become a standard citation to support executive foreign affairs authority, the full scope of his argument
was controversial at the time. The republican position of more
limited executive power and broad congressional power with respect to treaties, argued most forcefully by Gallatin and reaffirming his and Madison's efforts in the Jay Treaty debate, also had
substantial support-as the results of the 1800 election seem to
confirm.
D. The 1815 Commercial Convention with Great Britain
The War of 1812 exacerbated sectional and political ten462. This issue received relatively little direct academic attention prior to Medellin.
See NEWMVER, supra note 276, at 137 (recognizing Marshall was arguing in favor of selfexecution); Louis Fisher, PresidentialInherent Power: The "Sole Organ" Doctrine, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 140 (2007) (describing Marshall's argument as about executive
power "to carry out" and implement an extradition treaty); Edward T. Swaine, Taking
Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 353-59 (2008) (drawing on the Robins affair to
discuss presidential power to implement treaties); infra note 607 and accompanying
text. At least one contemporary court has accepted the full force of Marshall's argument. In Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit declared that without a statute providing for judicial involvement in extradition, "the Executive Branch would retain plenary authority to extradite"-presumably
pursuant to a treaty. For the numerous problems with statements of this kind, see generally Parry, supra note 419.
463. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 537, 654, 691 (1800); THE PAPERS OFJOHN MARSHALL,

supra note 436, at 120, 146 (providing copies of amendments offered by Marshall).
Congress was sharply divided over a republican effort to forbid extraditions where trial
could be had in the United States, see 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 691 (1800), and it adjourned without further action, see 4 THE PAPERS OFJOHN MARSHALL, supra note 436, at
146 n.1. The United States did not extradite anyone else for more than forty years, and
no extradition statute emerged until 1848. See Parry, supra note 419, at 114-15, 134-36.
464. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 354-62; see also ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra
note 29, at 691-94; see generally Casper, supra note 411 (describing Jefferson's concerns
about executive power and his efforts to adhere to separation of powers principles).
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sions. Federalists-especially those who represented shipping
interests-tended to oppose the war, as did many orthodox
southern Republicans.4 6 5 Moderate or nationalist Republicans,
by contrast, supported it.4 66 The war and its aftermath were also
the last years in which the Federalist Party had a significant national presence.4 67 The stresses of the war also led some hardline New England Federalists to flirt with secession, and a group
of influential party activists proposed extensive amendments to
the Constitution in the 1815 report of the Hartford Conven46
tion. 8
The war ended in a stalemate, which the 1814 Treaty of
Ghent confirmed by essentially restoring the pre-war status
quo.4 6 9 A few months later, the United States and Britain negotiated a commercial convention that established "a reciprocal liberty of commerce" and equalized duties and bounties imposed
by the two countries.4 7 ° The Treaty was not controversial-it was

neither "a victory for either side [n] or an important step in their
commercial relations"-and the Senate gave its approval.4 7 1
On December 23, 1815, President Madison notified Congress that the Treaty had been ratified, and he recommended
"such legislative provision as the convention may call for on the
part of the United States." 4 7 2

Just over two weeks earlier,

Madison had outlined an ambitious program for the rest of his
465. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN
155-56 (2005).
466. SeeJAMES E. LEwIS, JR., THE AMERICAN UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF NEIGHBORHOOD: THE UNITED STATES AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE 48-51 (1998); see
also GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS 46 (1952) (explaining support
or opposition to the war based on geographic location).
467. See DANIEL WALKER HowE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 82, 90, 94-95 (2007); BRADFORD PERKINS, CASTLEREAGH
AND ADAMS: ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES, 1812-1823, at 176 (1964).
468. See JAMES M. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE FEDERALISTS
AND THE ORIGINS OF PARTY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789-1815, at 321, 326-46
(1970).
469. For extensive discussion of the treaty negotiations and terms, see DANGERFIELD, supra note 466, at 66-89; PERKINS, supra note 467, at 39-127. The Senate gave its
unanimous advice and consent to the treaty on February 16, 1815. See id. at 144.
470. A Convention to Regulate the Commerce between the Territories of the
United States and of his Britannick Majesty art. 1, July 3, 1815, 8 Stat. 228. For discussion of the negotiations, see PERKINS, supra note 467, at 167-70.
471. PERKINS, supra note 467, at 170.
472. 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897,
at 570 Uames D. Richardson ed., 1897).
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presidency, including reviving the national bank, a protective
tariff, continued defense spending, and public works.4 73 In April
1816, Congress would approve the new bank and the tariff, but
the debates would sharpen tensions between old agrarian
Republicans and nationalist Republicans eager to support domestic manufacturing.4 7 4 Before it could address those issues,
however, Congress turned first to the treaty.
On December 29, John Forsyth, a nationalist Republican,
reported a bill from the House Committee of Foreign Relations
"to carry into effect those parts of the treaty which require legislative interposition. '4 75 The first four sections of the bill declared that duties and bounties would be equal, while the fifth
section provided "[t]hat so much of each and every act of Congress as is inconsistent with the provisions of this act be, and the
same is hereby, repealed. 4' 76 The bill did not provide for any
appropriations.
Federalist William Gaston objected to the bill, "believing the
convention, since its ratification in due form, had become a law
of the land, and unable to perceive wherein it needed the help
of an act of Congress to give it operation. 4

77

Consistent with the

Jay Treaty resolution, Forsyth replied that the bill was "indispensable; because the power of legislation was vested in Congress,
and could be exercised by no other authority."4 7 Gaston continued his objection the next day by declaring the bill "pernicious"
because the executive branch could carry the Treaty into effect
473. See id. at 562-69; HOWE, supra note 467, at 80-81; LEWIS, supra note 466, at 6061.
474. See HowE, supa note 467, at 82-86. For additional discussions of the tensions
between old and new republicans, see LEWIS, supra note 466, at 66-67; DREW R. McCoy,
THE ELUsIvE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 239-48 (1980);
Andrew Shankman, "A New Thing on Earth": Alexander Hamilton, Pro-Manufacturing
Republicans, and the Democratization of American PoliticalEconomy, 23 J. EARLY REPUB. 323
(2003). Congress also passed legislation to fund roads and canals, but Madison vetoed
it on constitutional grounds; although he supported the goal of the program, he believed a constitutional amendment was necessary to give Congress the power to implement it. See HowE, supra note 467, at 88.
475. 29 ANNALs OF CONG. 455 (1816). For brief narratives of the debate, see BUTLER, supra note 227, at 432-37; CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 13740. For Forsyth as nationalist republican, see HowE, supra note 467, at 82.
476. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 419-20 (1816).
477. Id. at 456.
478. Id. at 457; see also id. at 473 (discussing the resolution), id. at 653-54 (legislation required to execute treaty, not to make it valid).
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without legislation.4 7 9 He characterized the Jay Treaty debate as
a struggle over appropriations and insisted "[t]here could not
have been a serious difference of opinion among the wise and
able men of either side, whether a treaty constitutionally made,
upon a subject fit for a treaty, was or was not a law; to be executed by the executive, expounded by the judiciary, as other laws
made in other forms, prescribed by the Constitution."'4 0 He admitted that "treaties, like other laws, might be so made as to require the aid of supplemental legislation," but that was not true
for this Treaty, which "executes itself."4 ''
Other members of the House quickly joined the debate,
and many of their arguments repeated claims from the Jay
Treaty debates. Thus, opponents of the bill (whether Federalists
or nationalist Republicans4 8 2 ) made arguments similar to those
made by Federalists in the Jay Treaty debate: treaties automatically override existing federal statutes, 4 8 3 statutes cannot over-

ride treaties, 48 4 and the House has little or no role in implementing treaties and may even be bound to act when it does have a
role.48 5 Several opponents also relied on Washington's response
479. Id. at 466.
480. Id. at 467.
481. Id. at 467-68.
482. In the Fourteenth Congress, the House had 117 Republicans (orthodox and
national) and sixty-five Federalists, while the Senate had twenty-four Republicans and
twelve Federalists. See CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 138 n.4.
483. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1816) (Enos Throop); id. at 570 (William

Pinkney). Pinkney had been Attorney General in the Madison administration. PINKEY,
William-Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.
pl?index=P000362 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 606 (1816) (Alexander Hanson); id. at 643-44 (Joseph Hopkinson).
484. See id. at 485 (Thomas Gold); id. at 493 (Throop, saying a treaty is a compact
and superior to a law). John Calhoun claimed treaties are "paramount to laws," and
ultimately asserted there could never be a true conflict between a treaty and a statute
because although "[e]ach in its proper sphere operates with general influence . . . [a]
treaty never can legitimately do that which can be done by law; and the converse is also
true." Id. at 529-32. Alfred Cuthbert suggested Calhoun was "perhaps, carried too
strongly towards metaphysical subtlety and the soundness and completeness of theory."
Id. at 555. Henry St. George Tucker declared Calhoun's views "more ingenious than
solid." Id. at 559. Henry St. George Tucker was St. George Tucker's son. See David
Cobin & Paul Finkelman, Introduction to 1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, at ii, vii (3d ed. 1998).
485. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 486 (1816) (Hopkinson, claiming there was no role

for the House unless the treaty requires appropriations or a "collateral or extrinsic
act"); id. at 491 (Gaston, saying the House was bound to appropriate if the treaty is in
force and not overturned by statute); id. at 493-94 (Throop, declaring the House has no
cohtrol over treaty making "unless it was in cases where the treaty could not execute
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48 6
to the House's request for documents on the Jay Treaty.
Supporters of the bill (old Republicans and many nationalist republicans) tended to repeat the standard republican arguments that a treaty cannot override a federal statute,48 7 the
Supremacy Clause is about federalism only and does not place
treaties over federal statutes, 488 the House must legislate to carry
a treaty into effect whenever the treaty overlaps with congressional power,48 9 and if treaties can create commercial laws they
can create laws on any subject, including appropriations and
to argue
declarations of war.4 90 Participants also continued
49 1
about British practice and whether it was relevant.
Several speakers made more telling arguments. For example, some opponents pointed out that-notwithstanding the insistence of the Jay Treaty resolution that the House sought no
role in making treaties-passing a statute to carry a treaty into
effect, where that treaty does not conflict with existing laws, "submits to the House the whole terms, the entire merits of the
treaty" and thus is functionally a claim to share in the making of
the treaty.49 2 Thus, they did not merely suggest that the House
had a limited role but also explained-as had some Federalists
in the Jay Treaty debates-why a larger role could be in tension
with the text and structure of the treaty power.
Other participants did not simply note the situations in

itself"); id. at 540 (Elijah Mills, stating "it was never the intention of the convention to
vest the House of Representatives with any participation in the treaty-making power.");
id.at 567 (Pinkney); id. at 606-08 (Hanson); id. at 640-41 (Hopkinson); id. at 890, 894
(Asa Lyon, saying the House had "no right . . . to interfere with the treaty-making
power" and was "bound" to pass legislation to carry treaties into effect where necessary).
486. See id. at 602-03 (Robert Wright); id. at 606 (Hanson); id. at 672 (Benjamin
Huger); id. at 892 (Lyon). Lyon also referred to the Jay Treaty resolution as "the manoeuvre of a rear guard, to cover a retreat." Id. at 885.
487. See id. at 477 (Forsyth); id. at 536 (John Randolph); id. at 559 (Tucker); id. at
628 (Richard Wilde); id. at 632 (Daniel Sheffey); id. at 665 (John Jackson).
488. See id. at 477 (Forsyth); id. at 479 (Philip Barbour); id. at 560 (Tucker); id. at
628 (Wilde); id. at 633 (Sheffey).
489. See id. at 478, 481 (Barbour); id. at 538 (Cyrus King); id. at 543 (James Reynolds); id. at 547-51 (Rufus Easton); id. at 562 (Tucker); id. at 632 (Sheffey); id. at 665
(jackson); see also id. at 525 (Thomas Gholson, noting this view still left many areas of
treaty-making outside the control of the House); id. at 539 (King, saying no House
consent was required for treaties "respecting solely our external relations").
490. See id. at 480-81 (Barbour); id. at 522-24 (Gholson); id. at 595 (Thomas Robertson); id. at 621 (John W. Taylor); id. at 628 (Wilde).
491. See id. at 471 (Wright); id. at 481-82 (Barbour); id. at 525 (Gholson); id. at
532 (Calhoun).
492. See id. at 483 (Gold); see also id. at 606 (Hanson).
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which legislation was or was not necessary but also tried to articulate a broader rule for treaty implementation. As John Randolph, the leader of the old Republicans, recognized, "as there
are treaties which are self-executory, there are others which require legislative enactment. ' 493 Supporters of the bill grounded
their arguments on the republican view of congressional authority championed by Gallatin and Madison and articulated in the
Jay Treaty resolution. Rufus Easton explained,
A treaty though made has not force ... without a law of Con-

gress... to carry it into effect.., in all cases where the treaty
in its provisions interferes with, or contravenes any of the
powers expressly delegated to the legislative authority, or
where from the nature of the treaty itself it requires legislative
provision; but if the treaty is not contrary to the provisions of
the Constitution, and does not contravene any of the powers
delegated to Congress, and is of the description that it can be
carried into effect by the President alone, or by the President
and Senate, or by the judicial authority, without the aid of
Congress, legislation in such cases becomes wholly useless ....
Richard Wilde phrased the distinction between the two categories differently, as turning on whether "the stipulations of a
treaty relate entirely to objects purely international or extraterritorial," or "solely to objects intra-territorial, objects purely of municipal legislative jurisdiction."' '
Either way, supporters of the
493. Id. at 585; see also id. at 625 (Wilde); id. at 666 (Jackson). Jackson also denied
that the House was obligated to implement treaties. See id. at 663-69.
494. Id. at 554. Arguing for the same conclusion about the necessity of legislation,
Henry St. George Tucker declared "a treaty does not, cannot, execute itself." Rather, it
is a contract to do something, not "an act by which it is done." He explained,
The stipulations of the instrument which the nation by its Executive undertakes to perform, are ... of various characters, and separate and distinct natures. Some may be Executive merely, some Legislative; and indeed . . . it
seems, that the engagements of the contracting Powers may on some occasions be referable to the Judiciary department of the Government ....
If it be
agreed that something shall be done, which falls within the province of the
legislative power, then the legislative aid become necessary, because, though
the President and Senate may make a treaty, the Constitution nowhere empowers them to make a law.
Id. at 557-58; see also id. at 638 (Sheffey, agreeing with Tucker).
495. Id. at 625. He also noted "treaties may be mixed or compounded of stipulations, relating to objects, some of which belong to one class and some to the other." Id.
at 626. He further explained that treaties dealing with international or extra-territorial
issues "are either self-executory, and are in fact partly executed by the exchange of
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bill tended to view the distinction between types of treaties entirely in constitutional terms, by reference to the enumerated
powers of Congress-as opposed, or in addition, to the nature of
the treaty or its provisions.
Opponents suggested a different emphasis. William Gaston
declared,
It did not follow.., from his doctrine in regard to the efficacy of treaties, that they necessarily changed or repealed legislative acts, with which they did not entirely accord. The stipulations of a treaty might amount, and often did amount, to
no more than a pledge to alter or abrogate these acts, or to
make legislative regulations conformable to such stipulations.
Where the treaty was of this nature - that is to say, executory
merely, legislative aid was necessary. But where it could execute itself, there it needed no aid.49 6
Benjamin Hardin agreed:
Treaties might be made, no doubt ...

for the execution of

which it might be necessary to call upon the House to make
laws; offensive and defensive treaties for instance, which
could not otherwise be carried into effect; but when, as in the
present case, the treaty was complete, and capable of executing itself, nothing of the kind was necessary.49 7
For these participants, the powers of Congress were of little or
no importance compared to the nature of the treaty itself. Perhaps drawing on Chase in Ware,49 and also anticipating Marshall
in Foster,49 9 they argued the distinction between treaties for constitutional purposes turned on the prior interpretive question
whether the treaty itself required legislation or could go immediately into effect. 0 0
ratifications, as in a treaty of peace, or they depend for their execution on the executive
and judicial powers, which are sufficient for that purpose." Id. at 628.
496. Id. at 491. Gaston's conception of "executory" appears to have differed from
Iredell's in Ware and to have been very close to Marshall's in Foster.
497. Id. at 545; see also id. at 608 (Hanson, arguing "the treaty is capable of executing itself"); id. at 609 (Richard Stanford, arguing the House has discretion and "an
indirect control over" treaties that stipulate for legislation or require appropriations or
further regulations, but "most of our treaties ...were not of such description, but such
as were sufficiently full in their details, and went plainly and obviously to their intended
objects").
498. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
499. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829) (1829).
500. John Calhoun went further and suggested that if the treaty negotiators be-
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Some opponents also went beyond the traditional federalist
doctrine that treaties trump federal statutes to suggest a more
comprehensive and moderate view of the relationship between
the two. Thus, Gaston observed that treaties and statutes were
equally laws of the nation. 50 ' He went on,
They both derive their efficacy from being Constitutional expressions of the will of the nation; and where there are two
expressions of that will, which cannot stand together, the last
necessarily abrogates the first. A law may repeal a treaty....
And a treaty for the same reason may also repeal a precedent
act of Congress..
52

Gaston and other speakers-including Timothy Pickering,
Secretary of State during the Robbins affair, hard-line federalist,
and sometime disunionist-also made clear that they considered
the last-in-time rule to be a structural principle that confirmed a
broad treaty power without destroying legislative power, and
which counseled rejection of broad claims of congressional
power over treaty implementation. 50 3 Embracing the last-in-time
rule was a retreat for Federalists, but it was also an effective response to the Jay Treaty resolution. The resolution's emphasis
on enumerated powers ensured tension with the President and
Senate, because most treaties would overlap with those powers.
To representatives worried about the power of the House but
also concerned about political tension, the last-in-time rule af50 4
firmed congressional power without creating conflict.
lieved legislation was necessary, "the proper form" was to say so in the treaty itself. 29
ANNALS OF CONG.

527 (1816).

501. See id. at 490.
502. Id. Asa Lyon declared: "Treaties, then, are laws, and as such, have operative
force as other laws," which means "they have the power to repeal prior, contravening
laws." Id. at 891. But treaties are not superior to laws; they "may be repealed, or set
aside for good reasons, as well as other laws." Id. at 894.
503. See id. at 490 (Gaston); id. at 614-15 (Pickering). Pickering also would have
required a clear statement; Congress may only annul a treaty "by a formal act" that
"declare[s] a treaty no longer obligatory on the United States." Id. at 615. He referred
to the statute, passed while he was Secretary of State, to terminate the convention with
France. See id.; An Act to Declare the Treaties Heretofore Concluded with France, No
Longer Obligatory on the United States, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578 (1798). Pickering not only
supported the Hartford Convention movement but also "preferred temporary dissolution of the union to continued Republican rule." PERKINS, supra note 467, at 139-40; see
also BANNER, supra note 468, at 114-15, 330.
504. Arguing from the other side, Rufus Easton also saw the connection between
self-execution and the last-in-time rule. "It is a correct principle," he admitted,
that subsequent laws, inconsistent with former laws, repeal such former laws,
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At the same time that the House was debating, the Senate
passed its own bill, which provided, "Be it enacted ... [t]hat so
much of any act or acts as is contrary to the provisions of the
Convention ...shall be deemed and taken to be of no force or
effect."5" 5 The House ignored the Senate's bill in favor of its
own. Some House members argued that the Senate's decision to
pass a bill of any kind indicated that the Senate also believed the
treaty was not self-executing. 50 6 Others opposed the Senate's
proposal because it was only declarative and did not actually repeal conflicting laws-and thus it did not admit the House's role
in implementing treaties and could be interpreted instead as
confirmation that treaties override laws.5" 7 On January 13th, the
House passed Forsyth's bill by a vote of 86-71.5°8
When the Senate began its debate on the House bill, James
Barbour objected that existing federal statutes in conflict with
the treaty were already "annulled upon the ratification of the
treaty."509 Echoing Gaston's argument in the House, Barbour
explained that the treaty power was complete, including in matters of commercial regulation; "[n] o legislative sanction is necessary, if the treaty be capable of self-execution. 51 0 But the treaty
and is a rule which cannot be controverted.... But the question to be decided is, when does a treaty become a law, when has it efficacy as such, and
when shall it be binding as the supreme authority of the nation?
29 ANNALS OF CONG. 548 (1816). He argued a treaty that overlapped with legislative
powers could not be supreme law until Congress passed legislation to put it into effect,
so that the last-in-time rule would best be satisfied-in his view-by requiring House
participation. See id. at 548-51. Hentry St. George Tucker, by contrast, declared the idea
of a last-in-time rule was "[i]mpossible! it is an inconsistency that cannot be admitted; it
is a construction that would beget unutterable confusion." Id. at 561; see also id. at 61719 (Taylor, arguing a last-in-time rule would allow treaties to appropriate funds and
alter the Constitution); see also Lobel, supra note 12, at 1101 n.151 (discussing this aspect of the debate).
505. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 36-37, 40 (1816).
506. Id. at 551 (Easton); id. at 580, 582 (Randolph).
507. See id. at 594 (Forsyth); id. at 595 (Erastus Root). Pickering agreed-and
therefore preferred the Senate bill, although he maintained no bill was necessary at all.
See id. at 594.
508. Id. at 674.
509. Id. at 47; see also id. at 49 (if a treaty is supreme law under the Supremacy
Clause, "then whatsoever municipal regulation comes within its provisions must ipso
facto be annulled."). James Barbour was the brother of Representative (and later Justice) Philip Barbour, who voted in favor of the House bill. See id. at 674; BARBOUR,
Philip Pendleton-Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=B000131 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
510. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 50 (1816). He went on to note that if "the treaty from its
nature cannot be carried into effect but by the agency of the Legislature ... then the
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power was not superior to legislative power. Rather, the two
powers were the same, so that "the last act, whether by the Legis'
lature or the treaty-making power, abrogates a former one."511
While the bill passed by the Senate had been merely "declaratory"-so that "all doubts and difficulties, should any exist,
might be removed"-the House bill was "a supererogation. '"512
Eligius Fromentin agreed, declaring that both the House and
Senate bills "enact provisions evidently useless. '5 13 He took it as
"a settled principle ... that the last law repeals the former law
so
far as the provisions of the former law are irreconcilable with the
provisions of the latter," which meant that the treaty "repeal [ed]
every law anterior to that treaty, which is in opposition to the
5 14
provisions of that treaty.
Other Senators spoke in favor of the House bill. Jonathan
Roberts declared it was "worse than absurdity" to say that a treaty
can become law without legislative enactment. 15 Nathaniel Macon insisted House participation was necessary for treaties that
516
overlapped with the enumerated powers of Congress.
George Washington Campbell also supported the House
bill, but in a way similar to that of Randolph and Easton in the
House. Campbell admitted "the conclusion would seem irresistible, that a treaty may be complete without the agency of the
House of Representatives, and go into effect, as a law of the
United States, without legislative enactment. ' 517 But, he went
on, the authority of the President and Senate to "to make a
treaty complete ... extends to such cases only wherein the subjects to which it relates are clearly within the treaty-making
power," which does not include "such subjects as lay more properly within the sphere of the general legislative powers previously
Legislature must act not as participating in the treaty-making power, but in its proper
character as a legislative body." Id. at 52.
511. Id. at 51.
512. Id. at 47, 57.
513. Id. at 58.
514. Id. at 59.
515. Id. at 66. Roberts seemed to go further than the republican position in the
Jay Treaty debates, for his statements made no distinction between treaties that overlapped with enumerated legislative powers, and those that did not, except for treaties of
peace. See id. at 70.
516. See id. at 75-76. As a Representative, Macon had voted for the Jay Treaty resolution. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (1796).
517. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 83 (1816).
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Thus, "some treaties become complete,

and go into effect as laws of the United States, without legislative
aid, while others are incomplete without such aid, and only
pledge the faith of the nation that the requisite legislative acts
will be passed for carrying their provisions into effect."519 Because the treaty affected revenue, he concluded, House participation was necessary."'
The Senate rejected the House bill the following day by a
vote of 21-10.21 No other issue appears in the reported debate,

although many of the various speeches were noted and not reported. Thus, the Senate's rejection appears largely to have
turned on opposition to the House's claims that treaties can
neither override statutes nor go into immediate effect without
House participation if they overlap with enumerated legislative
powers. The Senate vote may also indicate its embrace of the
moderate federalist position on the manner of distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.
The dispute between the House and Senate ultimately went
to a conference committee.522 The House conferees submitted a
written statement to their Senate counterparts, in which they
made several assertions that restated the principles of the Jay
Treaty resolution, but in a more diluted fashion and with a conciliatory tone. They first protested that
the House of Representatives does not assert the pretension
that no treaty can be made without their assent; nor do they
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. See id. at 86. Campbell had briefly succeeded Gallatin as Secretary of the
Treasury under Madison. CAMPBELL, George Washington-Biographical Informa(last visited
tion, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000083
Feb. 1, 2009). He may have supported a last-in-time rule, but only for treaties that were
"complete." See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 84-85 (1816).
521. Id. at 89.
522. When the House learned of the Senate's action, it took up the bill that had
passed the Senate. It voted to strike all of the Senate's language and replace it with that
of the House bill. See id. at 897 (81-70 vote in the Committee of the Whole); see also id.
at 898 (passage in the House). Forsyth "condemned the Senate's bill ... as an attempt
to deprive this House of its just powers in relation to the origination of propositions
affecting the public revenue." Id. at 884. The Senate then rejected the House amendments. See id. at 130-31 (19-15 vote not to strike the words "and declared" and vote to
reject the rest of the House amendments). The House then stood firm. See id. at 134
(Senate receives message "that the House insist on their amendments to the bill" and
"[t]hey ask a conference upon the subject."); see also id. at 136 (Senate insists on its
version of the bill and agrees to a conference).
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contend that in all cases legislative aid is indispensably necessary, either to give validity to a treaty, or to carry it into execution. On the contrary, . . . to some, nay many treaties, no
legislative
sanction is required, no legislative aid is neces5 23
sary.
They also suggested the Senate would admit "the necessity
of legislative enactment to carry into execution all treaties which
contain stipulations requiring appropriations, or which might
bind the nation to lay taxes, to raise armies, to support navies, to
grant subsidies, to create States, or to cede territory. '5 24 Thus,
they maintained, the difference between the two bodies was not
over principle but only over "application of the principle.5' 25
They pleaded that "it is safer in every doubtful case, to legislate"-in part because doing so would avoid tempting the Presi5 26
dent to execute treaties in such cases.
At the conference, according to the House conferees, the
Senate committee
admit[ted] the principle . . . that whilst some treaties might
not require, others may require, legislative provision to carry
them into effect ....
[T]he Senate doubted whether any act
of legislation was necessary [for this treaty], but since it was
deemed important by the House that an act should be passed,
they had no objection to give it their sanction; provided a
precedent was not established, binding them thereafter to assist in 2 passing
laws, in cases on which such doubts might not
7
5

exist.

At the same time, however, the Senate conferees insisted on retaining the words "and declared," so that the legislation would
begin with the phrase, "Be it enacted and declared .... -1528 They
explained that it was "expedient, with a view of giving to the bill
a declaratory, as well as an enacting form. ' 529 The House conferees acquiesced, and they explained to their peers that "these
words [we] re mere surplusage" that they had to accept if there
was to be any agreement at all.53 °
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

at 1019.

at 1020.
at 1022.
id.
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After a short debate, in which members disputed whether or
not the committee had given up too much, the House voted 10035 to accept the amended bill.53 1 On the Senate side, Rufus
King-a relatively moderate Federalist who was soon to be the
unsuccessful candidate for President against James Monroe-explained that the Senate conferees believed no legislation was required at all and "even a declaratory law ... is [a] matter of mere
expediency. ' 53 2 Thus, they had insisted on retaining the word
"declared" because it "imparts ... the character of a declaratory
law" that merely "recognises the existence and authority" of the
treaty.53
The claim of extensive House authority over treaties that
emerged from the Jay Treaty debates stumbled in 1816. The resulting statute did not "repeal" conflicting legislation; it merely
"enacted and declared" that such legislation should be "deemed
and taken to be of no force or effect," and even that statement
was controversial. The failure of the hard-line republican position may simply reflect the fact that this debate was far less partisan because the merits of the treaty were not at issue-although
the debate and resulting compromise were still highly political.
In addition, the Senate was also involved, and it had the opportunity to register its disagreement in a meaningful way.
Importantly, however, many of the victorious participants in
the 1816 debate did not argue simply for the superiority of treaties over legislation. Nor did they embrace a "presumption" of
self-execution or reject a role for the House. Nationalist republicans who opposed the House bill may have been uncomfortable
with the full implications of the Jay Treaty resolution, even if
531. See id. at 1049-50, 1057.
532. Id. at 160. For King as moderate Federalist and presidential candidate, see
BANNER, supra note 468, at 331; PERKINS, supra note 467, at 31-32, 96; WILENTZ, supra
note 465, at 202.
533. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 160-61 (1816). The Senate then accepted the conference version of the bill. Id. at 161. In relevant part, the statute reads,
Be it enacted and declared... [t]hat so much of any act as imposes a higher duty
of tonnage, or of impost on vessels and articles imported in vessels of Great
Britain, than on vessels and articles imported in vessels of the United States,
contrary to the provisions of the convention.., be, from and after the date of
the ratification of the said convention, and during the continuance thereof,
deemed and taken to be of no force or effect.
An Act Concerning the Convention to Regulate the Commerce Between the Territories
of the United States and His Britannic Majesty, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 255 (1816) (emphasis
added).
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they accepted it in a more limited context-such as appropriations, where the need for legislation was fairly obvious. Participants who saw merit in aspects of the federalist approach to the
treaty power (again, whether federalists or republicans in 1816)
backed sharply away from the Hamiltonian view. Instead, they
embraced a more moderate position that had two critical components: admitting that not all treaties operate as law by themselves, and advancing the last-in-time rule as a way to balance the
legislative and treaty powers. These proponents of the last-intime rule admitted that the treaty power was not superior to legislative power, that Congress was not bound by treaties, and that
it could override them.
By the end of these debates, thoughtful Senators and Representatives had almost fully articulated the doctrine that some
treaties were self-executing and could be put into effect by the
President or courts, while others required implementing legislation. This view tended to claim a larger role for treaties than
many republicans desired, and the last-in-time rule operated as a
necessary corollary to the idea of self-execution. Far from being
the reflexive adoption of a hoary maxim, the last-in-time rule as
it emerged from these debates was the thoughtful resolution of a
difficult theoretical and political issue. Its function was to ensure that the House would have an important albeit more limited constitutional role in overseeing the implementation and
operation of treaties."'
534. Two future Supreme Court justices, Philip Barbour of Virginia and John McLean of Ohio, voted for the House bill. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 674 (1816). Neither
was on the Court at the time of Foster or the last-in-time rule decisions, but McLean later
authored a circuit court opinion that expressed the republican view of the treaty power,
perhaps diluted a bit in response to the 1816 debate and Foster
A treaty under the federal constitution ... is not.., and cannot be the supreme law of the land, where the concurrence of congress is necessary to give
it effect. Until this power is exercised, as where the appropriation of money is
required, the treaty is not perfect. It is not operative, in the sense of the constitution, as money cannot be appropriated by the treaty-making power....
And in such a case, the representatives of the people and the states, exercise
their own judgments in granting or withholding the money. They act upon
their own responsibility, and not upon the responsibility of the treaty-making
power. It cannot bind or control the legislative action in this respect, and
every foreign government may be presumed to know, that so far as the treaty
stipulates to pay money, the legislative sanction is required.
Turner v. Am. Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F.Cas. 344, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1852) (No.
14,251). MacLean applied these principles to a treaty providing for the sale of land and
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E. Aftermath and Conclusions
In the years after the 1816 debate, the House and Senate
continued to debate questions of treaty implementation, and the
House continued to insist on its authority to review the merits of
treaties in the course of considering laws-usually appropriations-that were necessary for implementation. 535 Throughout
this period, Congress also authorized the President to enter into
numerous international agreements that were not submitted for
Senate ratification-that is, they were congressional-executive
agreements, not treaties. Although these agreements began to
appear even before the congressional debates on the treaty
power, it is difficult not to believe that the frequent debates over
the role of the House-which stressed the ambiguity and tension
in the relationship between the treaty and legislative powerssupported the constitutional legitimacy of such agreements and
eventually their expansion into international trade.5 3 6
Treatise writers also addressed these issues in the years
before Foster, and they tended to support federalist positions, so
that federalist legal arguments persisted well after the party lost
national influence or importance. In 1822, Thomas Sergeant
declared, "[a]s a treaty is declared to be the Supreme law of the
land, it is obligatory on Courts; and where it affects the rights of
parties litigating in Court, it is as much to be regarded as an act
of Congress. 5 31 7 He went on to note that "[i]n some instances
held that a statute was required to carry the treaty into effect, which meant that the
statute-not the treaty-provided the rule of decision for the court. Id. at 346.
535. See BUTLER, supra note 227, at 437-43; CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 118-50;

FISHER, supra note 329, at 40-42; Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv.L. Rv. 799, 812 n.45 (1995).
536. For histories of Congressional-executive agreements, see Ackerman & Golove,
supra note 535, at 837-907; Hathaway, supra note 47, at 1286-1302. "[W]ith the exception of the general friendship and commerce agreements concluded with island nations," Hathaway states, "there is little evidence [through the mid to late nineteenth
century] of congressional-executive agreements regarding international trade."
Hathaway, supra note 47, at 1292. Ackerman and Golove note that House members
rarely if ever claimed a role in making treaties-as opposed to implementing themand so these debates are not directly analogous to contemporary reliance on Congressional-executive agreements. I am less sure, perhaps because I am not trying to fit this
history into a theory of constitutional change being produced by concentrated moments of constitutional politics. In any event, Ackerman and Golove also concede that
"the modernist reading of the text"-allowing Congressional-executive agreements"was within eighteenth-century interpretive horizons." Ackerman & Golove, supra note
535, at 813.
537. SERGEANT, supra note 426, at 395; see also id. at 396 ("it is doubtful, whether a
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has exercised the power of declaring the State

of the nation under existing treaties, and of enforcing and carrying into effect the obligations of neutrality." 3 8 Sergeant also
provided brief discussions of the congressional debates without
taking clear positions on the intersections among the treaty
power, legislative powers, and the Supremacy Clause.5 39
William Rawle took a more forceful tone. His 1825 treatise
began by describing treaties as "laws, in making which the house
of representatives has no original share," and he also argued the
House is "bound" to perform the "duty" of appropriating funds
"to support the exercise of the treaty making power. "540 His discussion of the Jay Treaty debates suggested the House "acquiesced" to some extent in Washington's reply, while his discussion
of the 1816 debates described the House bill as "a dangerous
innovation" and the final statute as "a sort of compromise, which
it is difficult to reconcile with a sound construction of the constitution." 14 The tone of these comments clearly indicates sympathy with core federalist positions, but other parts of his discussion were more consistent with the moderate federalist position
in the 1816 debates. First, he accepted the legitimacy of the lastin-time rule-although he also took care to assert that the rule
necessarily "consider[s] the treaty as complete and effective," as
opposed to statutes passed to carry treaties into effect, "which
suppose the treaty imperfect. '54 2 Second, he admitted that a
treaty can neither appropriate money nor raise revenue; only
congressional legislation can accomplish those goals.5 43
New York Chancellor James Kent's 1826 Commentaries on
American Law was less compromising and generally espoused the
treaty is to be considered as of the same character as an act of Congress, in respect to
criminal offences."). The 1830 second edition adds a discussion that closely tracks the
language of Foster. See id. at 405-06 (2d ed. 1830). For background on Sergeant, see
ELIZABETH KELLEY BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION:

1790-1860, at 39 n.1

(1952). Sergeant's older brotherJohn participated in the 1816 debate as a member of
the House, and he voted against the House bill. See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 674 (1816).
538. SERGEANT, supra note 426, at 397.

539. See id. at 401-03.
540. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 56, 67-68 (1825). The chapter on the treaty power in the 1829 second edition
is not materially different. For background on Rawle, including his Federalist views, see
BAUER, supra note 537, at 58-65.

541. RAWLE, supra note 540, at 62-63.
542. Id. at 61.
543. See id. at 64-67.
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federalist position in the Jay Treaty debate. Thus, he expressed
"regret and astonishment" over the Jay Treaty resolution and dismissed it as "a naked abstract claim of right, never acted
upon."5 4' 4 After endorsing Washington's message to the House,
Kent strenuously sought to minimize the House's role in implementing treaties:
If a treaty be the law of the land, it is as much obligatory upon
Congress as upon any other branch of the government, or
upon the people at large, so long as it continues in force, and
unrepealed. The House of Representatives are not above the
law, and they have no dispensing power.... The argument in
favor of the binding and conclusive efficacy of every treaty
made by the President and Senate is so clear and palpable,
that it has probably carried very general conviction throughout the community; and this may now be considered as the
decided sense of public opinion.5 4 5
Kent went on to claim, erroneously, that his remarks reflected "the sense of the House of Representatives, in 1816," and
he proved a poor prophet when he asserted that "the resolution
of 1796 would not now be repeated."5 4' 6 Yet Kent nonetheless
can be read to accept, perhaps grudgingly and certainly obliquely, the last-in-time rule:
[The House has] a right to make and repeal laws, provided
the Senate and President concur; but without such concurrence, a law in the shape of a treaty is as binding upon them
as if it were in the shape of an act of Congress, or of an article
of the7 constitution, or of a contract made by authority of
4
law.

5

The importance of these debates and the resulting commentaries has more than one dimension. First, of course, the
continued concern about problems of treaty implementationspecifically with reference to the balance between legislative and
executive power-demonstrated both that the text of the Consti544. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 286 (3d ed. 1836).
545. Id. at 286-87.
546. Id. at 287. Louis Henkin notes, "[t]he resolution was re-affirmed in 1871." See
HENKIN, supra note 408, at 482 n.115 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 835
(1871)).
547. KENT, supra note 544, at 287. Writing after Foster,Justice Joseph Story articulated similar views and forcefully defended self-execution, but he expressly admitted the
legitimacy of the last-in-time rule. See 3JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 694-97 (1833).
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tution was ambiguous and that there was little if any baseline
understanding of how the political branches would or should exercise their overlapping powers. The debates were therefore
crucial in creating a framework for managing or resolving constitutional ambiguity-more important, I would argue, than the
treatises. Second, the differences between Federalist treatise
writers and many members of Congress demonstrate pluralism
on issues of constitutional interpretation. Further, the tone and
content of Chief Justice Marshall's subsequent opinion in Foster
is much closer to that of the congressional debates than to that
of the treatise writers.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the topics that did
not draw attention are also significant-because some issues
were no longer matters of contention. Throughout the congressional debates, almost no one suggested that enforcement of
treaties against the states was in any way problematic. Republicans certainly conceded at least that much when they continually
insisted the Supremacy Clause was directed only at the states.
Similarly, most participants assumed the judiciary had a role in
treaty implementation. Although there was no clear agreement
on anything like a "presumption" in favor of or against self-execution, few if any participants by 1816 denied that some treaty
provisions could be enforced by courts without implementing
legislation.
V. THE SUPREME COURT RETURNS TO THE DEBATE
A. Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman
The Supreme Court returned to the debate over treaty implementation with its 1829 decision in Foster v. Neilson."48 The
case presented a dispute over title to land in West Florida. The
plaintiffs claimed title under a grant from Spain and further asserted that the 1819 treaty between the United States and Spain
recognized their title. Speaking through Chief Justice Marshall,
the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim on two grounds.
First, the Court noted that from before the date of the alleged grants, the United States had asserted sovereignty over the
disputed land and had denied Spanish claims. 549 Federal stat548. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
549. See id. at 309.
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utes enacted prior to the treaty reflected this view.55 ° The Court
deferred to this exercise of sovereignty: "if the legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not in its own courts
that this construction is to be denied."5 5 1 More generally, the
issue of sovereignty over land was a question "respecting the
boundaries of nations" and thus was "more a political than a legal question" to which courts must defer. 52
Marshall next considered whether the eighth article of the
1819 treaty could have any impact on this understanding.5 5
The Court was divided over the meaning of the eighth article,
and Marshall ultimately based his opinion on a more fundamental conclusion."' Whatever the eighth article might mean, its
impact depended on whether it "act[ed] directly on the grants,
so as to give validity to those not otherwise valid," or whether it
only "pledge [d] the faith of the United States to pass acts which
shall ratify and confirm them."5 5 Marshall asked, in other
words, whether the eighth article was self-executing as a rule of
decision for the courts.
Marshall then explained why this distinction was important:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a
legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object
to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infraterritorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign
power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States, a different principle is established.
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It
is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when
the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty ad550. See id. at 303-04, 308.
551. See id. at 309. The "construction" Marshall referred to was the government's
interpretation of an 1800 treaty between France and Spain and its effect on the 1803
treaty between the United States and France for the purchase of the Louisiana Territory. See id. at 301.
552. See id. at 309. In his Robbins speech, Marshall identified national boundaries
as political issues. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 607 (1800).
553. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 310-15.
554. For discussion of this aspect of the opinion, see David Sloss, Wen Do treaties
Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and
Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 20, 84-85 (2006).
555. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (1829).
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dresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute
the contract before it can be556
come a rule for the court.
Turning to the language of the treaty, Marshall declared that it
did not "act[ ] directly on the subject" and instead used "the language of contract." 5 57 As a result, the treaty did not "repeal[ ]
those acts of congress which were repugnant to it," and implementing legislation was necessary.5 58
As I mentioned in the Introduction, commentators debate
whether this language creates a general presumption in favor of
self-execution under the Supremacy Clause. The arguments on
either side are unconvincing because the structure of Marshall's
argument suggests a middle course. He first states that the presumption elsewhere is against self-execution, but that the United
States follows "a different principle." So far, this language only
rejects a presumption against self-execution. Critically, the rest
of the passage did not take the further step of creating a new
presumption going the other way. Instead, Marshall simply asserted there are two types of treaties-those that are "equivalent
to an act of the legislature" and create rules of decision for
the
courts, and those that require the legislature to "execute
559
contract before it can become a rule for the court.
Marshall's opinion has an initial similarity to Iredell's in
Ware. Both begin with the observation that, in general, treaties
are not self-executing, but that the Supremacy Clause established a different rule. From there, however, their opinions diverge. Iredell can be read to declare that treaties are almost always self-executing under the Supremacy Clause, except that
they cannot disturb vested rights without precise language stat556. Id.
557. See id. at 314-15.
558. See id.
559. I thus agree with John Yoo that Marshall presents the self-execution issue as "a
simple either/or question," seeYoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 2090,
although I disagree with his subsequent attempt to draw a presumption against selfexecution from Foster. See id. at 2090-91. I also disagree with Henkin, Paust, Sloss, and
Vizquez, who see a presumption in favor of self-execution. See HENKuN, supra note 408,
at 199-200; PAUST, supra note 3, at 70-71; Sloss, supra note 7, at 19-21; Vizquez, supra
note 6, at 700-03; Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, supra note 7, at 2193-94. Admittedly,
Marshall uses slightly different language to describe the two categories. He states that
"whenever" a treaty operates of itself, it is self-executing, and "when" it does not, it is
non-self-executing. I am not aware of any rule of construction that gives distinct and
doctrinally dispositive meanings to "when" and "whenever" in this context.
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ing an intention to do just that. Marshall, on the other hand,
established no presumption and instead looked to the language
of the treaty to decide whether or not it was self-executing.5 6 °
Notably, moreover, Marshall's tone is less insistent than Iredell's. His conception of treaty implementation, for example,
more clearly anticipates a role for Congress-a stance that is particularly salient given the facts of the case. He was also less emphatic in Foster than he had been in the Robbins affair, when he
had argued for self-execution in the context of executive power
rather than judicial power. 561 His language in Foster-including
the focus on the language of the treaty-is also less strident than
that of the federalist treatise writers. In fact, it is strikingly similar to the statements of moderate Federalists and republicans in
the 1816 debate (as well as to Jefferson's and Chase's views of
years before).562
Three years later, in United States v. Percheman, the Court reconsidered the language of the eighth article of the 1819 treaty
and determined that it was self-executing after all. Worth noting
is no one disputed that the land at issue had been within Spanish
territory prior to the treaty, and the federal statutes that had
been important in Foster were not relevant. Marshall consulted
the Spanish version of the treaty and observed that it appeared
to "stipulate expressly for that security to private property which
the laws and usages of nations would, without express stipulation, have conferred."5 63 He then asserted that "[i]f the English
and the Spanish parts can, without violence, be made to agree,
560. Not surprisingly in light of his statements in the Virginia legislature, Marshall
also did not repeat Iredell's claim that a treaty was always "obligatory, in point of moral
obligation... on the Legislative, Executive, andJudicial Departments." Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
561. See Wedgwood, supra note 420, at 365 (arguing Marshall was more willing to
defer to Congress than during the Robbins affair). Similarly, his opinion in Foster can
be read as backing away from-or at least clarifying-the implications of his opinion in
The Schooner Peggy.
562. 1 cannot prove that Marshall was aware of the 1816 debates or that the views
expressed in those debates simply permeated U.S. legal culture in the 1820s. But Marshall tended to keep abreast of political issues and at least sometimes followed Congressional debates on important issues. See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEFJUsTICES-IP OF

JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at 54 (1997) (arguing Marshall was aware of the ebbs and
flows of the political process and its impact on the potential power of the Court); RoBARGE, supra note 277, at 272, 300 (asserting Marshall had a "keen interest in party
matters" and noting he followed the debate on President Jackson's Indian removal policy).
563. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833).
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that construction which establishes this conformity ought to prevail. ' 564 Marshall concluded that the English text was more flexible, and he reinterpreted it to have the same meaning as the
56 5
Spanish text.
David Sloss argues Percheman "overruled" Foster, with the result that "courts should be cautious in applying [the idea of nonself-execution] to the presumption in favor of judicial remedies
for violations of individual treaty rights." 566 Carlos Vdzquez contends that Percheman "recognize[s] that the Supremacy Clause
establishes a strong presumption that treaties are enforceable in
court in the same circumstances as provisions of statutes and the
Constitution of like content. ' 567 Neither claim has much to do
with the Court's analysis. As in Foster, the Court focused on the
text of the treaty to determine whether or not legislation was
necessary to its implementation. The only difference-and it is
certainly an important one-is that the Court adopted rules of
construction (not presumptions) to guide its interpretation.
First, Marshall can be read as suggesting, perhaps even holding,
that treaty language should be interpreted consistently with in568
ternational law unless there is a reason to read it differently.
Second, he stated that treaties drawn up in more than one language should be interpreted to "conform[] . . . to each
564.
565.
566.
567.

Id.
See id. at 89.
Sloss, supra note 554, at 88.
Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 7, at 607.
568. See Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 88; see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 110, 125 (1814) (stating the effect under the Constitution of a declaration of
war should be consistent with prevailing notions of international law). Vdzquez suggests the Court created a presumption in favor of self-ekecution in part by asking
"whether the United States had 'insisted on the interposition of government."' Vizquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 7, at 645 (quoting Percheman, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) at 88). But this language appears as part of the Court's discussion of international
law and the inferences that can be drawn from it about the intentions of the parties to a
treaty. It has nothing to do with a general constitutional attitude toward self-execution.
Nor is it likely, in light of his insistence on a general rule of non-self-execution outside
the United States, that Marshall meant to imply international law ordinarily made treaties self-executing. Of course, one easily could argue, as Sloss does, that the relevant
interpretive rules include a "presumption in favor ofjudicial remedies for violations of
individual treaty rights," or that the general idea of interpreting treaties to be consistent
with international law should govern today over more specific and historically contingent rules. See Sloss, supra note 554, at 32. The first seems entirely consistent with Foster
and Percheman, while the second requires a more relaxed approach to the cases but
would also allow greater doctrinal flexibility.
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Percheman tweaks but does not substantially alter the structure that Fostercreated for determining whether a treaty was selfexecuting. And that structure follows the moderate tone
adopted by leading participants in the 1816 debates: some treaties are self-executing, and some are not, depending on the nature and language of the provision in question. There is no general presumption but, as I discuss in the Conclusion, this position can support a series of specific presumptions about certain
kinds of treaty provisions.
B. The Last-in-Time Rule
In Foster, Marshall declared that self-executing treaties are
"equivalent to an act of the legislature" and that such a treaty
"repeal [s] those acts of congress which [are] repugnant to it. ' ' 57 0
He did not discuss the impact of a federal statute on an existing
treaty, but his assertion that self-executing treaties and statutes
have "equivalent" status under the Constitution and his embrace
of the moderate congressional position on treaty implementation-a view which itself was a retreat from the Hamiltonian insistence that treaties are superior to statutes-are consistent with
5 71
the last-in-time rule.
Justice Curtis took the next step. His circuit opinion in Taylor v. Morton considered the impact of a federal statute on an
existing treaty. Looking to the Supremacy Clause, he concluded
that although it makes treaties "part of our municipal law ... it
has not assigned to them any particular degree of authority. "572
To resolve the issue, he first asserted judges could not ask
whether a statute that conflicts with a treaty "proceeds upon a
just interpretation of the treaty" because that was a matter for
the legislative branch.5 7 3 If Congress had power to pass the statute, which includes the power "to modify and repeal existing
laws," it must be applied unless there was something special
about treaties and the treaty power that compelled a different
569. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
570. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829) (1829).
571. See Kesavan, supra note 7, at 1611; Ku, supra note 15, at 334-36.
572. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799).
573. Id. Curtis also declared that whether a party to a treaty had violated or withdrawn from it was not a judicial question. See id. at 787.
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The power "[t]o refuse to execute a treaty ... is prerogative, of which no nation can be deprived," and "it must reside somewhere. 5 7 5 Yet the potential consequences of limiting
this power to the treaty-makers and thereby placing the treaty
power above legislative power, he declared, were so serious that
such a position was "impossible to maintain. ' 57 6 Thus, Curtis expressed "no doubt that it belongs to congress," which meant that
"legislative power is applicable to [treaties] whenever they relate
to subjects, which the constitution has placed under that legislative power. ' 5 77 Here the republican claim in the congressional
debates-that treaties were not automatically superior to federal
statutes-operated as a premise. Further, the republican position that congressional consent was necessary for any treaty that
overlapped with legislative powers-an argument that had been
battered by the 1816 debates-emerged in a new form as an explicit justification for the last-in-time rule.
The Supreme Court adopted the last-in-time rule in a series
of cases in the 1870s and 1880s. In The Cherokee Tobacco, a plurality stated flatly, "[t]he effect of treaties and acts of Congress,
when in conflict, is not settled by the Constitution. But the question is not involved in any doubt as to its proper solution."5 7 8

Citing Foster,Justice Swayne declared "[a] treaty may supersede a
prior act of Congress."5 79 Citing Taylor, he continued by affirming that "an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty. "580
Any larger questions involving the relationship of treaties and
statutes "must be met by the political department of the government. ' 581 Justice Bradley's dissent objected to the ease with
which the majority equated "a solemn treaty" with "mere municipal law," but he admitted a last-in-time rule. 582 Like Timothy
574. Id. at 785.
575. Id. at 786.
576. Id.
577. Id. In an alternate holding, Curtis stated the treaty was not self-executing in
any event under Foster. See id. at 787-88.
578. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870). Three justices
did not participate, and two justices dissented, so that the opinion for the Court did not
have the votes of a majority of all the justices even though it commanded a majority of
those who heard the case. See also The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597 (1884)
(discussing this issue).
579. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. at 621.
580. Id.
581. Id.

582. Id. at 623 (BradleyJ., dissenting).
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Pickering in the 1816 debate, however, he would have imposed a
clear statement rule, so that "laws of a general character" would
not override treaties "unless expressly mentioned."58' 3
Fourteen years later, in Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money
Cases), the Court again declared, "so far as the provisions in [a
statute] may be found in conflict with any treaty with a foreign
nation, they must prevail in all the judicial courts of this country."584 The Court relied on Foster, which it paraphrased at
length. According to the Court, "[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations" and depends on the political
branches for its enforcement. 85 "But a treaty may also contain
provisions which confer certain rights upon" individuals.5 86 The
Constitution "places such provisions as these in the same category as other laws of congress," such that they may be "a rule of
decision" for courts. 5 8 7 The Court went on to paraphrase Taylor,
stating the Constitution gives a treaty "no superiority over an act
of Congress" in the sense of making it "irrepealable or unchangeable. '58 8 Channeling Republican doctrine, the Court
even suggested the participation of the House, Senate, and President in making statutes weighs in favor of making them superior
to treaties.
Whitney v. Robertson followed the same structure as The Head
Money Cases. Some treaty provisions are "not self-executing" and
require "legislation to carry them into effect. ' 58 9 If some provisions of a treaty are self-executing, then they "require no legislation to make them operative [and] have the force and effect of a
legislative enactment. '590 In cases of conflict between a federal
statute and a treaty provision, "the one last in date will control
the other, provided always
the stipulation of the treaty on the
subject isself-executing."5 1 Whitney differs in one important respect, however. Stepping back from The Head Money Cases's sug583. Id. at 622.
584. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597 (1884).
585. Id. at 598.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 598-99; see also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1886)
(quoting and applying this portion of the Head Money Cases).
588. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599.
589. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
590. Id.
591. Id. The Court also stated that it was preferable "to construe them so as to give
effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either." Id.
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gestion that legislation was superior, the Court explained the
Constitution places treaties and federal statutes "on the same
footing," and "no superior efficacy is given to either over the
other. '5 9 2 Relying on Taylor, the Court recognized that this approach could create problems, but insisted they were political
issues, not judicial issues. All the courts could do was "construe
593
and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will.
In The Head Money Cases and Whitney, the last-in-time rule is
not a rule of construction. Instead, the Court treats it as the
necessary counterpart to the Foster doctrine that recognizes the
self-executing nature of some treaty provisions. 9 4 Further, as in
Foster, neither case articulates a presumption for or against selfexecution. The Court appears to assume that most treaty provisions are not self-executing in the sense of creating rules of decision for courts, but it does not impose any burdens of proof for
distinguishing among provisions. Last Term, however, in Medellin, the Court cited both cases as support for the suggestion of a
presumption against self-execution. 9 5 Whether or not a presumption is desirable, Medellin's use of these cases betrays the
current Court's failure to understand their context as reflections
of a debate over treaty implementation that took place largely in
the halls of Congress. At least to the end of the nineteenth century, the moderate position on self-execution and the last-in-time
rule that emerged in the 1816 debates remained coherent and
continued to prevail.
VI. CONCLUSION
A primary goal of this Article has been to portray the ambiguity, disagreement, and debate surrounding the implementation of treaties in the early years of government under the Constitution. Original understandings on many issues either did not
exist or were tenuous and even conflicting. Beyond recognition
592. Id.
593. Id. at 195. The Court reaffirmed the analysis of Whitney and The Head Money
Cases in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
600-03 (1889).
594. It also reflects, asJules Lobel argues, late nineteenth century "notions of absolute sovereignty, nationalism, congressional supremacy, and positivism." Lobel, supra
note 15, at 1110. Yet the rule's origin in the 1816 debates suggests a longer and more
complex pedigree.
595. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008). For another example of
Medellin's loose approach to sources, see supra note 221.

2009]

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TREATIES

1329

that the Supremacy Clause ensured the superiority of treaties
over state law and confirmed that some treaty provisions would
be enforceable in court, the Framers and ratifiers left the details
of treaty implementation to be worked out over time.
As this Article has shown, most of that working out took
place in Congress, where a series of debates-culminating in the
1816 dispute over treaty implementation-produced a compromise position. First, some treaties are self-executing, which
means they vest power directly in the President or are enforceable in court without legislation. Second, other treaties are not
self-executing because they require implementing legislation to
have domestic legal effect. Third, conflicts between treaties and
federal statutes will be resolved by the last-in-time rule, which
recognizes that treaties do not need legislative implementation
merely because they conflict with federal statutes, but also acknowledges congressional authority over matters regulated by
treaties and rejects the idea that treaties are superior to statutes.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Fosterand the last-in-time rule
cases adopted the compromise position almost in its entirety.
Still, the compromise view left many participants dissatisfied, and some of the more doctrinaire republican and federalist
contentions did not disappear. Further, these competing ideas
appeared, flourished, or foundered in a context broader than
legal or constitutional argument. 59 6 Since the early twentieth
century, that broader context has included the rise of the United
States to "great power" or "superpower" status, massive growth in
the federal government, increase in the kinds of tasks undertaken by government generally, expansion of executive power, a
shift toward using congressional-executive agreements instead of
treaties, and changes in the kinds of individual rights that treaties address.5 9 7 Against these developments, one easily could
conclude that the pedigree of the 1816 compromise is insufficient by itself as a basis for constitutional doctrines of treaty implementation-that is, unless one maintains that early U.S. constitutional history alone should determine constitutional doctrine.
596. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 15, at 1110.
597. See HENKIN, supra note 408, at 198 (noting increase in "human rights [as] a
focus of international concern .. in numerous international covenants and conventions" since World War II).
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On the issue of self-execution, for example, Anne Woolhandler has observed that to the extent treaty provisions were selfexecuting in the founding period and through most of the nineteenth century, they usually addressed issues of private rights.
Today, by contrast, numerous treaties and multilateral conventions create or recognize individual liberal rights against governments and state actors. She questions whether earlier assumptions about self-executing treaty provisions should automatically
59 8
apply to this changed context.
Woolhandler's question is apt for anyone who thinks that
history is relevant but not controlling on constitutional issues.
Under such a view-which I share-the search for a timeless and
immutable doctrinal rule is misguided. The better course is to
bring the historical conversation and current problems together
with the goal of arguing, interpreting, and making decisions that
are neither entirely bound by history nor entirely unconstrained
by it.599 For example, the historical narrative in this Article
makes clear not only that treaties creating or affecting private
rights were believed self-executing, but also that the House was
jealous of its powers and concerned about Presidential power,
that self-execution doctrine and the last-in-time rule have accommodated that jealousy to some extent, and that the President
and Senate are aware of and sometimes respect the powers of
the House. The question then is whether or how these various
factors apply to contemporary circumstances. I think these concerns remain valid and that within the U.S. constitutional tradition-as many writers have argued in many contexts-individual
enforcement of legal rights is an important counterweight to certain forms of governmental power,6 °° while congressional authority is a significant check on free-ranging executive power. In
598. See generally Woolhandler, supra note 7.
599. This approach is loosely related to the idea of "fidelity in translation." See
generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). Notably,
this approach allows substantial space for normative and policy claims such as the ones
Carlos Vdzquez advances in Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 7, to support a presumption in favor of self-execution. What it denies is the argument from historical
certainty and authority that often supports such claims.
600. I mean this as a doctrinal statement, not an affirmation of a specific political
philosophy. For efforts to recognize the value of rights while also understanding them
as existing within governmental and other power structures, see PHENG CHsAH, INHJMAN CONDITIONS:
ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND HuMAN RIGHTS 145-77 (2006); John T.
Parry, Rights and Discretion in CriminalProcedure's "War on Terror", 6 OH. ST. J. CRAM. L.
323 (2008).
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short, the concerns that drove the early debates do not merely
continue to be important; they may be heightened in current
circumstances.
In keeping with this argument, I suggest the following brief
conclusions. First, for treaties that create individual rightswhether private legal rights or liberal rights against government
actors-the general post-ratification understanding and the
1816 compromise still hold. In general, the provisions of such
treaties should be self-executing as rules of decision. Indeed,
they should be presumed to be so unless the treaty-makers (including the Senate) or Congress determine otherwise, in which
case legislation is necessary.60 1
When treaties grant power to the executive branch, however, the compromise-to the extent the version ratified by the
Court even includes executive self-execution-should give way
to a more cautious approach. The President does not simply exercise an Article 1i caretaker power when implementing a
treaty. 60 2 Rather, as the dominant force in U.S. foreign policy,

the President wields vast power domestically and internationally
and has enormous influence on congressional action in the area.
While the President was also the central figure in early U.S. foreign policy, the relative positions of the executive and legislative
branches have changed markedly. Presidential implementation
of a treaty takes place within a much broader array of presidential power and policy-making authority. For these reasons,
courts should not presume that a treaty provision vests the President with power to act free of congressional cooperation in the
ways Marshall suggested in the Robbins debate. To the contrary,
separation of powers concerns counsel a careful and narrow approach to such provisions.
Treaty provisions that neither create individual rights nor
vest power in the executive branch are less likely to be self-executing if the 1816 compromise remains relevant. Put somewhat
differently, under the compromise, there is no general presumption for or against self-execution, but presumptions will arise
601. For the legitimacy and validity of non-self-execution declarations, see Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004); Vdzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra
note 7, at 667-94; see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human
Rights, and ConditionalConsent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (2000).
602. For discussion of presidential power and treaties, see generally Swaine, supra
note 462.
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with respect to different kinds of treaties.6 °3 This last category of
treaty provisions includes those for which implementing legislation is necessary, as well as provisions that for one reason or another are less amenable to direct enforcement by the President
or judiciary.
In addition, the compromise also supports the ongoing legitimacy and desirability of the last-in-time rule as a democratic
check on the treaty power and executive foreign affairs power.6 °4
Finally, it bolsters not only the historical legitimacy of congressional-executive agreements but also their political legitimacy in
60 5
the face of challenges to their constitutionality.
How then does Medellin fit into this scheme? In general, the
majority opinion works within the historical parameters of the
debate over treaty implementation, and the ultimate result is defensible under the terms of the 1816 compromise.60 6 Even the
Court's conclusion that the President lacks power in some circumstances to implement a non-self-executing treaty6 0 7-an
analysis that is remarkably free of nuance 6 08-has
the virtue of
reviving concerns about presidential authority in foreign affairs
that had less weight in earlier cases.60 9
That said, the Court's analysis strains at the edges of the
compromise and at times comes close to republican positions
that the compromise seemed to discard. For example, the doctrinal version of the compromise, as stated in Foster, supports the
Medellin majority's general focus on treaty language. But to the
extent the Court put a thumb in the scale on the side of non-selfexecution, it departed from'that analysis.6 10 Instead, it came
closer to contemporary lower court decisions that have effec603. See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term-Leading Cases, 122 HARv. L. REv. 435, 44245 (2008) (arguing for specific "default presumptions" for or against self-execution
rather than a general presumption either way).
604. See Ku, supra note 15, at 386-89.
605. For justification of congressional-executive agreements, see Hathaway, supra
note 47, at 1307-38. For the constitutional debate, compare Ackerman & Golove, supra
note 535, with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HAv. L. Rxv. 1221 (1995).
606. The careful analysis injustice Stevens' concurring opinion bears out this view.
See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
607. See id. at 1368-69 (majority opinion).
608. For useful discussions, see Stephan, supra note 6; Ingrid B. Wuerth, Medellin:
The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1 (2009).
609. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
610. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102
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tively enforced a presumption against self-execution 6 '-which
in turn reflects positions roughly similar to those taken by Gallatin at his more partisan moments in the Jay Treaty debates.
Neither a thumb in the scale nor a presumption against selfexecution is warranted, and Medellin does not provide any explicit argument to the contrary. Foster already reflects a balance
of interests that include skepticism about but acceptance of treaties as law-making documents, federalism values, and separation
of powers concerns about the relationship between the executive
and legislative branches. Further, to the extent the expansion of
treaty practice, particularly in the area of human rights, threatens to upset that balance, the existence and legitimacy of nonself-execution declarations underscores the ability of the treatymakers to be aware of and address the array of issues surrounding domestic implementation of treaty obligations.
But just as the majority opinion appears to reach back to
positions outside the compromise as articulated in Foster,Justice
Breyer's dissent also departs from that framework-and indeed
from any of the arguments that drove the early debates.6 1 2 His
multifactor approach to the question of self-execution arguably
seeks only to provide context for the interpretive decision, but
he imports so much context that the text of the treaty risks disappearing in a rush of policy judgments.
To some extent, of course, "policy" is inevitably part of a
contemporary judge's interpretive methodology. In addition to
the changes in the broader context of treaty implementation
that I already mentioned, any historical approach to self-execution must also recognize the changes that have taken place in
conceptions, and self-conceptions of the federal judicial role.
Marshall sought to portray the self-execution inquiry as a simple
textual analysis. He almost certainly had policy reasons for
adopting that approach-after all, I have suggested that he was
consciously ratifying the compromise view hammered out in
Congress-but his doctrinal approach made little room on its
face for policy judgments in specific cases. Today, however,
there is wide, if often grudging, acceptance of the idea that no
AM.J. INT'L L. 540, 546-47 (2008) (arguing the Court did not create a general presumption against self-execution).
611. See id. at 551; see also Vzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land, supra note 7, at 629.
612. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1380-83 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (suggesting a case-bycase multifactor analysis of self-execution).
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judge can approach the text of a statute or treaty without a variety of commitments that will affect and in some cases determine
the resulting interpretation. Certainly, the multi-factor analysis
that Breyer proposed not only reflects but embraces that idea of
the judicial process.
The difference, then (and perhaps as always), is one of degree. For Foster and the political debates that stand behind it,
recognition of a distinction between self-execution and non-selfexecution, and of the last-in-time rule, is the result of a policy
debate. Of course the further step of classifying treaties into one
category or another also includes policy choices. But the focus
in Foster is on the plausible readings of the text. Breyer's approach, by contrast, forwards the policy decisions so much that
text becomes just one of many factors.
I am not arguing Breyer's approach is illegitimate. Such a
claim would not only be naive but would also conflict with my
argument that self-execution doctrine has ambiguous foundations and took time to emerge from the crucible of early political
debates. As the progeny of such debates, the doctrine reflects a
balance of policies that demand rebalancing over time. I prefer
continued adherence to the 1816 compromise, essentially for
policy reasons and jurisprudential inclination, and I distrust the
easy acceptance of broad case-by-case policy-making power that
seems to characterize Breyer's jurisprudence. But his approach
has the virtue of transparency; he makes clear that he is balancing multiple factors with strong attention to policy. Although I
preferJustice Stevens' concurrence, I ultimately find Breyer's approach preferable to that of the majority, which puts forward a
chain of reasoning that depends more on assertion about the
relevant text than actual analysis of it and more on claims of
historical continuity than actual engagement with the relevant
history.
In the end, this Article has attempted to provide a better
picture of debates about treaty implementation in early U.S. constitutional history. I have tried not only to reveal the ambiguities
of the founding arrangement but also to provide the context for
understanding the development of and justifications for contemporary doctrines of self-execution and the last-in-time rule.
More pointedly, this history also provides a perspective for assessing and possibly assimilating new approaches to the issues surrounding implementation of treaties. To the extent one seeks a
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general original understanding on these issues, one might dare
conclude that the generation that experienced ratification and
the early debates over treaty implementation would appreciate
such efforts and would even give them its blessing.

